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Abstract 
 
Stoic philosophy taught along with the other prominent philosophical schools of the Hellenistic 
Era (i.e. the Academics, the Peripatetics and the Epicureans) that the goal or final end (telos) of 
human existence is our well-being or happiness (eudaimonia). The Stoics provided various 
definitions of this telos, the most famous being “living in agreement with nature” (ηὸ 
ὁκνινγνπκέλσο ηῇ θύζεη δῆλ) or “living according to nature” (secundum naturam vivere) and 
this goal essentially comes down to living according to perfect reason and virtue. The purpose of 
this study is to investigate how Seneca presents the Stoic doctrines regarding this topic in his 
Epistulae Morales (“Letters on Morality”) and to determine whether he managed to make the 
theoretical framework, proposed by the Stoics for the attainment of a happy life, more easily 
applicable in practice without compromising orthodox Stoic teachings. The orthodoxy of 
Seneca‟s philosophy may be judged by comparison with the doctrines of the early Stoic teachers, 
which is why this study will first look at the traditional Stoic teachings concerning the definition 
of the telos as well as the theory behind the attainment thereof. Thereafter it will be investigated 
how true Seneca stayed to these traditional teachings and whether he managed to make the Stoic 
telos more realistically attainable by the practical advice he offers in his letters. 
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Opsomming 
Stoïsynse filosofie voer aan soos die ander prominente filosofiese skole van die Hellenistiese era 
(d.w.s. die Akademie, die Peripatetiese skool, en die Epikureërs) dat die einddoel (telos) van die 
mensdom welsyn of geluk (eudaimonia) is. Die Stoïsyne het verskillende definisies van die telos 
verskaf; die mees bekende is “om in ooreenkoms met die natuur te leef” (ηὸ ὁκνινγνπκέλσο ηῇ 
θύζεη δῆλ) of “om volgens die natuur te leef” (secundum naturam vivere) en hierdie einddoel 
kom in wese daarop neer om volgens volmaakte rede of deug te leef. Die doel van hierdie studie 
is om te ondersoek hoe Seneca die Stoïsynse leerstellings oor hierdie onderwerp in sy Epistulae 
Morales (“Briewe oor Moraliteit”) behandel en om te bepaal of hy dit makliker gemaak het om 
die teoretiese raamwerk, wat deur die Stoïsyne vir die bereiking van „n gelukkige lewe 
voorgestel is, in die praktyk toe te pas sonder om die ortodokse Stoïsynse leerstellings te 
kompromitteer. Die ortodoksie van Seneca se filosofie kan beoordeel word deur dit met die 
leerstellings van die vroeë Stoïsyne te vergelyk. Hierdie studie begin dus met „n ondersoek na die 
tradisionele Stoïsynse leerstellings aangaande die definisie van die telos, sowel as die teorie oor 
die bereiking daarvan. Daarna word ondersoek hoe getrou Seneca was aan die tradisionele 
leerstellings en of hy deur die praktiese raad in sy briewe dit makliker gemaak het om die 
Stoïsynse telos te bereik. 
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Introduction 
 
While through the advances of modern science many ancient philosophical theories in the fields 
of physics, mathematics and astronomy, for example, have been replaced by modern ones, the 
issues treated in ancient ethics concerned with the right conduct of living are timeless and 
without a doubt still of value to us today (Jordan 1990:152; Chalmers 2005:6; Curnow 2005:7). 
The ethical theories of all four prominent philosophical schools of the Hellenistic Era (323 – 
31/30 BC), namely the Stoics, the Academics, the Peripatetics and the Epicureans, are 
eudaimonist in their structure (Cooper 1996:261; Striker 1996:170; Brennan 2005:35). In this 
view the goal or final end (telos) – also called the “highest good” (summum bonum) – of a 
person‟s life is happiness (eudaimonia), and this was the starting point for each school in giving 
their accounts of the right conduct of living (Brennan 2005:117; cf. Hadot 1969:99). Eudaimonia 
is, as its etymology indicates, a “blessed” or “god-favoured” condition. The word eudaimon is 
not used in Greek the way “happy” is used in English, “to describe transient moods or 
satisfactions” (Long 1996:181). Eudaimonia is not a subjective feeling, but something objective, 
that others can recognise in a person (Sandbach 1989:41). It is a state of well-being and inner 
harmony and it was the purpose of Hellenistic ethics to determine the conditions under which 
such a state could be attained (Barnes 2001:365). 
 
Stoic ethics was above all “meant to be lived” (Schofield 2003:253). However, it has often been 
criticized for its “impractical rigidity and pointless idealism” (Inwood 2005:95), since it requires 
people to live according to perfect reason and yet seems to offer little realistic hope that this goal 
can actually be achieved. Arguably in response to this criticism from rival schools, the 
representatives of the Middle Stoa, Panaetius and Posidonius, started to develop a more 
practically oriented ethical theory. However, they have often been accused of not staying true to 
original Stoic doctrines and of developing a second kind of morality, designed to make the 
idealistic Stoic telos (i.e. the happy life) more easily attainable by the ordinary man (Hadot 
1969:71; Inwood 2005:100-1). The focus on the practical application of Stoic ethical doctrines is 
also evident in the writings of the Late Stoa, which include the works of Seneca, Epictetus and 
Marcus Aurelius (Costa 1988:2; Colish 1990:12; Gill 2003:40). A large part of the surviving 
material from this period is in fact written in therapeutic mode and does not focus on the mere 
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preaching of doctrine. Marcus Aurelius‟ journals, for example, were written as a means of self-
consolation; Seneca wrote to advise and console his friends and relatives, and Epictetus his 
pupils (Schofield 2003:253).  
 
It has been suggested that the Middle Stoa‟s abatement of early ethical theory has also influenced 
the writers of the Late Stoa, such as Seneca, but as scholars like Smuts, Hadot and Inwood have 
shown, Seneca stayed true to all the fundamental teachings of the Stoic school (cf. Smuts 
1948:22; Hadot 1969:83; Inwood 2005:3, 24). It should be clear that Seneca was not a 
philosopher who created or expounded specific philosophic theories; rather, he wrote within an 
already existing system with which he was, for the most part, in agreement. However, since he 
also collected some of his philosophical ideas from sources outside the Stoic system, scholars 
such as Motto have labelled him as eclectic “binding himself to the dogmas of no particular 
school” (Motto 1985:9). Although it is true that Seneca adopted some ideas from other 
philosophies, if these seemed useful to him, and is open to proposing some changes in traditional 
Stoicism, those changes never threaten the core of Stoic doctrines (Inwood 2005:24).  
 
Given this background, it should be informative to see to what extent Seneca did in fact stay true 
to the fundamental ethical teachings of the early Stoa, and whether he nevertheless managed to 
make some contributions with regards to the practical application of an ethical theory that has 
been thought of as unnecessarily rigid and too idealistic to be put into practice. Since the core of 
all ancient philosophical schools‟ ethical theories was their account of the telos (or summum 
bonum), this will also be the focal point of this study of Stoic ethics in Seneca‟s Epistulae 
Morales (“Letters on Morality”). In order to be able to judge Seneca‟s orthodoxy, one first needs 
to familiarize oneself with the traditional Stoic teachings on this issue. After discussing the 
Stoics‟ various definitions of the telos as well as the theoretical guidelines they proposed for the 
attainment of this telos, this study will take a look at how true Seneca stayed to these traditional 
teachings and finally investigate whether he managed to make the Stoic telos more realistically 
attainable by the practical advice he offers in his letters. 
 
I have chosen the Epistulae Morales since they best illustrate the practicability of Seneca‟s 
philosophy (cf. Sorensen 1984:190). Moreover, on account of their conversational style and the 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Introduction   3 
 
 
exceptionally modern ideas contained in them, these letters will be appealing and extremely 
valuable even to people living today (cf. Mans 1978:237-8; Motto 1985:3). The following study 
will start with a brief overview of the history of Stoicism to introduce the reader to the 
development and the main representatives of the Stoic school from the time of its foundation in 
c. 300 BC to the Roman Imperial Period (cf. Chapter 1). 
 
Chapter 2 will take a look at what exactly the Stoics believed the telos (i.e. happiness) consisted 
of. The Stoics are best known to have defined happiness as “to live in agreement with nature” (ηὸ 
ὁκνινγνπκέλσο ηῇ θύζεη δῆλ), however, the different Stoic teachers all provided different 
formulations of the telos, and even amongst modern critics there is a disagreement regarding the 
original formulation of the telos and the correct interpretation thereof. The aim of this chapter is 
to explain how the various telos-definitions attributed to the Stoics are to be understood by 
taking a look at the Stoics‟ idea of nature, that is both universal nature and our own human 
nature. Since few original texts are available to us of the older Stoic teachers, I draw on the 
information provided by Joannes Stobaeus, Diogenes Laertius and Cicero, as well as publications 
of modern scholars such as Brennan, Cooper, Gill, Inwood and Long, to name a few. 
 
Chapter 3 will discuss the ethical theory provided by the Stoics for the attainment of the telos. 
Stoic ethical theory is divided into three parts: the first one is concerned with the moral value of 
things, the second with impulses and emotions, and the third with actions (Hadot 1969:117). To 
sum up briefly the key ideas of each part, first, the theory of moral value states that only virtue is 
good, only vice is bad, everything else is considered indifferent. In the second part the Stoics 
argue that emotions (pathē) are impulses caused by a wrong value judgement, i.e. the judgement 
that a certain indifferent is either good or bad, and since emotions are, thus, entirely 
contradictory to reason the Stoics proposed that everyone should strive for apatheia (“freedom 
from emotions”) 1  (cf. Rist 1969: 26-7, 97; Sandbach 1989:3, 63; Sorabji 2000:7; Brennan 
2003:263; Gill 2003:40). 
                                                             
1 The concept of apatheia („freedom from emotions‟) does, however, not imply total impassivity and absence of all 
motivation. Rather, it entails the replacement of emotions (pathē) with other species of impulses, such as the so-
called “good feelings” (eupatheiai), or “selection and rejection” (eklogē, apeklogē).  
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The third part of Stoic ethical theory deals with appropriate actions (kathēkonta) and morally 
correct actions (katorthōmata) (cf. Gill 2003:41). 
 
Chapter 4 of this study will be a literary analysis of selected passages of Seneca‟s Epistulae 
Morales, illustrating how he presents the Stoic telos and some of the key elements of Stoic ethics 
discussed in the preceding chapters, as well as the practical advice he offers for anyone wishing 
to make progress towards attaining a happy life. Though the Stoics evidently presented in their 
ethical theory clear guidelines on how happiness could be attained, it seems that the standard 
they set was too idealistic to be reached in practice. In this final chapter I wish to show that 
Seneca made this unrealistic goal more accessible without compromising the fundamental 
doctrines of Stoic ethical theory. The objective of this thesis is ultimately to contribute towards 
the discussion of Stoic ethics in Seneca‟s Epistulae Morales. 
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Chapter 1: Historical Background 
 
Stoicism is divided into three historical periods: the Old Stoa (from the foundation of the school 
by Zeno in c. 300 BC to the early second century BC), the Middle Stoa (second century BC) and 
the Late Stoa (the Roman Imperial Period) (cf. Colish 1990:7; Sedley 2003a:7). The basic 
teachings of the school were retained throughout all three periods, however, with slight changes 
in emphasis. The aim of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of the history and 
development of the Stoic school. 
 
Stoicism was founded by Zeno of Citium (modern Larnaca), Cyprus, in about 300 BC. From his 
early twenties he had been fascinated by the philosophical traditions at Athens which had been 
the centre of cultural and philosophical activity in the ancient world particularly from the fourth 
and third centuries BC (Sedley 2003a:8-9). When Zeno first came to Athens in 312/11 BC, he 
began to study under various philosophers whose different theories all influenced him in 
founding his own philosophical school a number of years later. His teachers included the Cynic 
Crates, the Megarians Stilpo and Diodorus Cronus, and the Academics Xenocrates and Polemo 
(Hunt 1976:2; Marietta 1998:147; Gill 2006:84).  
 
Though one runs the risk of making Stoicism appear like a mere creative synthesis of other 
people‟s thoughts when comparing it to the doctrines of other philosophical schools, a study of 
the development of Stoicism would be incomplete without discussing the influences the various 
teachers had on Zeno in creating his own philosophy. Zeno first studied under Crates, the head of 
the Cynic school at the time. Cynicism was founded by Diogenes, a follower of Antisthenes who 
had been a student of Socrates (Hunt 1976:3). The school has as its basis an extreme version of 
Socratic ethics (Gill 2006:84). The Cynics followed Socrates in despising physical pleasure and 
material goods and believing that virtue alone is sufficient for happiness, which is an idea that 
influenced the development of Zeno‟s theory on value, i.e. that only virtue is good, only vice is 
bad, and everything else is indifferent (Brennan 2005:23; Gill 2006:82-3). Moreover, Socrates 
defined four cardinal virtues: wisdom, justice, courage and temperance, which were all 
interlinked and whoever possesses one has all of them (Brennan 2005:24). Zeno also took from 
Socrates the idea that the best character-state is one of freedom from emotion (Gill 2006:83).  
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Zeno studied next with Stilpo and Diodorus Cronus of the Megarian school, also known as the 
eristic or dialectic school (Hunt 1976:9). The Megarians regarded Euclides as the source of their 
teachings, though no formal school was founded until after his death. He was a contemporary of 
Antisthenes and like him a pupil of Socrates (Hunt 1976:8). The Megarian ethical theory 
therefore roughly agreed with that of the Cynics (Protopapas-Marneli 2005:171). Stilpo‟s most 
celebrated doctrine was the “self-sufficiency of the wise” and the idea that nothing that happens 
to a man‟s body or possessions is either good or bad (Sedley 2003a:10; Gill 2006:84). One can 
see how this must have strengthened Zeno‟s theory on value, mentioned above, i.e. that the only 
real good is virtue, the only real bad is vice, and that conventional physical or material goods, for 
example health and wealth, are in fact indifferents (Gill 2006:84). Stilpo and Diodorus also 
influenced Zeno in the development of Stoic logic (Hunt 1976:10; Marietta 1998:147; 
Protopapas-Marneli 2005:171). 
 
Finally, Zeno came into contact with the Academic school under the leadership of Xenocrates 
and later Polemo. Following the teachings of Plato, who too had been a pupil of Socrates, the 
Academics also maintained that a person‟s happiness lay in virtuous living. However, in contrast 
to the Cynics and the Megarians, they believed virtue alone is not sufficient and that there are 
also bodily and external goods to be pursued (Arnold 1911:63; Sedley 2003a:10; Gill 2006:84). 
Zeno did not fully adopt this view, but found a way to incorporate it into his own ethical theory: 
he upheld the teaching that bodily and external advantages like health and wealth are in fact 
indifferent to a person‟s happiness, but classified them as “preferred” objects naturally to be 
pursued. In Zeno‟s view we should thus pursue such advantages, but without caring about them 
as if their possession would improve our lives or add to our happiness (Sedley 2003a:10). One 
doctrine that Zeno incorporated more directly into his philosophy was Polemo‟s view that ethical 
development consisted of “living in agreement with nature” which came to be the standard 
formulation of the Stoic telos (Protopapas-Marneli 2005:172; Gill 2006:84). This will be 
discussed in the following chapters.  
 
From Xenocrates, Zeno is said to have taken the tripartite division of philosophy into physics, 
logic and ethics. In this division each part is equally important (Protopapas-Marneli 2005:172). 
In dealing with the Cynics and the Megarians, Zeno had been mainly concerned with ethics and 
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logic, but hardly at all with the physical aspect of philosophy. Here the Academics also had 
something to offer. Elaborating on the doctrine of Anaxagoras, the Academics taught that the 
universe began with the working of mind upon unordered matter. Zeno, too, advocated that the 
universe consisted of two principles, the active, which he identified with reason, and the passive, 
which is inert matter (Arnold 1911:69; Sandbach 1989:72). It has also been suggested that the 
main Stoic physical doctrine was in fact taken from Aristotle, the founder of the Peripatetic 
school (Hunt 1976:2). Aristotle‟s chief interest lay in explaining nature. He presented the 
universe as a well-structured system with all its parts working together in harmony. In this regard 
it is reasonable to assume that the Peripatetics must have had some influence on Zeno‟s own 
interest in physical inquiry (Hunt 1976:15). 
 
Around the turn of the century Zeno formed his own philosophical group; his followers were at 
first known as Zenonians but eventually they were called Stoics after the Stoa Poikilē (“painted 
porch”, situated near the Agora in Athens) in which Zeno used to teach (Marietta 1998:148; 
Sedley 2003a:10-11; Sellars 2006:1, 5). There was no formal foundation of a school, and unlike 
the other three leading Hellenistic schools, the Academics, the Peripatetics, and the Epicureans, 
the Stoics had no common property or legal status (Sandbach 1989:22) but this did not prevent 
them from becoming the leading philosophical school of the Hellenistic Age (Sedley 2003a:11). 
 
Zeno‟s pupils included Persaeus of Citium, Philonides of Thebes, Aratus of Soli, Sphaerus from 
the Bosphorus, Dionysius of Heraclea, Aristo of Chios and Cleanthes of Assos (Arnold 1911:79-
84; Sellars 2006:6). Of these the last two proved to be the most significant. Aristo disregarded 
completely Zeno‟s doctrines on physics and logic, and only focused on ethics. However, 
regarding Zeno‟s ethical theory, Aristo did not support the idea that certain external or physical 
advantages, for example wealth or good health, although classified as morally indifferent, might 
be rated preferable to their opposites, for example poverty or ill health. In his own day Aristo‟s 
impact at Athens seemed to have been quite significant. Among his pupils were Apollophanes, a 
leading Stoic, and the celebrated scientist Eratosthenes. Later tradition, however, rather chose to 
stay true to Zeno and the concepts of “preferred” and “dispreferred” indifferents became 
standard items in Stoic ethics (Arnold 1911:82; Sedley 2003a:14; Sellars 2006:6). 
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Cleanthes (331-232 BC) remained closer to Zeno‟s teachings but he gave Stoicism a distinct 
religious orientation (Arnold 1911:85; Colish 1990:10; Marietta 1998:148). He is best known for 
his Hymn to Zeus, the earliest extended Stoic text to survive (Marietta 1998:148; Sellars 2006:7; 
cf. Thom 2005). After Zeno‟s death in 262 BC Cleanthes took over the leadership of the school 
(Marietta 1998:148; Barnes 2001:361; Sedley 2003a:8, 15). Towards the end of his life, many of 
Cleanthes‟ followers seem to have been drawn aside by the Academic Arcesilaus or the more 
independent teachings of Aristo. The continued existence of Stoicism seemed threatened but in 
this crisis it was saved by Cleanthes‟ successor Chrysippus of Soli (Arnold 1911:90-1). 
 
Chrysippus of Soli (282 – 206 BC) succeeded Cleanthes as the head of the Stoic school in 232 
BC (Arnold 1911:91; Marietta 1998:148; Sellars 2006:7). He is arguable the most important of 
the early Stoics since it is due to his efforts that the school continued to exist in the face of the 
attacks by sceptical Academic philosophers (such as Arcesilaus) and the increasing popularity of 
the rival school of Epicurus who preached that happiness is found in pleasure, not virtue. 
Chrysippus reaffirmed, but also modified, the ideas of his predecessors and devoted all his 
energy to systematizing Stoic doctrine which would become the basis for Stoic orthodoxy 
(Arnold 1911:91-93; Sedley 2003a:15; Sellars 2006:7-8).  
 
In the years following Chrysippus‟ death, the two prominent Stoic figures were Diogenes of 
Seleucia, also known as Diogenes of Babylon, (c. 238 – 150 BC) and Antipater of Tarsus (c. 200 
– 129 BC) (Arnold 1911:96; Sedley 2003a:8; Sellars 2006:8). Diogenes is especially noted for 
his contribution in the study of language and logic (Marietta 1998:149). In 155 BC he went on an 
embassy to Rome along with the heads of the two other chief philosophical schools in Athens, 
Critolaus representing the Peripatetics and Carneades the Academic school (Arnold 1911:100; 
Sellars 2006:8). This was an important event in the introduction of Stoicism (and other Greek 
philosophies) to the Roman world and thus paved the way for the more permanent influence of a 
later Stoic, Panaetius of Rhodes (c. 185 – 110 BC) (Arnold 1911:100; Sellars 2006:8).  
 
Antipater, who succeeded Diogenes as head of the Stoic school, also played an important role in 
the history of Stoicism, but both seem to have been unequally matched against the Academic 
Carneades. In an effort to defend Stoic doctrine against Carneades‟ attacks, Antipater tried to 
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emphasize the common ground between Stoicism and Platonism, and began to compromise 
earlier Stoic teachings. The increasing eclecticism, with Stoics drawing on material from 
Platonism and other philosophical schools, is in fact the main characteristic that distinguishes the 
Middle Stoa, as this period began to be called, from the Old Stoa (Marietta 1998:149; Sedley 
2003a:20; Sellars 2006:8-9). This deviation from orthodox Stoicism can also be observed in the 
teachings of Panaetius of Rhodes (c. 185 – 110 BC) and Posidonius of Apamea (c. 135 – 51 BC) 
who introduced significant changes to several Stoic doctrines (Colish 1990:10; Barnes 
2001:362), also drawing upon non-Stoic sources (especially views of Plato and Aristotle) in 
expanding their theories (Sandbach 1989:15; Colish 1990:10; Sellars 2006:10-11). 
 
Panaetius, who studied under the Stoics Diogenes and Antipater, became head of the Stoa in 
128 BC (Sellars 2006:9). He is best known for “humanizing” Stoic ethics and focusing his 
attention on the average person rather than the ideal of the Stoic sage. He rejected the idea that 
virtue is sufficient for happiness and suggested that material goods are also required (Marietta 
1998:149; Sellars 2006:9). In 146 BC Panaetius went to Rome where he came into contact with 
important thinkers and statesmen at the court of Scipio Africanus the younger. He stayed there 
for fifteen years and it is due to his efforts that Stoicism became a permanent influence in Rome 
among prominent figures of the late republican era (Arnold 1911:20, 101; Colish 1990:10-11). 
 
Posidonius studied under Panaetius in Athens around 125 – 114 BC and eventually established 
himself in Rhodes (Colish 1990:12; Sellars 2006:10). In contrast to the more scientific Panaetius, 
Posidonius focuses more on the religious aspects of Stoicism (Arnold 1911:104; Marietta 
1998:150). His most significant deviation from Stoic orthodoxy was in the field of psychology 
(Sellars 2006:10). He is most famous for disagreeing with Chrysippus‟ analysis of emotions 
(pathē) and adopting a version of the tripartite psychology which Plato discusses in his Timaeus 
(Sedley 2003a:21), dividing the soul into the faculties of reason, emotion and desire (Sellars 
2006:10). Posidonius also showed interest in the world in which an individual existed by his 
study of mathematics, geography, history, astronomy, meteorology, biology and anthropology 
(Colish 1990:12; Sellars 2006:10). 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter 1: Historical Background   10 
 
 
The years 88 – 86 BC mark a turning point in philosophical history: The Peripatetic philosopher, 
Athenion, and then an Epicurean, Aristion, briefly gained absolute power at Athens, and both 
decided to back Mithridates in his War against the Romans (Sedley 2003a:24). Athens was 
sacked by Sulla‟s army and subsequently lost its standing as the centre of the philosophical 
world (Sedley 2003a:24-5). Most philosophers left the city and it seems that philosophical 
schools lost their institutional importance, since there is little information on any successions of 
their school-heads after 86 BC (Sedley 2003a:25). The following years saw a decentralisation of 
philosophy in all the leading schools. Athens was no longer the metropolitan headquarters of 
philosophical activity; now small local philosophical groups, of which there had already been 
quite a few, flourished throughout the Greco-Roman world (Sedley 2003a:28). In the case of the 
Stoics the demise of the school in Athens might in fact already have occurred before this era of 
decentralization. It is uncertain whether the Stoa survived as a formal institution after the death 
of Panaetius in 110 BC. As already mentioned Posidonius did not succeed him as the head of the 
Athenian school but taught in Rhodes. 
 
However, Stoicism continued to be an active philosophical force for at least the first two 
centuries AD and became strongly implanted in Greco-Roman culture and, to a certain extent, in 
political life (Gill 2003:33). As mentioned above, in Rome Stoicism had already achieved 
widespread influence from the first century BC onward. One of the most celebrated of all Roman 
Stoics at the time – and in the whole Roman history – was Marcus Cato but besides him few 
Romans of the late republic became Stoics; more people seem to have been drawn to the 
Antiocheans, New Academics, or even Epicureans (Sedley 2003a:30-1). However, around the 
time of transition from the Republican to the Imperial age Stoicism became increasingly 
influential in Rome. To upper-class Romans it presented ethical guidance for political 
involvement; to others who often had to suffer under certain emperors, Stoicism could also offer 
a theoretical basis for moral disapproval of the emperor and for principled disengagement or 
suicide (Gill 2003:34). Two Greek Stoics who were particularly influential at the start of the 
Imperial Era were Athenodorus and Arius Didymus who gained the trust of Augustus and were 
eventually employed as moral counsellors to the emperor (Sedley 2003a:31). Stoic philosophers 
were soon found not only at the imperial court but also in public lecture-rooms, and in the time 
of Tiberius‟ reign (14 – 37 AD) these lectures became increasingly popular (Arnold 1911:111). 
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One of the better known lecturers was Attallus, whose listeners included, amongst others, Lucius 
Annaeus Seneca (c. 4 BC – 65AD) (Arnold 1911:113). 
 
Seneca is considered one of the most prominent figures of the so-called Late Stoa. This third and 
final stage of Stoicism is marked by an important shift from the Old and Middle Stoa in two 
ways: Firstly, none of the Roman Stoics was an official school-head. Secondly, they show a 
nearly exclusive interest in ethics (Colish 1990:12). However, they were not so much interested 
in the theoretical element of the study of ethics, but rather in the practical application of ethical 
principles to specific situations. Writers of the Late Stoa show a great deal of insight in applying 
Stoic ethics to meet their own personal needs and those of their immediate audience (Colish 
1990:13). Seneca‟s written work, including the Epistulae Morales, addressed to his young friend 
Lucilius, and a series of philosophical Dialogues, is the largest collection of surviving texts for 
any Stoic and was thus a key source in shaping the image of Stoicism in later generations 
(Sellars 2006:12-13). It should be noted that Seneca was not primarily a philosopher, but a 
politician, best remembered for his role as tutor and personal advisor of Emperor Nero. His 
political career and personal life suffered a number of upsets owing to the caprices of members 
of the imperial court (particularly, the emperors Caligula, Claudius and Nero) and his philosophy 
is thus marked by a desire to find a remedy for the wounds which life had inflicted upon him and 
also his friends and relatives to whom he addressed his writings (Campbell 1969:8; Mans 
1978:233; Motto 1985:9; Sandbach 1989:131, 150-1; Colish 1990:14; Lawless 1994:5). Among 
the topics he examined in his work were friendship, clemency, the right use of wealth and most 
notably suicide (Colish 1990:14). 
 
Two younger contemporaries of Seneca were Lucius Annaeus Cornutus (c. 20 – 66 AD) and 
Musonius Rufus (born in c. 30 AD). Cornutus, who had presumably been Seneca‟s or his 
family‟s slave, began teaching philosophy and rhetoric in Rome at around 50 AD. Among his 
pupils were the poets Lucan (Seneca‟s nephew) and Persius (Arnold 1911:112; Sellars 2006:13). 
Musonius Rufus, an Etruscan of high social rank (Sellars 2006:14), made it his aim to restore the 
ethics of the Old Stoa. Two topics on which he especially focused were sexual equality and the 
dignity of manual labour (Colish 1990:19).  
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Another influential figure of the Roman Stoa was Musonius‟ pupil Epictetus (c. 50 – 130 AD), a 
highly educated slave who was later granted his freedom (Sellars 2006:15). He focused 
especially on the ethical and religious aspects of Stoicism and in his surviving texts, the 
Discourses and the Manual, he especially emphasises the virtue of self-control and independence 
from worldly fortune (Marietta 1998:150). For him the only thing of true value was moral 
liberty, which, he taught, every man is able to attain through the exercise of his reason and will 
(Colish 1990:20). Epictetus‟ strict moralism also attracted the interest of early church fathers, 
such as Clement of Alexandria and Origen, in the centuries that followed (Gill 2003:36). 
 
The Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius (121 – 180 AD) was the last of the major Roman Stoics. 
He was certainly no professional teacher of philosophy; his surviving work, titled Meditations (in 
English convention; the Greek title in fact translates as “To Himself”), rather seems to have been 
a means of self-consolation and examination of conscience and was probably not intended for 
other readers (Colish 1990:20-1; Sellars 2006:17). 
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Chapter 2: Definition of the Stoic telos 
 
The Stoics, along with the other prominent philosophical schools of the Hellenistic Era (i.e. the 
Academy, the Peripatetics and the Epicureans), believed that there is for each of us a goal or 
final end (telos) which was defined as “that for the sake of which everything is done in the 
appropriate way, while it is not done for the sake of anything else” ([ηέινο ἐζηὶλ] νὗ ἕλεθα πάληα 
πξάηηεηαη θαζεθόλησο, αὐηὸ δὲ πξάηηεηαη νὐδελὸο ἕλεθα; Joannes Stobaeus (Stob.) Anthologium 
II.7.3b; cf. Gould 1970:161; Cooper 1996:261; Striker 1996:282; Sellars 2006:123). In other 
words, this final end is the natural goal of our existence and standard of reference for everything 
we do and desire, and, as all Hellenistic philosophies propose, what we all desire most is to live a 
happy life.  
 
Given the basic assumption that there is a final end (telos) of human life, to be called happiness 
(eudaimonia) or living well, it was the task of the different philosophical schools, firstly, to 
define what this final end consists of and, secondly, to explain how it could be reached (Striker 
1996:172; Long 2006:29). One might say that a philosophical school‟s account of the telos, in 
fact, determined the whole of its ethical philosophy and contained the central doctrines that 
distinguished it from the other schools of the time (Brennan 2005:117). The Stoics provided 
various definitions of the telos, the most famous being “living in agreement with nature”. It is the 
aim of this chapter to look at what each of the definitions of the telos meant. Chapter 3 will then 
focus on how the Stoics thought it could be achieved. 
 
One condition accepted by all Hellenistic philosophical schools is that the end should in some 
sense be “according to nature” (θαηὰ θύζηλ), i.e. it should be related to the nature of the living 
being whose telos it was said to be, as well as the nature of the universe (Striker 1996:283). In 
determining what the most natural end for humans would be, both the Stoics as well as their rival 
school, the Epicureans, began their enquiry into the human telos with an analysis of the earliest 
stage of human development. Epicurus, on the one hand argued that the only natural telos for 
humans is pleasure, since even the youngest children naturally pursue pleasure and try to avoid 
its opposite, pain. Hence a „happy life‟ will be the most pleasant life (Striker 1996:284). For the 
Stoics, on the other hand, as will still be discussed below, happiness could only be found in a life 
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according to reason, the distinct characteristic both of universal and human nature. The details of 
this will still be discussed, but what is noteworthy at this point, is that by starting their 
deliberation of the human telos from the pre-cultural self, “Stoics and Epicureans give 
themselves the space to ask what we can and should make of ourselves if we let our basic human 
nature rather than conventional ideology take charge of our values and human development” 
(Long 2006:27). This suggests that an understanding of our true nature will help us in developing 
our inborn potential in ways much greater than cultural norms might do. The idea is, thus, that 
the attainment of genuine happiness is completely in our own hands and should not be sought in 
whatever society might dictate. 
 
Following the Socratic-Cynic tradition, which formed the basis of many Stoic principles, the 
Stoics also had a second condition for happiness that needed to be incorporated in their definition 
of the telos, namely the concept of virtue (Frede 1999:71). They believed that the essence of 
happiness would be virtue, the essence of unhappiness vice (Long 1996:186), and the evidence 
available to us shows that “living in agreement with nature” was, in fact, equalled to “living 
according to virtue” (Cooper 1996:261; Brennan 2005:35). According to the Stoics, virtue is not 
something we are born with and in that sense have “by nature”, but they do believe that nature 
has equipped us in such a way that, if nothing went wrong in our natural development, we would 
become virtuous (Motto 1985:10; Frede 1999:71). 
 
As has been pointed out in the introduction, the explanation of the Stoic telos is no easy task 
since the different Stoic teachers all used different formulations to define it, and secondly, even 
amongst modern critics there is a disagreement regarding the original formulation and the correct 
interpretation of the telos. Let us now take a look at the various definitions of the telos that have 
been preserved in Diogenes Laertius‟ (D.L.) Vitae philosophorum VII.87-89 and Joannes 
Stobaeus‟ (Stob.) Anthologium II.7.6a (cf. Sandbach 1989:53-55; Brennan 2005:135-6): 
 
(87.)    Δηόπεξ πξ῵ηνο ὁ Ζήλσλ ἐλ ηῶ Πεξὶ ἀλζξώπνπ θύζεσο ηέινο εἶπε ηὸ ὁκοιογοσκέλως ηῇ θύζεη δῆλ, 
ὅπεξ ἐζηὶ θαη‟ ἀρεηὴλ δῆλ· ἄγεη  γὰξ πξὸο ηαύηελ ἡκᾶο ἡ θύζηο. ὁκνίσο δὲ θαὶ Κιεάλζεο ἐλ ηῶ Πεξὶ 
ἡδνλῆο θαὶ Πνζεηδώληνο θαὶ Ἑθάησλ ἐλ ηνῖο Πεξὶ ηει῵λ. πάιηλ δ‟ ἴζνλ ἐζηὶ ηὸ θαη‟ ἀξεηὴλ δῆλ ηῶ 
θαη‟ ἐκπεηρίαλ ηῶλ θύζεη ζσκβαηλόληωλ δῆλ, ὥο θεζη Χξύζηππνο ἐλ ηῶ πξώηῳ Πεξὶ ηει῵λ· κέξε 
γάξ εἰζηλ αἱ ἡκέηεξαη θύζεηο ηῆο ηνῦ ὅινπ. 
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(88.)  δηόπεξ ηέινο γίλεηαη ηὸ ἀθοιούζως ηῇ θύζεη δῆλ, ὅπεξ ἐζηὶ θαηά ηε ηὴλ αὑηοῦ θαὶ θαηὰ ηὴλ ηῶλ 
ὅιωλ, νὐδὲλ ἐλεξγνῦληαο ὧλ ἀπαγνξεύεηλ εἴσζελ ὁ λόκνο ὁ θνηλόο, ὅζπεξ ἐζηὶλ ὁ ὀξζὸο ιόγνο, δηὰ 
πάλησλ ἐξρόκελνο, ὁ αὐηὸο ὢλ ηῶ Δηί, θαζεγεκόλη ηνύηῳ ηῆο η῵λ ὄλησλ δηνηθήζεσο ὄληη· εἶλαη δ‟ 
αὐηὸ ηνῦην ηὴλ ηνῦ εὐδαίκνλνο ἀξεηὴλ θαὶ εὔξνηαλ βίνπ, ὅηαλ πάληα πξάηηεηαη θαηὰ ηὴλ ζπκθσλίαλ 
ηνῦ παξ‟ ἑθάζηῳ δαίκνλνο πξὸο ηὴλ ηνῦ η῵λ ὅισλ δηνηθεηνῦ βνύιεζηλ. ὁ κὲλ νὖλ Δηνγέλεο ηέινο 
θεζὶ ῥεη῵ο ηὸ εὐιογηζηεῖλ ἐλ ηῇ ηῶλ θαηὰ θύζηλ ἐθιογῇ. ... 
(89.)    Φύζηλ δὲ Χξύζηππνο κὲλ ἐμαθνύεη, ᾗ ἀθνινύζσο δεῖ δῆλ, ηήλ ηε θνηλὴλ θαὶ ἰδίσο ηὴλ ἀλζξσπίλελ· ὁ 
δὲ Κιεάλζεο ηὴλ θνηλὴλ κόλελ ἐθδέρεηαη θύζηλ, ᾗ ἀθνινπζεῖλ δεῖ, νὐθέηη δὲ θαὶ ηὴλ ἐπὶ κέξνπο. (D.L. 
VII.87-89 in Hicks 1925:194, 196) 
 
Therefore, Zeno was the first to say, in [his treatise] On the Nature of Man, that the final end is “to 
live in agreement with nature”, which is the same as a “to live according to virtue”, for nature 
guides us towards virtue. And both Cleanthes in his treatise On Pleasure, and Posidonius, as well as 
Hecato in his work On Ends [defined the end] similarly. Furthermore, “to live according to virtue” is 
equivalent to “to live according to the experience of the things that happen by nature”, as 
Chrysippus says in the first book of [his treatise] On Ends; for our [own] natures are parts of the 
nature of the universe. Therefore, the end becomes “to live following nature”, that is, following both 
one‟s own [nature] and that of the universe, doing none of the things which the common [or 
universal] law is accustomed to forbid, which is the right reason which pervades all things and which 
is the same as Zeus, who is the leader of the administration of all that exists. And this very thing is the 
virtue of the happy man and the „good flow‟ of life, whenever all things are done according to the 
harmony of each [man‟s individual] spirit with the will of the administrator of the universe. Diogenes 
then expressly says that the end is to reason well by the selection of what is according to nature. ...  
By „nature‟, following which one ought to live, Chrysippus understands both common [or universal] 
nature and more particularly human [nature]; Cleanthes, on the other hand, takes  common [or 
universal] nature alone as that which should be followed, and not the [nature] of the individual as 
well.2 
 
   Τὸ δὲ ηέινο ὁ κὲλ Ζήλσλ νὕησο ἀπέδσθε· „ηὸ ὁκοιογοσκέλως δῆλ‟· ηνῦην δ‟ ἐζηὶ θαζ‟ ἕλα ιόγολ 
θαὶ ζύκθωλολ δῆλ, ὡο η῵λ καρνκέλσο δώλησλ θαθνδαηκνλνύλησλ. Οἱ δὲ κεηὰ ηνῦηνλ 
πξνζδηαξζξνῦληεο νὕησο ἐμέθεξνλ „ὁκοιογοσκέλως ηῇ θύζεη δῆλ‟ ὑπνιαβόληεο ἔιαηηνλ εἶλαη 
θαηεγόξεκα ηὸ ὑπὸ ηνῦ Ζήλσλνο ῥεζέλ. Κιεάλζεο γὰξ πξ῵ηνο δηαδεμάκελνο αὐηνῦ ηὴλ αἵξεζηλ 
πξνζέζεθε „ηῇ θύζεη‟ θαὶ νὕησο ἀπέδσθε· „ηέινο ἐζηὶ ηὸ ὁκνινγνπκέλσο ηῇ θύζεη δῆλ‟. Ὅπεξ ὁ 
Χξύζηππνο ζαθέζηεξνλ βνπιόκελνο πνηῆζαη, ἐμήλεγθε ηὸλ ηξόπνλ ηνῦηνλ· „δῆλ θαη‟ ἐκπεηρίαλ ηῶλ 
θύζεη ζσκβαηλόληωλ‟. Δηνγέλεο δέ· „εὐιογηζηεῖλ ἐλ ηῇ ηῶλ θαηὰ θύζηλ ἐθιογῇ θαὶ ἀπεθιογῇ‟. ... 
Ἀληίπαηξνο δέ· „δῆλ ἐθιεγοκέλοσς κὲλ ηὰ θαηὰ θύζηλ, ἀπεθιεγοκέλοσς δὲ ηὰ παρὰ 
                                                             
2
 All translations provided in this thesis are my own, unless stated otherwise. 
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θύζηλ δηελεθῶς‟. Πνιιάθηο δὲ θαὶ νὕησο ἀπεδίδνπ· „πᾶλ ηὸ θαζ‟ αὑηὸλ ποηεῖλ δηελεθῶς θαὶ 
ἀπαραβάηως πρὸς ηὸ ησγτάλεηλ ηῶλ προεγοσκέλωλ θαηὰ θύζηλ‟. (Stob. II.7.6a in Wachsmuth and 
Hense 1884:75-6) 
 
And Zeno, rendered the goal as follows: “to live in agreement” and this is to live according to one 
harmonious reason, as those living in conflict are unhappy. But his successors, on the other hand, 
adding more detail to it produced the following: “to live in agreement with nature”, since they 
believed that Zeno‟s definition was lacking a predicate. For Cleanthes, his first successor as the head 
of the school, added “with nature” and rendered it as follows: “to live in agreement with nature”. 
Chrysippus, wanting to make this [even] clearer, produced this formulation: “to live according to the 
experience of the things that happen by nature”. And Diogenes [defined it as]: to reason well by 
the selection and rejection of what is “according to nature”. ... And Antipater: “to live by 
continually selecting what is according to nature and rejecting what is contrary to nature”. And 
often he would also render [it as follows]: “to do everything concerning oneself continually and 
perpetually in order to attain the things that are preferable according to nature”. 
 
One complication which must be mentioned right away is that it seems to be uncertain whether 
the wording “to live in agreement with nature” (ηὸ ὁκνινγνπκέλσο ηῇ θύζεη δῆλ) actually 
originated with Zeno. According to Diogenes Laertius, Zeno “was the first” to define the telos as 
“to live in agreement with nature”, but according to the quote by Stobaeus Zeno called it simply 
“to live in agreement” (ηὸ ὁκνινγνπκέλσο δῆλ), and it was his successor Cleanthes who added 
“with nature” (ηῇ θύζεη), taking Zeno‟s formula to be incomplete (Sandbach 1989:53; Striker 
1996:223; Schofield 2003:242). It is noteworthy that no one in antiquity appears to have 
suggested that there was any real difference between Zeno and Cleanthes in their views of the 
end; this is an issue of debate amongst modern scholars (Sandbach 1989:54). 
 
Some modern scholars suggest that the definitions “to live in agreement” and “to live in 
agreement with nature” were, in fact, synonymous (Smuts 1948:1; Reesor 1989:109; Brennan 
2005:138). Brennan (2005:138) argues that “to live in agreement” was simply a “short-hand” 
that Zeno sometimes used instead of the full version which he proposed in his treatise “On the 
Nature of Man” (cf. D.L. VII.87). However, there are some modern critics who take Stobaeus‟ 
text to be evidence that Zeno never used the full form “ηὸ ὁκνινγνπκέλσο ηῇ θύζεη δῆλ”, but 
merely “ηὸ ὁκνινγνπκέλσο δῆλ” which they render with “to live consistently” (Brennan 
2005:139). If one takes this interpretation to be correct, one must assume either that Cleanthes 
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and Chrysippus fundamentally misunderstood their predecessor and introduced a completely new 
interest in nature, or that they felt that rational consistency and being in agreement with nature 
would come down to the same thing (Brennan 2005:139). According to Brennan (2005:140), 
such an interpretation seems unlikely to be true and is based on an incorrect translation of “ηὸ 
ὁκνινγνπκέλσο δῆλ” as “to live consistently”; “the Greek word at issue always means “to agree” 
or “be in agreement” ”. If one then translates “ηὸ ὁκνινγνπκέλσο δῆλ” correctly with “to live in 
agreement” the theory that this formula was simply a “short-hand” for the fuller version is all the 
more plausible since the phrase “to live in agreement” is clearly incomplete and needs a 
complement to make sense, and the obvious complement in this context would be “with nature” 
(Brennan 2005:138). 
 
Striker (1996:223), on the other hand, sees the theory of grammatical incompleteness as unlikely 
to be correct, arguing that the words “ὁκνινγνπκέλσο δῆλ” can in fact stand without a 
complement, even if the phrase “may not be either very colloquial or very elegant Greek”, but it 
should not be regarded as meaning the same as “ὁκνινγνπκέλσο ηῇ θύζεη δῆλ” but rather 
something like “leading a consistent and coherent life” (Striker 1996:223). Striker claims that 
one does not need a reference to nature to make the formula intelligible and “neither of the two 
formulae seems logically to imply the other” (Striker 1996:223). She, nevertheless, agrees with 
other scholars that there was no serious disagreement between Zeno and his followers and that 
both formulae were probably meant to express the same doctrine (Striker 1996:223).  
 
Another suggestion is that Zeno did, in fact, use both formulae himself; they were, however, not 
synonymous but the longer version was rather given to explain the shorter (Striker 1996:231; 
Schofield 2003:242). “Living consistently” characterises the behaviour which satisfies the 
conditions of a happy life, whereas “living consistently (or “in agreement”) with nature” is meant 
to explain how such consistent behaviour relates to the natural order and that it is agreement with 
this natural order that provides consistency in living (Striker 1996:231; Schofield 2003:242). 
“On this view of the matter, there is something like a non-accidental pun on “consistently”, and 
the two formulae do in a sense come down to the same thing: we shall live consistently (i.e. each 
with his or her own self) if and only if we live consistently with nature” (Schofield 2003:242). 
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Defining the happy life simply as “consistent” would be rather vague (Striker 1996:231) and, 
seeing that there is some evidence that shows Zeno himself used the full version “to live in 
agreement with nature”, there is no need to speculate whether there was a stage in Stoic ethical 
theory at which Zeno was ever satisfied with mere rational consistency (Brennan 2005:140). But 
whether one believes that the formula “to live in agreement with nature” originated with Zeno or 
with his successors, it seems plausible that, even if one rejects the idea that the longer version 
was identical in meaning with the shorter one, it was intended to make the shorter version more 
intelligible. The addition of “with nature” in the second formula provides a standard to which a 
rational creature can look in order to achieve a consistent life (Striker 1996:231). If we, then, 
assume either that the two versions were synonymous or that the fuller version is simply an 
attempt to explain the original formula, rather than an innovation in doctrine, then not too much 
depends on this question of attribution (Sellars 2006:125). As mentioned above, no one amongst 
ancient critics appeared to have made an issue of it or suggested that there was any disagreement 
between Zeno and his immediate followers in their views of the final end (Sandbach 1989:54). 
 
Returning to the two passages quoted above, we can compile the following list of the various 
definitions of the telos provided by the Stoics: 
 
1) to live according to virtue (θαη‟ ἀξεηὴλ δῆλ)  
 
2) to live according to one harmonious reason (θαζ‟ ἕλα ιόγνλ θαὶ ζύκθσλνλ δῆλ) 
 
3) Chrysippus: to live according to the experience of the things that happen by nature 
(θαη‟ἐκπεηξίαλ η῵λ θύζεη ζπκβαηλόλησλ δῆλ)  
 
4) to live following nature (ηὸ ἀθνινύζσο ηῇ θύζεη δῆλ) 
 
5) Diogenes: to reason well by the selection (and rejection) of what is according to nature 
(εὐινγηζηεῖλ ἐλ ηῇ η῵λ θαηὰ θύζηλ ἐθινγῇ <θαὶ ἀπεθινγῇ>) 
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6) Antipater: to live by continually selecting what is according to nature and rejecting  
what is contrary to nature (δῆλ ἐθιεγνκέλνπο κὲλ ηὰ θαηὰ θύζηλ, ἀπεθιεγνκέλνπο δὲ ηὰ 
παξὰ θύζηλ δηελεθ῵ο) 
 
7) Antipater: to do everything concerning oneself continually and perpetually in order to 
attain the things that are „preferable‟ according to nature (πᾶλ ηὸ θαζ‟ αὑηὸλ πνηεῖλ 
δηελεθ῵ο θαὶ ἀπαξαβάησο πξὸο ηὸ ηπγράλεηλ η῵λ πξνεγνπκέλσλ θαηὰ θύζηλ) 
 
Regarding all the “nature-formulae” above, one further important aspect should be pointed out, 
namely, that by nature, the Stoics meant both one‟s own individual human nature, as well as the 
nature of the universe (cf. θαηά ηε ηὴλ αὑηνῦ θαὶ θαηὰ ηὴλ η῵λ ὅισλ; D.L. VII.88), though there 
seems to have been a disagreement among the early Stoics. According to Diogenes Laertius 
(VII.89), Cleanthes took the nature in question here to refer to universal nature only. A life in 
agreement with universal nature according to Cleanthes meant a life in agreement with the 
reason that pervades and rules the universe, i.e. God or the will of God, and so he gave Zeno‟s 
formula a distinct religious connotation (Smuts 1948:3; Gould 1970:164; Cooper 1996:273). 
However, it appears that there might not have been any real difference in theory and, as will be 
shown below, the distinction between human and universal nature can easily be reconciled. Now, 
before discussing the meaning of the various telos-formulations, it is imperative to find out first 
what the Stoics understood by nature, that is, both universal nature and our own human nature. 
 
 
2.1 Universal Nature 
 
Zeno advocated that the universe consisted of two principles, the passive principle which is the 
inert matter, and the active principle, which creates and rules the universe and which is the soul 
or reason (G: logos, L: ratio) of the universe, also often referred to as God, pneuma, fate, 
providence or simply nature (Arnold 1911:69; Smuts 1948:4; Snyman 1969:28; Sandbach 
1989:72). When discussing the nature of the universe I will only be concerned with the active 
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principle. Let us now take a look at the various aspects of this Nature (hereafter, I will use this 
capitalised form to distinguish universal nature from human nature).  
 
The Stoics saw the universe as a living being with a soul or reason in it (Cicero (Cic.) De Natura 
Deorum I.39; Snyman 1969:27) and Zeno argued further that this reason, which pervades the 
world, is possessed of divine power (Zeno...rationem quondam per omnem naturam rerum 
pertinentem vi divina esse adfectam putat; Cic. De Nat. Deor. I.36; Snyman 1969:28). Nature 
and reason (logos), in fact, often appear to be used as synonyms by Stoic writers (Long 1971:85) 
though technically the latter is rather a characteristic of the former (Graeser 1974:176). The word 
logos has many implications. The corresponding verb is legein “to say”, but logos is not only 
“language”, or “speech”, but also the rational explanation of something and its underlying 
purpose (Arnold 1911:163; Sandbach 1989:72). So, the active principle or God, who shapes the 
inert matter and creates the world and everything in it, does so with reason and purpose, which 
means that the world is not a random and haphazard construction (Sandbach 1989:72) but all 
events are predetermined or fated to occur (Brennan 2005:235; Gill 2006:197) – there is no 
coincidence (Snyman 1969:29) and everything works according to a specific predetermined plan.  
 
Believing that the world and its events are all pre-determined according to a rational plan, the 
Stoics thus inferred the following to be the two main properties of Nature: Nature as fate or 
destiny on the one hand, and Nature as right-reasoning and provident on the other hand (Long 
1971:91; Sandbach 1989:79). The idea of fate points to the certainty, necessity, inevitability and 
immutability of God‟s plan; providence denotes the rationality, organization, order and purpose 
of the plan (Sandbach 1989:80; Bobzien 1998:48-9). 
 
We will now take a look at what the Stoics themselves had to say about Nature, fate and 
providence. Zeno himself defined fate as a “power which moves matter...and it may equally well 
be called providence and nature” (δύλακηλ θηλεηηθὴλ ηῆο ὕιεο..., ἥληηλα κὴ δηαθέξεηλ πξόλνηαλ 
θαὶ θύζηλ θαιεῖλ; Aëtius, De placitis reliquiae I.27.5 in Arnold 1911:202; cf. Gould 1970:142).  
 
From Chrysippus we have a whole list of various definitions of Nature and fate (preserved by 
Cicero and Stobaeus): 
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…ipsumque mundum deum dicit esse et eius animi fusionem universam, tum eius ipsius 
principatum, qui in mente et ratione versetur, communemque rerum naturam [universam] atque omnia 
continentem, tum fatalem vim et necessitatem rerum futurarum… (Cic. De Nat. Deor. I.39 in 
Rackham 1956:40, 42) 
 
...he [Chrysippus] says that the world itself is a god, and a universal fusion of its soul, then that it is 
the ruling principle of itself, which pervades the mind and reason, and a common [universal] nature of 
things which holds everything together, then [also] that it is the power of fate and the necessity of 
future events... 
 
Χξύζηππνο δύλακηλ πλεσκαηηθὴλ ηὴλ νὐζίαλ ηῆο εἱκαξκέλεο, ηάμεη ηνῦ παληὸο δηνηθεηηθήλ. [...] 
Εἱκαξκέλε ἐζηὶλ ὁ ηοῦ θόζκοσ ιόγος, ἢ ιόγος ηῶλ ἐλ ηῷ θόζκῳ προλοίᾳ δηοηθοσκέλωλ· ἢ ιόγνο, 
θαζ‟ ὃλ ηὰ κὲλ γεγολόηα γέγολε, ηὰ δὲ γηλόκελα γίλεηαη, ηὰ δὲ γελεζόκελα γελήζεηαη. 
Μεηαιακβάλεη δ‟ ἀληὶ ηνῦ ιόγνπ ηὴλ ἀιήζεηαλ, ηὴλ αἰηίαλ, ηὴλ θύζηλ, ηὴλ ἀλάγθελ, πξνζηηζεὶο θαὶ 
ἑηέξαο ὀλνκαζίαο, ὡο ἐπὶ ηῆο αὐηῆο νὐζίαο ηαζζνκέλαο θαζ‟ ἑηέξαο θαὶ ἑηέξαο ἐπηβνιάο. (Stob. I.5.15 
in Bobzien 1998:48) 
 
“Chrysippus [maintains that] the substance of fate is a power of breath, administering order of the all. 
[...] „Fate is the Reason of the universe‟ or „the Reason of the things in the universe administered 
by providence‟, or „the Reason in accordance with which past events have happened, present 
events happen, and future events will happen‟; and instead of „Reason‟ he uses „truth‟, „cause‟, 
„nature‟, and „necessity‟, and adds other terms which apply to the same substance from different 
perspectives.” (trans. Bobzien 1998:48) 
 
Similar Stoic accounts of fate are found in a passage by Diogenes Laertius (Vitae philosophorum 
VII.149). Here it says that “all things happen according to fate” (θαζ‟ εἱκαξκέλελ [...] ηὰ πάληα 
γίλεζζαη) and further that, “fate is the causal chain of things that exist or the reason according to 
which the world is arranged” (ἔζηη δ‟ εἱκαξκέλε αἰηία η῵λ ὄλησλ εἰξνκέλε ἢ ιόγνο θαζ‟ ὃλ ὁ 
θόζκνο δηεμάγεηαη; cf. Gould 1970:142-3; Bobzien 1998:48). This “causal chain” (αἰηία 
εἰξνκέλε) must be understood as a process in which for each fated event there are fated prior 
conditions that caused the particular event to occur. The Stoics, thus, appear to see the world as 
subject to a vast causal web from which nothing that happens is excluded (Gould 1970:143). 
 
Most of the above speaks of the inevitability and necessity of Nature‟s predetermined plan which 
no living thing can escape. But it should be kept in mind that when Nature arranged the world 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter 2: Definition of the Stoic telos  22 
 
 
and everything in it, it did so with right reason and providence. Providential Nature aims to 
create a universe capable of enduring and endows it with beauty and excellence (Arnold 
1911:204). According to Zeno, it is the function of divine Nature “to command what is right and 
to forbid the opposite” (Zeno…naturalem legem divinam esse censet, eamque vim obtinere recta 
imperantem prohibentemque contraria; Cic. De Nat. Deor. I.36). It is, thus, responsible for the 
good order of the world and for its “usefulness” to human beings (Sandbach 1989:80). Though 
this is difficult to believe if one considers the disasters and hardships suffered by individuals, the 
Stoics advocated that everything that happens is for the greater good of mankind, even if 
individuals must sometimes be sacrificed in order to save the community (Arnold 1911:205-6).  
 
To sum up the main points explored above, for the Stoics the universe is a system in which all 
events are predetermined by fate and at the same time this system is controlled by a right-
reasoning divine providence which ensures that the system is as good as possible for its human 
members (Sandbach 1989:35; Long 1996:1914). By accepting the theory of determinism one 
will see that there is an inevitable and immutable order of events and that everything that 
happens is part of a single predetermined plan. At the same time, by believing in the concept of a 
divine providence that cares for mankind, one is assured that this predetermined system is 
designed for everyone to have the best life possible (Long 1996:191). Living in agreement with 
universal Nature, thus, seems to imply resigning oneself completely to the world‟s predetermined 
plan and accepting gladly whatever happens, while trusting that it is all for a greater good. 
 
Here arises the question of how the idea of human free will and responsibility can be compatible 
with this theory of determinism, and this indeed provoked a great deal of controversy. The 
debate never stopped during the five hundred years of the Stoic school‟s existence (Frede 
2003:179). It is a complex problem and falls outside the main scope of this thesis, but it cannot 
be ignored altogether. However, before we can go on to discuss the debate regarding the 
compatibility of determinism with human accountability, one more aspect of Fate should be 
explored. 
 
In several passages Fate is also referred to as pneuma (“spirit” or “breath”) or dunamis 
pneumatikē (“power of breath”; cf. Stob I.5.15 above) that permeates all things and shapes and 
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moves them (Sandbach 1989:73; Bobzien 1998:54; Frede 2003:185; Brennan 2005:235). The 
theory that all things are controlled by Fate does not imply that they are influenced from a 
distance or directed from on high by “strings of divine puppet-masters” (Brennan 2005:235); 
instead Fate as pneuma works from the inside of all things (Bobzien 1998:54). However, this 
pneuma is not present in everything in the same form. According to the Stoics, there is a “natural 
order” of all existing things (scala naturae) in the universe (Frede 2003:185), i.e. they saw the 
universe as a home of beings of various ranks, and among them, only man possesses the faculty 
of reason which is pneuma in its purest form (Arnold 1911:186; Long 1971:93; Frede 2003:185). 
Animals do not have reason, but they do have a soul (psuchē) which grants them perception, 
sensation and mobility (Arnold 1911:187; Long 1971:93; Frede 2003:185). In plants the pneuma 
manifests itself as what might be called “growth-power” or simply “nature” (physis) which 
allows them to grow and sustain themselves (Arnold 1911:188; Long 1971:93; Frede 2003:185). 
Lowest in the scala naturae are the lifeless objects like stones. In these the pneuma constitutes 
their inner “cohesion” (hexis), which keeps them together in their particular outward shape 
(Arnold 1911:189; Frede 2003:185). 
 
No existing thing can have any of the higher degrees of pneuma without also having all the lower 
ones. So, stones possess cohesion, plants cohesion and “growth-power”, animals cohesion, 
“growth-power” and soul. Human beings possess all four properties (cohesion, “growth-power”, 
soul and reason), however, certain parts, such as the bones, the nails and the hair, have cohesion 
and “growth-power” only; in the eyes, nose and ears there is cohesion, “growth-power” and 
sensation, i.e. soul in the sense in which animals possess soul; it is in man‟s intelligence only in 
which pneuma manifests itself as reason (Arnold 1911:190). Hence, the Stoics concluded that the 
final end for human beings must be expressible in terms of reason, and wholly in terms of reason 
(Long 1971:93) and so it seems self-explanatory how “to live in agreement with nature” could 
have come to mean the same as “to live according to reason”. It should now also be clear that 
there was no real discrepancy  between universal and human nature, since the former manifests 
itself in the latter, and so living in agreement with universal Nature and one‟s own human nature 
in fact comes down to the same thing. 
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Let us now briefly discuss the criticism received by the Stoics. As already mentioned, the 
doctrine of determinism provoked a great deal of controversy since the belief in an all-
encompassing fate seems to leave humans with the only option of readily complying with its 
predetermined order and so appears to contradict completely the belief in human free will 
(Arnold 1911:200; Gould 1970:148; Frede 2003:179). Man‟s mind seems to be bound to an 
eternal series of causes (Gould 1970:148). Not only does this deprive us of our free will but also, 
if nothing we do is really “up to us”, then we can, moreover, not justifiably be held responsible 
for any of our actions. In other words, we cannot rightfully be praised or blamed for anything we 
do (Brennan 2005:242, 244). Chrysippus tried to reconcile the doctrines of determinism and 
moral accountability, by explaining the starting point of actions drawing on some ideas of Stoic 
psychology. He proposes that human beings are not bound in their actions by necessity but rather 
respond to external stimuli in line with their nature as rational agents (Gill 2006:198). 
Chrysippus explains that one must distinguish between the external and internal cause of action, 
also called the “proximate cause” (prokatarktikē, proxima) and “principal cause” (proēgoumenē, 
antecedens or principalis) (Arnold 1911:212; Gill 2006:198). The idea is that, before any action 
can take place humans must first “assent”, i.e. respond rationally, to the presentation (G: 
phantasia, L: visum) of an external stimulus to their minds. This presentation is the “proximate 
cause”. The principal cause lies within the nature of the agents themselves (Arnold 1911:212; 
Gill 2006:1998; Holowchak 2008:46). 
 
Chrysippus illustrates this theory with an analogy of a rolling cylinder, which can be briefly 
summed up as follows: in order for a cylinder to roll down a slope, it needs an initial force (an 
“external stimulus”) to start moving. This would be the proximate cause. However, what is 
responsible for the cylinder to continue rolling is its shape (its “nature”) which allows it to 
respond to the external stimulus in this particular way (Arnold 1911:212; Gould 1970:149-50; 
Bobzien 1998:260; Holowchak 2008:47). The idea is that, as the cylinder rolls due to its nature 
when given a proximate cause, so do people assent or withhold assent in accordance with their 
own nature when given a proximate cause (Holowchak 2008:47).  
 
It appears then that Chrysippus still holds that our actions are caused by fate through external 
stimuli, but it should be clear that these stimuli are not enough to necessitate action (Bobzien 
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1998:260; Holowchak 2008:46). In other words, these stimuli are certainly triggers for our 
actions, but they do not determine how we respond (Bobzien 1998:269; Brennan 2005:257). 
Assent is needed for any movement to take place and this assent is in our power. Hence, it should 
be clear that the Stoics‟ theory of determinism does not contradict with our free will. Moreover, 
how we respond to the external stimuli presented to our minds really depends on what kind of 
moral character we have, and on these grounds, one can then also justifiably be praised or 
blamed for one‟s actions (Arnold 1911:212; Brennan 2005:257). 
 
Whether Chrysippus was really successful in showing that determinism is in fact compatible 
with human free will and moral accountability, is undecided. Over the last decades, the debate on 
the compatibility of these two Stoic doctrines has steadily increased in secondary literature, and 
“to this very day the question has not been settled to everyone‟s satisfaction” (Frede 2003:179). 
 
 
2.2 Human Nature 
 
The Stoics drew up their theory of any creature‟s telos from the consideration of its inborn nature 
(Brennan 2005:125). They proposed that the final end and optimal condition for any creature 
would be the perfection of its one distinctive attribute (Gould 1970:167; Inwood 2005:251). As 
has been mentioned above, what distinguishes human beings from all other creatures is the 
capacity of reason. Hence, we will achieve our final end, happiness, by perfecting our reason. 
This might be conceptually straightforward but less easy to put into practice (Inwood 2005:251-
2). However, for now we are still only interested in explaining what the telos meant; how they 
thought it could be achieved, will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
The starting point for our discussion of the human telos will be the doctrine of oikeiōsis. This 
Greek term is usually left untranslated since there is no satisfying equivalent for it in English. 
Some unsuccessful candidates include “appropriation”, “affinity”, “orientation” and “familiari-
zation” (Brennan 2005:154; Gill 2006:37; Sellars 2006:107) and we might as well keep the 
transliterated Greek as a technical term. It is derived from the word for a house or household, 
oikos; and the corresponding adjective, oikeios, would mean “having to do with one‟s household 
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/ family / kin”, or more broadly “that with which one feels some affinity or familiarity”, or 
simply “appropriate”, or “one‟s own”, or “that which belongs” (Brink 1956:139; Sandbach 
1989:32; Brennan 2005:154-5; Gill 2006:37). Oikeiōsis is thus, the “recognition and appreciation 
of something as belonging to one” (Striker 1996:281); or “knowing precisely what things are and 
what things are not one‟s own” (Holowchak, 2008:38); or the “process of making a thing 
belong” (Sandbach 1989:32). 
 
The central idea of the oikeiōsis-theory is that all animals – including humans – are naturally 
equipped to preserve themselves or their constitution (“personal oikeiōsis”), as well as other 
members of their species (“social oikeiōsis”) (Striker 1996:178; Gill 2006:26). In my discussion 
of the final end, I will only be concerned with the former. Personal oikeiōsis has two stages: the 
first stage is shared by all animals; the second, more advanced stage is limited to adult humans 
(Gill 2006:77). The Stoics argue that every animal from birth feels oikeion to itself, which means 
that it is given impulses towards preserving itself in the state in which it finds itself (Brink 
1956:139; Brennan 2005:156; Sellars 2006:108). In the first stage of personal oikeiōsis animals, 
thus, instinctively pursue what is advantageous for them and avoid what is harmful; in the 
second, adult human, stage of personal oikeiōsis there is a clear shift from an instinctive pursuit 
of things that preserve one‟s constitution (and avoidance of their opposites) to an increasingly 
rational and consistent selection of such things (and rejection of their opposites) (Gill 2006:77; 
cf. Long 1971:100; Cooper 1996:268). As mentioned above, one condition of the final end was 
that it should in a sense be “natural”, and so the reason that the Stoics appealed to this doctrine of 
oikeiōsis in their discussion of the final end, must have been to show that humans naturally 
develop towards a certain conception of this final end (Striker 1996:283, 286). 
 
In giving their account of Stoic ethics both Diogenes Laertius (Vitae Philosophorum VII.85) and 
Cicero (De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum III.16) start out with the doctrine of oikeiōsis (Cooper 
1996:267; Striker 1996:224; Sellars 2006:107), though, as we shall see, they appeal to it for 
different purposes. Diogenes Laertius appeals to the doctrine of oikeiōsis to show the logical 
basis of the Stoics‟ telos-theory, i.e. to explain why they held that living in agreement with 
nature should be the “natural” goal for human beings. Cicero, on the other hand, uses the 
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doctrine of oikeiōsis to discuss the natural process of human development and to explain how 
human beings evolve from impulse driven animals to beings directed by perfect reason. 
 
Let us first take a look at the account given by Diogenes Laertius: 
 
(85.)   Τὴλ δὲ πξώηελ ὁξκήλ θαζη ηὸ δῶνλ ἴζρεηλ ἐπὶ ηὸ ηεξεῖλ ἑαπηό, νἰθεηνύζεο αὑηῶ ηῆο θύζεσο ἀπ‟ 
ἀξρῆο, θαζά θεζηλ ὁ Χξύζηππνο ἐλ ηῶ πξώηῳ Πεξὶ ηει῵λ, πξ῵ηνλ νἰθεῖνλ ιέγσλ εἶλαη παληὶ δῴῳ ηὴλ 
αὑηνῦ ζύζηαζηλ θαὶ ηὴλ ηαύηεο ζπλείδεζηλ· νὔηε γὰξ ἀιινηξη῵ζαη εἰθὸο ἦλ αὐηὸ <αὑηῶ> ηὸ δῶνλ, 
νὔηε πνηήζαζαλ αὐηό, κήη‟ ἀιινηξη῵ζαη κήη‟ νἰθεη῵ζαη. ἀπνιείπεηαη ηνίλπλ ιέγεηλ ζπζηεζακέλελ 
αὐηὸ νἰθεη῵ζαη πξὸο ἑαπηό· νὕησ γὰξ ηά ηε βιάπηνληα δησζεῖηαη θαὶ ηὰ νἰθεῖα πξνζίεηαη... 
 (86.) ... νὐδέλ ηε, θαζί, δηήιιαμελ ἡ θύζηο ἐπὶ η῵λ θπη῵λ θαὶ ἐπὶ η῵λ δῴσλ, ὅηη ρσξὶο ὁξκῆο θαὶ αἰζζήζεσο 
θἀθεῖλα νἰθνλνκεῖ θαὶ ἐθ‟ ἡκ῵λ ηηλα θπηνεηδ῵ο γίλεηαη. ἐθ πεξηηηνῦ δὲ ηῆο ὁξκῆο ηνῖο δῴνηο 
ἐπηγελνκέλεο, ᾗ ζπγρξώκελα πνξεύεηαη πξὸο ηὰ νἰθεῖα, ηνύηνηο κὲλ ηὸ θαηὰ θύζηλ ηῶ θαηὰ ηὴλ ὁξκὴλ 
δηνηθεῖζζαη· ηνῦ δὲ ιόγνπ ηνῖο ινγηθνῖο θαηὰ ηειεηνηέξαλ πξνζηαζίαλ δεδνκέλνπ, ηὸ θαηὰ ιόγνλ δῆλ 
ὀξζ῵ο γίλεζζαη <ηνύ> ηνηο θαηὰ θύζηλ· ηερλίηεο γὰξ νὗηνο ἐπηγίλεηαη ηῆο ὁξκῆο.  
(87.)    Δηόπεξ πξ῵ηνο ὁ Ζήλσλ ἐλ ηῶ Πεξὶ ἀλζξώπνπ θύζεσο ηέινο εἶπε ηὸ ὁκνινγνπκέλσο ηῇ θύζεη δῆλ, 
ὅπεξ ἐζηὶ θαη‟ ἀξεηὴλ δῆλ· ἄγεη γὰξ πξὸο ηαύηελ ἡκᾶο ἡ θύζηο… (D.L. VII.85-87 in Hicks 1925:192, 
194) 
 
They [the Stoics] say that an animal has as its first impulse self-preservation, because nature 
“appropriates” (νἰθεηνύζεο)3  it to itself from the beginning, as Chrysippus affirms in the first [book] 
of his [treatise] On Ends, saying that the first thing “which is appropriate” (νἰθεῖνλ)4 to any animal is 
its own constitution, and its consciousness thereof. For it was not likely that nature would alienate an 
animal from itself, nor that nature would, after creating it, neither alienate [it from] nor “appropriate” 
[it to itself]. Hence, one may conclude that nature, when constituting the animal, it “appropriated” it to 
itself, for in this way the animal rejects the things that are harmful, and accepts the things that are 
“appropriate” (ηὰ νἰθεῖα). ... 
…Moreover, they say, nature made no difference between plants and animals, for it manages those 
too, (though) without impulse and sensation, and [even] some processes in ourselves take place in the 
same manner as in plants. But since for animals, impulse is added as well, by the use of which they 
seek what is “appropriate” [for them], it is “according to nature” for them to be directed according to 
impulse. But, since reason has been given to rational beings according to a more perfect leadership, 
                                                             
3 As mentioned above, it is difficult to find a good English equivalent for this Greek word; also consider the 
translations “endears it to itself” (Hicks 1925:193; Long 1971:103), “makes it belong to itself”, or “makes it its 
own”.  
4
 Cf. also “the first thing which is dear” (Long 1971:104); or “the first thing which every animal regards as its own”. 
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“to live according to reason” rightly becomes for them “according to nature”. For reason is added as 
the craftsman of impulse. 
Therefore, Zeno was the first to say - in [his treatise] On the Nature of Man - that the (telos) is “to live 
in agreement with nature” which is the same as a “to live according to virtue”, for nature guides us 
towards virtue... 
 
Diogenes Laertius‟ argument can be summed up in the following points5: 
 
1) The “first impulse” that every animal has been given by nature is self-preservation. This 
assumption is based on the fact that every animal instinctively rejects what is harmful and 
pursues what is “appropriate” (ηὰ νἰθεῖα), i.e. helpful, to itself. 
 Therefore, it is “according to nature” (θαηὰ θύζηλ) for animals to be directed by impulse. 
 
2) “Rational beings” (ηνῖο ινγηθνῖο), i.e. humans, have (in addition to this “first impulse”) 
been given reason, as the “craftsman of impulse”6.  
 Therefore, it is “according to nature” (θαηὰ θύζηλ) for humans to live according to reason 
(ηὸ θαηὰ ιόγνλ δῆλ). 
 
3) “Therefore” (Δηόπεξ) the final end is “to live in agreement with nature” (ηὸ 
ὁκνινγνπκέλσο ηῇ θύζεη δῆλ) which is the same as “to live according to virtue”. This 
“therefore” is rather abrupt and in order to understand Diogenes‟ conclusion, one needs an 
argument to show why agreement with nature should be the final end of life for “rational 
beings” (Striker 1996:228). What seems to be implied in the argument, that Nature is “not 
likely” to create beings that would seek to harm or be indifferent to their constitution but 
rather makes all its creatures (be it plants, animals or humans) capable of maintaining their 
constitution, is that Nature is a right-reasoning and benevolent agency (which indeed is one 
of its properties as we have seen above) and evidently provides the best rational order 
                                                             
5 For a more detailed analysis of this extract the reader is referred to Long (1971:97-102) and Graeser (1974:180-
185). 
6 Let it be noted that the emergence of reason does not amount to the emergence of a rational part of the soul, or 
refer to the training of a non-rational part of the soul (Frede 1999:74; Gill 2006:138). The Stoics decidedly rejected 
the Platonic or Aristotelian theory of a partition of the soul into rational and non-rational parts. “The Stoic view is 
that we are born with an irrational soul of the kind animals have, but that this soul as a whole in the case of human 
beings is transformed into, and thus replaced by, reason” (Frede 1999:74). 
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(Graeser 1974:182; Cooper 1996:272; Striker 1996:229), and therefore, rational creatures 
will want to organize their lives by living in conscious and rational agreement with such a 
nature and this, in turn, is achieved by living virtuously. 
 
The central thought in this exposition of the „final end‟ is the alignment of one‟s own nature, the 
way universal Nature created it (Smuts 1948:5). In the course of our natural development we 
should come to see that reason is the thing that is „our own‟ or „appropriate‟ to ourselves 
(oikeion), and so it is our goal (telos) to maintain and perfect that reason by living virtuously 
(Brennan 2005:156). It appears to be the purpose of this account by Diogenes Laertius to show 
that a living being‟s telos is determined by that being‟s specific nature as well as universal 
Nature (having created the being in that specific way) that determines the final end of its life 
(Smuts 1948:5).  
 
This account, thus, (more or less successfully) provides a logical explanation for why “living in 
agreement with nature” should be the final end for human beings but it does not offer an 
argument as to how a human being‟s interest should shift at a certain stage in life from instinctive 
self-preservation to an exclusive interest in the rational order of Nature and living virtuously. 
Cicero seems to provide such an argument (as has been suggested above) in his account of 
human development in Fin. III.16-21 (Striker 1996:230; Gill 2006:145; Holowchak 2008:39). 
 
In the following extract Cicero has his spokesman Cato explain the Stoic account of the human 
telos and like Diogenes Laertius he starts out with a discussion of the most basic instinct with 
which animals, including humans, are born – self-preservation (Cooper 1996:267): 
 
 “Placet his”, inquit, “quorum ratio mihi probatur, simul atque natum sit animal (hinc enim est 
ordiendum), ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum et ad suum statum eaque, quae 
conservantia sunt eius status, diligenda, alienari autem ab interitu iisque rebus quae interitum 
videantur afferre…” (Cic. Fin. III.16 in Rackham 1961:232) 
 
He said: It is agreed upon by those whose reasoning I adopt, that as soon as an animal is born (for that 
is where one must start from) is appropriated with itself and committed to preserving itself and to 
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value highly its own constitution and the things which preserve its constitution, but it is alienated from 
destruction and those things which appear to bring about destruction... 
 
This is followed by an exposition of the ideal pattern of development for human beings which 
culminates in a life according to perfect reason and virtue (Gill 2006:130). In Fin. III.20 Cicero 
sums up the developmental process as follows: 
 
[1] primum est officium (id enim appello θαζῆθνλ) ut se conservet in naturae statu, [2] deinceps ut 
ea teneat quae secundum naturam sint, pellatque contraria. qua inventa selectione et item 
reiectione [3] sequitur deinceps cum officio selectio, [4] deinde ea perpetua, [5] tum ad extremum 
constans consentaneaque naturae,… (Cic. Fin. III 20 in Rackham 1961:238) 
 
[1] The first “appropriate act” (for this I call the Greek kathēkon) is to preserve oneself in one‟s 
natural constitution; [2] the next is to retain those things which are according to nature and to 
repel those contrary to it; [and] when this principle of selection and also of rejection has been 
discovered, [3] there follows next in line selection conditioned by “appropriate action”7; [4] then 
such selection becomes a permanent habit. [5] And finally, it becomes constant and in harmony 
with nature, … 
 
From this passage one can identify the following five stages in human development (cf. Cooper 
1996:269; Striker 1996:226, 289-290; Holowchak 2008:41-2): 
 
1) Human beings, like other animals, begin their lives with a basic impulse to preserve 
themselves in their natural constitution. 
 
2) This impulse prompts young children “to retain those things which are in accordance with 
nature and to repel those contrary to it”. In other words, they learn to select (i.e. pursue) 
and reject (i.e. avoid) what is helpful and harmful to their constitution, respectively.  
 
3) As humans grow more mature they continue to perform such “selection” (and “rejection”) 
because they have come to realize that it is “appropriate” to do so (Cooper 1996:269). The 
                                                             
7
 Cf. the alternative “choosing things in an appropriate way” (Striker 1996:289). 
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clear difference between this third stage and stage two, is that humans now no longer act 
on instinct but on reason (Cooper 1996:268). 
 
4) Eventually this “appropriate” way of behaving, i.e. selecting what is in “accordance with 
nature” (and rejecting the opposite) becomes perpetua, a “permanent habit”. 
 
5) In the final stage the habit of performing appropriate actions by selection and rejection 
should become “constant and in harmony with nature” (constans consentaneaque naturae) 
and this is what constitutes homologia (“agreement”) or convenientia (“conformity”), as 
Cicero calls it (Fin. III.21), the final end all human beings should strive for. 
 
In Fin. III.21 Cicero goes on to explain that in this final stage human beings have come to see the 
“order and harmony” (ordinem et ... concordiam) of their reason-directed action of “selection 
and rejection”, and this becomes much more important than the objects for which they 
“originally felt an affection” (cf. multo eam pluris aestimavit quam omnia illa, quae prima 
dilexerat; Rackham 1961:238-9; cf. Cooper 1996:269; Striker 1996:226). This will lead people 
to conclude that the “primary natural things”, i.e. the things that they previously pursued 
believing them to be helpful or good for their constitution, are, in fact, completely indifferent and 
no longer desirable for their own sake. The only thing that is good in itself and worth to be 
pursued now is the “ordered and harmonious” performance of appropriate actions which 
constitutes virtuous conduct and virtue itself (honeste facta ipsumque honestum; Cic. Fin. III.21). 
The main difference between this final stage and the previous two stages is the fact that, 
previously, appropriate actions were performed for the sake of attaining these primary natural 
things (Cic. Fin. III.22), whereas appropriate actions that are “constant and in harmony with 
nature” – later Cicero calls them “correct actions” or “correctly performed actions” (Cic. Fin. 
III.24), θαηνξζώκαηα in Greek – are performed solely for their own sake (Gill 2006:130; 
Holochak 2008:43).  
 
What appears to be needed is a change of one‟s internal attitude towards the primary natural 
things. By exercising our “intelligence and reason” (cognitione et ratione; cf. Cic. Fin. III.21) we 
will eventually abandon some earlier ideas about what was valuable in life, and once we act 
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“with a fully developed capacity of reason” (Cooper 1996:272) we will come to live virtuously. 
The details of this development from selecting primary natural things for their sake to only 
seeing value in the virtuous action itself are obscure, but this will be discussed in further detail in 
the next chapter. 
 
 
2.3 Summary 
 
From all that has been stated above one can infer the following about the Stoic telos: Firstly, 
when the Stoics speak of “living in agreement with nature” (ηὸ ὁκνινγνπκέλσο ηῇ θύζεη δῆλ) or 
“living following nature” (ηὸ ἀθνινύζσο ηῇ θύζεη δῆλ), they refer to both universal Nature and 
human nature, since humans all have a part of the divine pneuma directing them (D.L. VII.87). It 
has been suggested above that “living in agreement with universal Nature” means resigning 
oneself completely to the world‟s predetermined plan and accepting gladly whatever happens; 
we can trust to find happiness in this agreement with Nature, since we know that it has designed 
this plan (with right reason and purpose) for the benefit of all its creatures and, moreover, since 
resistance to this inevitable predetermined order seems futile and would only lead to 
unhappiness. Living in agreement with one‟s own human nature, in turn, means perfecting the 
one attribute distinctive to our nature. This distinctive attribute of human nature is reason, which 
is, of course, a part of universal reason residing in us, and so it requires no further explanation 
how “living in agreement with nature” could have come to mean the same as “to live according 
to one harmonious reason” (θαζ‟ ἕλα ιόγνλ θαὶ ζύκθσλνλ δῆλ).  
 
It has been shown above that reason is something that emerges automatically over time (provided 
that all goes well in the course of our natural development) and replaces our initial animalistic 
impulses. This means that instead of pursuing “the things that accord with our nature” (ηὰ θαηὰ 
θύζηλ; ea quae sunt secundum naturam) and avoiding their opposites on instinct, we now 
rationally decide to pursue and avoid certain things because it is appropriate to do so (cf. Cic. 
Fin. III.20). However, from Cicero‟s account in Fin. III.20, it would seem that once reason has 
emerged it still allows for considerable further improvement or perfection. “It is at this point that 
we actively and deliberately have to involve ourselves to attain the perfect competence which 
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will guarantee our well-being” (Frede 1999:74). What “living according to reason” essentially 
means is “to live according to reason in its state of excellence” (Gould 1970:169) and so we must 
actively try to perfect our capacity of reason. Perfect reason will enable us to see what is truly 
good and bad and perform morally correct actions with unfailing consistency, which is what 
constitutes virtue and virtuous conduct. 
 
Now it is also clear how the Stoics could have regarded the formula “to live in agreement with 
nature” to mean the same as “to live according to virtue”. Nature, in fact, “guides us towards 
virtue” as Diogenes Laertius puts it (D.L. VII.87; cf. Graeser 1974:183; Striker 1996:288), by 
giving us the capacity of reason, which, once it is perfected, enables us to know what is truly 
good and bad and what should and should not be done and this knowledge is the disposition of 
wisdom (G: phronesis, L: prudentia) the pre-eminent one of the four cardinal virtues. We regard 
it as pre-eminent since the other three justice (G: dikaiosunē, L: iustitia), courage (G: andreia, L: 
fortitudo) and temperance (G: sōphrosunē, L: temperantia) all depend on it: Justice is wisdom 
concerned with assigning and judging the correct use of things; courage is wisdom concerned 
with the correct judgement of the things to be endured; temperance is wisdom concerned with the 
moderate selection and acquisition of things (Arnold 1911:306-12; Gould 1970:170; Sandbach 
1989:42; Colish 1990:43; Schofield 2003:243; Brennan 2005:144). 
 
Let us now try to make sense of the rest of the telos-definitions that we have encountered. The 
assumption is that these additional formulas were not intended to replace the original “to live in 
agreement with nature”, but rather to explain it (Sandbach 1989:56). In order to understand 
Chrysippus‟ formula “to live according to the experience of the things that happen by nature”, 
we have to ask what happens in the course of nature that we need to have experience of, if we 
want to live in agreement with nature. Before we can answer this question, we must also take 
into account the supporting remark “for our [own] natures are parts of the nature of the universe” 
(Cooper 1996:273; Schofield 2003:245). This implies that we must realize “that we are not 
isolated units but rather parts of a systematically integrated whole” (Sellars 2006:127), which 
should lead us to cultivate a new perspective on the world by which we see everything that 
happens from the viewpoint of Nature as a whole and not simply from our own limited viewpoint 
(Sellars 2006:126). If we now focus our attention on “the things that happen by Nature” at large, 
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we can make the following observation: One aspect of Nature – which has already been pointed 
out several times – is that it is benevolent, since it provides for each of its creatures (be it plants, 
animals, or humans) a well-structured constitution and the ability to maintain that constitution, 
which makes it possible for each of these creatures, under normal circumstances, to live a 
flourishing and good life. At the same time, however, we can also observe that Nature often 
deprives its creatures of the conditions in which they can flourish. In the case of human beings, 
for example, although good health is something which benevolent Nature wants for us, that same 
Nature also causes incurable diseases, famines or natural disasters (Cooper 1996:273). From this 
the Stoics conclude that, though Nature wants things to go well for its creatures, it will 
sometimes have to sacrifice individuals in order to preserve the world as a whole (Arnold 
1911:205-6; Cooper 1996:273), and the “experience” and knowledge we gain from such an 
observation, will help us to accept gladly whatever comes our way and “not to think of anything 
that happens to us as any better or worse than anything else that we might imagine as having 
happened instead” (Cooper 1996:274).  
 
There seems to be another aspect to Chrysippus‟ formula. The “things that happen by nature” 
could also refer to the ways in which Nature has equipped each of its creatures with a distinctive 
attribute whose perfect development – as has been stated above – constitutes the excellent 
condition for that particular being. Ideally the creature will arrive naturally at its most excellent 
condition, but in the case of humans we are often hindered by external causes (Sellars 2006:126) 
such as our upbringing, social setting and cultural conventions. The idea is that an understanding 
(or “experience”) of what our distinctive attribute is and how we naturally ought to develop will 
help us in shaping and perfecting our inborn potentialities (Long 2006:27-8), and hence come to 
live in “agreement with nature” by living according to our perfectly developed reason. It would 
appear, then, that Chrysippus‟ formula is still true to the original definition of the telos; he 
simply attempted to explain how “living in agreement with nature” is made possible by adding 
more detail to Zeno‟s definition. 
 
Diogenes of Babylon, too, did not make any fundamental change by defining the telos as “to 
reason well by the selection (and rejection) of what is according to nature” (Sandbach 1989:57). 
It would appear that with his formula he seeks to provide an account to justify the pursuit of the 
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primary natural things (or “things according to nature”; i.e. the things that humans previously 
pursued believing them to be helpful or good for their constitution), which – as we should know 
once our reason has been perfected – are completely indifferent and no longer desirable for their 
own sake, and to show how they can be rationally related to virtue and so be incorporated in the 
telos. “Somehow, it must be rational to pursue “indifferents”, even though they form no part of 
the good, and … even though it is also a matter of indifference whether they are actually attained 
or not” (Brennan 2005:144). It seems plausible to relate the pursuit of indifferents to the agent‟s 
telos of living virtuously by saying that a virtuous life consists in a life in which one exercises 
one‟s perfect rationality and virtue in the pursuit of indifferents (cf. the discussion of Cic. Fin. 
III.21, 24). “It is exactly by choosing wisely and avoiding bravely, by selecting temperately and 
distributing justly, that a life which in some sense is taken up with and given over to indifferents 
can nevertheless at the same time be a life directed towards the end of virtue” (Brennan 
2005:144). In this way then, Diogenes‟ formula “to reason well by the selection (and rejection) 
of what is according to nature” can be regarded as equivalent to “living in agreement with 
nature”, as well as to “living according to virtue” (Brennan 2005:144). 
 
The idea that human beings can find happiness simply by “reasoning well” in the selection of 
things without any regard for the things themselves, was open to objection and it would appear 
that Antipater‟s modifications was designed to meet whatever criticism the Stoics might have 
received in this regard (Sandbach 1989:57). In his second formula, “to do everything concerning 
oneself continually and perpetually in order to attain the things that are „preferable‟ according to 
nature”, Antipater introduced the acquisition of naturally preferable things to the end but still 
attributed no value to them with regards to one‟s happiness (Sandbach 1989:57). “This formula, 
then, which by including the natural objectives recognises that they are essential for moral 
action, also establishes their relation to it; not their acquisition, but the attempt to acquire them 
constitutes morality” (Sandbach 1989:57-8). 
 
Only with Panaetius and Posidonius, the main representatives of the Middle Stoa, are significant 
deviations from the Old Stoic teachings obvious, as they both allocated considerably more value 
to the “primary natural things” (Smuts 1948:10). Panaetius moreover placed greater emphasis on 
the individual human nature (Arnold 1911:283; Smuts 1948:12), and whereas the Old Stoic telos 
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called for a constant, unchanging internal attitude that would help us to live happily in a world 
where external circumstance are constantly changing, Panaetius proposes that one should rather 
learn to adapt oneself to exactly these ever-changing circumstances (Smuts 1948). The details 
regarding these discrepancies between the Old and Middle Stoa should not concern us further; as 
we shall see Seneca and other representatives of the Late Stoa appear to have turned back to the 
orthodox doctrines of the Old Stoa. 
 
As a concluding thought we can say that the Stoics believed that humans are “constitutively 
capable of developing to the point of gaining complete happiness, through virtue and rational 
reflection, regardless of the specific character of their inborn nature, upbringing and social 
context” (Gill 2006:131). To sum up what has been discussed in this chapter, we can say that in 
order to live a happy life we ought to bring ourselves into complete agreement with nature by 
living virtuously and this will be achieved by living according to, i.e. perfecting, our one 
distinctive attribute, namely reason. Given these initial assumptions about the Stoic telos, the 
next chapter will proceed to discuss the developmental process one must undergo to achieve it. 
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Chapter 3: Attainment of the Stoic telos 
 
In the previous chapter it has been shown that for the Stoics happiness – the “final end” (telos) of 
human life – is attained by “living in agreement with nature” which essentially means “living 
virtuously”. In short, their position can be expressed as, “If we want to be happy, we must live 
virtuously”. We have looked at various definitions of this final end, but what seems to be most 
noteworthy about all of them is, that happiness is not a state of being, but rather a way of living. 
This means that happiness is a goal that must actively and constantly be achieved. In the 
discussion of Cic. Fin. III.21 above, it has been shown that “living in agreement with nature” 
consists of performing actions that are “constant and in harmony with nature” (constans 
consentaneaque naturae), that is, performing “correct actions” or “correctly performed actions”, 
or θαηνξζώκαηα in Greek (Cic. Fin. III.24). These are actions “according to virtue” (ηὰ θαη‟ 
ἀξεηήλ; Stob.II.7.8) and they are performed solely for their own sake and only the wise are 
capable of performing such actions, since the wise alone possess perfect reason which constitutes 
virtue. 
 
The question that poses itself now is how someone who is not yet wise can come to perform such 
morally correct or virtuous actions and thus attain happiness. This chapter does not look at how 
the Stoics thought this goal could be achieved in practice, but merely discusses the theory behind 
the developmental process one must undergo in one‟s mind in order to be able to live happily.  
 
In order to determine how human beings can go from performing actions, directed by instinct (as 
is the case in the beginning stages of their lives) to performing morally correct actions directed 
by virtue, one needs to start by considering the Stoics‟ theory of motivation. The theory states 
that every action is motivated by an impulse (G: hormē; L: appetitus or impetus) which arises in 
response to a presentation (G: phantasia; L: visum)
8
 of something in the agent‟s environment 
(Brennan 2003:260; Gill 2006:138). This overall pattern of motivation applies to both rational 
animals (adult humans) and non-rational animals (children and non-human animals) (Gill 
                                                             
8 Some scholars render phantasia with impression (eg. Brennan 2005:52; Gill 2006:139) but I prefer to follow the 
translation used by Hunt (1976:61) and Reesor (1989:49) – „presentation‟. The term „impression‟ (typōsis) is rather 
what Zeno called the phantasia‟s effect on a persons‟ soul (D.L. VII 50; cf. Hunt 1976:60-1). 
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2006:139). As has been shown in the discussion of D.L. VII.85-87 and Cic. Fin. III.16, every 
animal‟s first impulse is towards self-preservation, i.e. to pursue what is “oikeion” to its nature, 
and to avoid the opposite.  
 
However, whereas children and non-human animals act instinctively upon receiving a 
presentation, in adult human beings (i.e. rational beings) the impulse to act does not occur 
without an additional mental operation: an act of assent (G: sunkatathesis; L: adsensus) to 
presentations, more accurately “impulsive presentations” (phantasiai hormētikai), i.e. 
presentations capable of moving an impulse (Stob. II.7.9; Reesor 1989:50; Sandbach 1989:60; 
Sorabji 2000:43; Brennan 2003:262,266; Cooper 2005:183 Gill 2006:139). This psychological 
phenomenon has already been touched on briefly in the discussion of Chrysippus‟ cylinder 
analogy in the previous chapter, but it will now be explored in further detail.  
 
The Greek term for assent, is derived from the verb ζπγθαηαηίζεκη which means to “go along 
with”, “to vote for”, “to agree with” or “to endorse” (Long 1999:577; Brennan 2005:51). In view 
of the Stoic theory of motivation, assenting to an impulsive presentation means evaluating its 
content and deciding what would be the appropriate way to react to it. Assent is thus made up of 
two judgements: one regarding the value of the content of a presentation, i.e. judge whether it is 
good or bad (or perhaps neither), the other regarding the necessary action to be taken (Sorabji 
2000:2; Brennan 2003:266, 270; Gill 2006:79). Only if we assent to the impulsive presentation, 
the impulse to act is created. For example, if we are faced with some kind of danger, the impulse 
to flee from it is only created when we assent to the presentation of danger, i.e. judge (1) that 
something bad is imminent and (2) that it is appropriate to avoid it (Brennan 2003:262). 
 
As has been discussed in the previous chapter regarding moral responsibility of individuals for 
their actions, whether one gives or withholds assent depends entirely on one‟s moral character 
and so the key difference between the virtuous actions (i.e. morally correct actions) performed 
by the wise and the vicious actions performed by the non-wise also lies in their assent to 
impulsive presentations (Brennan 2005:52; Gill 2006:198). The difference between the assent of 
the wise and the non-wise comes down to the following two aspects: (1) the character of the 
presentations they assent to, and (2) the way in which they assent to them.  
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Regarding the first aspect it must be noted that, presentations are considered either true or false 
depending on whether their content, i.e. whatever they propose to one‟s mind, is true or false 
(Brennan Reesor 1989:51; 2005:66). Additionally, the Stoics classified some of the true 
presentations as kataleptic (Hunt 1976:63; Reesor 1989:51; Brennan 2005:66). The word 
“kataleptic” was a Stoic invention (Brennan 2005:66); it is derived from the noun θαηάιεςηο 
which means “comprehension”, “cognition” or “grasp” (Arnold 1911:133; Hunt 1976:63; Long 
1999:548; Pomeroy 1999:112). “Kataleptic” thus suggests connotations such as 
“comprehensive”, “cognitive” or “graspable” (Hunt 1976:63; Brennan 2005:66). For a 
presentation to be not only true but kataleptically true it has to come with a sort of guarantee that 
its content is undoubtedly true (Boys-Stones 1998:317; Long 1999:577; Brennan 2005:68). The 
wise only assent to kataleptic presentations (Brennan 1996:324; Brennan 2005:176), while the 
non-wise assent to all kinds of presentations, false, true, and kataleptic since they lack the 
steadfast knowledge to distinguish between them. 
 
Regarding the second aspect one needs to explore another facet of the act of assent. Since assent 
has the function of judging and evaluating presentations, the outcome of any act of assent is a 
cognitive state, e.g. an opinion (or belief; G: doxa; L: opinio) (Long 1999:580; Brennan 
2003:263). So, to assent to a presentation means to have an opinion about the value of the 
presentation. This is also true for presentations that do not necessarily arouse an impulse, such as 
perceptive (aisthētikai), rational (logikai) and cognitive (katalēptikai) presentations (cf. Reesor 
1989:50). In the case of impulsive presentations, assent comprises an additional opinion 
regarding the appropriate action that should be taken (cf. Stob. II.7.9). Opinion is only one type 
of cognitive state, one that results from what the Stoics refer to as “weak assent”. In cases where 
strong assent is given, i.e. assent which is fully justified (because the presentation is 
kataleptically true), the cognitive state is a “genuine grasp” of the truth contained in the 
presentation, and this is knowledge (G: epistēmē; L: scientia) (Arnold 1911:133; Long 1999:578; 
Brennan 2003:263; Brennan 2005:89-90). 
 
The difference between a weak assent and a strong assent has nothing to do with how weakly or 
strongly one is convinced of something. The Stoics were not concerned with how strongly and 
consistently one does uphold one‟s point of view, but rather how strongly and consistently one 
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could uphold it when confronted with various challenges (Brennan 2005:69). A weak assent is an 
assent that is immediately abandoned when we are, for example, shown that it contradicts 
another point of view we might hold, or when we are challenged by certain emotional or 
psychological pressures. A strong assent, on the other hand, is an assent that cannot be 
abandoned regardless of our circumstances or the challenges we face (Brennan 2005:69). Only 
the wise are capable of having a strong assent to presentations, for only the wise have a 
consistent and error-free world view that they can never hold contradicting beliefs or be tempted 
to abandon one belief for another (Brennan 2005:71). Thus, only the wise can have knowledge. 
The assent of a non-wise, on the other hand, regardless of whether it is given to a false, true or 
kataleptic presentation, will always be a weak assent (Brennan 2005:72), since the non-wise lack 
the consistent mental disposition of the wise for their assent to be stable and reliable, and so the 
non-wise will always only have mere opinions. 
 
Opinions can be either true or false depending on whether the presentations one is assenting to 
are true or false (Brennan 2005:66). It should further be noted that, even when a non-wise person 
assents to a kataleptic presentation, the outcome is still opinion and not knowledge (Boys-Stones 
1998:317; Brennan 2005:71). Since he might often also assent to non-kataleptic presentations 
and presentations that are actually contradictory to the given kataleptic presentation, he clearly 
lacks the criterion of discernment (i.e. knowledge) by which he can be sure that the presentation 
which he assents to is indeed kataleptic (Hunt 1976:65; Boys-Stones 1998:317). 
 
So far it has been shown, that all actions stem from impulses. And all impulses in rational beings 
are cognitive states mediated by assent. The wise will only receive impulses from kataleptic 
presentations and all their impulses are episodes of knowledge, resulting from strong assent. The 
non-wise, on the other hand, fail to discern between false, true and kataleptic presentations; all 
their impulses are opinions which come from weak assent. From this brief overview of the Stoic 
theory of motivation, it can be concluded that in order to perform morally correct actions like the 
wise, one will need to have the correct sort of impulses, which depend on one‟s correct 
evaluation of impulsive presentations. Therefore, the starting point for anyone who wishes to live 
happily should be to seek to acquire correct understanding of the true value of things, i.e. of 
what is good and bad. Knowledge of the value of things will enable a person to judge the content 
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of impulsive presentations correctly which will produce the correct sort of impulses which will 
in turn lead to correct actions. With an eye on finding out how progress can be made towards 
virtuous conduct, the remainder of this chapter will now correspondingly go on to discuss in 
further detail the Stoics‟ theory of (1) value, (2) impulses, and (3) actions. The aim is ultimately 
to clarify the steps in the mental development one has to undergo in order to reach (or at least get 
closer) to the goal of living a happy life. 
 
 
3.1 Theory of Value 
 
One‟s greatest hindrance to living virtuously, i.e. performing virtuous or morally correct actions, 
is one‟s false beliefs about the value of the content of impulsive presentations. Anyone who 
wishes to live virtuously (or at least make progress towards this ideal), should start by 
abandoning such false beliefs and seeking to acquire correct understanding of the true value of 
things. Some of the concepts discussed below have already been touched on in the previous 
chapter, but this section will set out the Stoics‟ theory of value in closer detail.  
 
The Stoics divided all things that exist into three value categories: things that are good, things 
that are bad, and things that are indifferent (Brennan 2005:119; Inwood 2005:101-2; Sellars 
2006:110). This theory is preserved in Diogenes Laertius‟ Vitae philosophorum VII.101-2 and 
Joannes Stobaeus‟ Anthologium II.7.5a: 
 
η῵λ δ‟ ὄλησλ θαζὶ ηὰ κὲλ ἀγαζὰ εἶλαη, ηὰ δὲ θαθά, ηὰ δ‟ νὐδέηεξα. Ἀγαζὰ κὲλ νὖλ ηάο η‟ ἀξεηάο, 
θξόλεζηλ, δηθαηνζύλελ, ἀλδξείαλ, ζσθξνζύλελ θαὶ ηὰ ινηπά· θαθὰ δὲ ηὰ ἐλαληία, ἀθξνζύλελ, 
ἀδηθίαλ θαὶ ηὰ ινηπά. νὐδέηεξα δὲ ὅζα κήη‟ ὠθειεῖ κήηε βιάπηεη, νἷνλ δσή, ὑγίεηα, ἡδνλή, θάιινο, 
ἰζρύο, πινῦηνο, εὐδνμία, εὐγέλεηα· θαὶ ηὰ ηνύηνηο ἐλαληία, ζάλαηνο, λόζνο, πόλνο, αἶζρνο, 
ἀζζέλεηα, πελία, ἀδνμία, δπζγέλεηα θαὶ ηὰ παξαπιήζηα. (D.L. VII.101-2 in Hicks 1925:206,208) 
 
Of the things that exist, they [the Stoics] say, that some are good, some are bad, and some are neither. 
Goods9, then, are the virtues, wisdom, justice, courage, temperance etc.; bads10 are the opposites: 
                                                             
9 Hereafter I will use the English term “goods” for the Greek ἀγαζὰ and the Latin bona (cf. Brennan 2005). 
10
 Hereafter I will use the English term “bads” for the Greek θαθά and the Latin mala (cf. Brennan 2005). 
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foolishness, injustice, etc. The things that are neither are all the things which neither benefit nor harm, 
such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, good repute, noble birth and their opposites: 
death, sickness, pain, ugliness, weakness, poverty, ill-repute, low birth and the like. 
 
 
η῵λ δ‟ ὄλησλ ηὰ κὲλ ἀγαζά, ηὰ δὲ θαθά, ηὰ δὲ ἀδηάθνξα. Ἀγαζὰ κὲλ ηὰ ηνηαῦηα· θξόλεζηλ, 
ζσθξνζύλελ, δηθαηνζύλελ, ἀλδξείαλ θαὶ πᾶλ ὅ ἐζηηλ ἀξεηὴ ἢ κεηέρνλ ἀξεηῆο· θαθὰ δὲ ηὰ ηνηαῦηα· 
ἀθξνζύλελ, ἀθνιαζίαλ, ἀδηθίαλ, δεηιίαλ θαὶ πᾶλ ὅ ἐζηη θαθία ἢ κεηέρνλ θαθίαο· ἀδηάθνξα δὲ ηὰ 
ηνηαῦηα· δσὴλ ζάλαηνλ, δόμαλ ἀδνμίαλ, ἡδνλὴλ πόλνλ, πινῦηνλ πελίαλ, ὑγίεηαλ λόζνλ, θαὶ ηὰ ηνύηνηο 
ὅκνηα. (Stob. II.7.5a in Wachsmuth and Hense 1884:57-8) 
 
Of the things that exist, some are good, some are bad, and some are indifferent. Goods are things such 
as these: wisdom, temperance, justice, courage and everything that is a virtue or participates in virtue; 
bads are things such as these: foolishness, intemperance, injustice, cowardice and everything that is a 
vice or participates in vice; indifferents11 are things such as these: life, death; good repute, ill repute; 
pleasure, pain; wealth, poverty; health, sickness, and similar things.  
 
From these nearly identical accounts one can assert that according to traditional Stoic teaching, 
only virtue and what participates in virtue is truly good; only vice and what participates in vice is 
bad. All other things, such as health, wealth, life, and good repute and their opposites, are 
indifferent (cf. Motto 1985:10; Sorabji 2000:169-70; Brennan 2003:263-4; Brennan 2005:27-8; 
Inwood 2005:101-2; Sellars 2006:110).  
 
Diogenes Laertius explains further how the term „indifferent‟ is to be understood: 
 
  Δηρ῵ο δὲ ιέγεζζαη ἀδηάθνξα· ἅπαμ κὲλ ηὰ κήηε πξὸο εὐδαηκνλίαλ κήηε πξὸο θαθνδαηκνλίαλ 
ζπλεξγνῦληα, ὡο ἔρεη πινῦηνο, δόμα, ὑγίεηα, ἰζρὺο θαὶ ηὰ ὅκνηα· … ἄιισο δὲ ιέγεηαη ἀδηάθνξα ηὰ 
κήζ‟ ὁξκῆο κήη‟ ἀθνξκῆο θηλεηηθά, ὡο ἔρεη ηὸ ἀξηίαο ἔρεηλ ἐπὶ ηῆο θεθαιῆο ηξίραο ἢ πεξηηηάο, ἢ 
ἐθηεῖλαη ηὸλ δάθηπινλ ἢ ζπζηεῖιαη...· (D.L. VII.104 in Hicks 1925:208, 210) 
 
But [they also say that] indifferents are so called in two ways: In one way [the term refers to] the 
things which contribute neither to happiness nor to unhappiness, such as wealth, good repute, health, 
strength, and the like. ... In another way things are called indifferent which stimulate neither impulse 
                                                             
11  Hereafter I will use the English term “indifferents” for the Greek ἀδηάθνξα and the Latin indifferentia (cf. 
Brennan 2005). 
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nor repulsion, such as the fact that one has an odd or even number of hairs on one‟s head or whether 
one extends or draws back one‟s finger. 
 
A similar account is provided by Stobaeus (II.7.7) who distinguishes between the “indifferents” 
that are simply neither good nor bad and the “absolute indifferents” (θαζάπαμ ἀδηάθνξα) – the 
“things which stimulate neither impulse nor repulsion” (ηὰ κήζ‟ ὁξκῆο κήη‟ ἀθνξκῆο θηλεηηθά). 
Both Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus make it clear that the things which the Stoics term 
“indifferents” are indifferent in the former sense, i.e. they are neither good nor bad and as such 
do not contribute in any way to one‟s happiness; they are, however, capable of stirring an 
impulse and are thus not indifferent with regard to a person‟s action of selecting or rejecting 
them.  
 
In order to discern which of the so-called „indifferents‟ should be selected and which should be 
rejected, the Stoics had to allocate some sort of value to them, namely “selective value” (ἀμία 
ἐθιεθηηθή) (Stob. II.7.7; Sorabji 2000:170; Brennan 2003:264).  
 
Diogenes Laertius provides the following account: 
 
Τ῵λ ἀδηαθόξσλ ηὰ κὲλ ιέγνπζη πξνεγκέλα, ηὰ δὲ ἀπνπξνεγκέλα· πξνεγκέλα κὲλ ηὰ ἔρνληα ἀμίαλ, 
ἀπνπξνεγκέλα δὲ ηὰἀπαμίαλ ἔρνληα. (D.L. VII.105 in Hicks 1925:210) 
 
Of the indifferents, they say that some are preferred, others dispreferred. The things that have value 
are preferred, the things that have disvalue are dispreferred.  
 
Stobaeus attests a similar description: 
 
Ἔηη δὲ η῵λ ἀδηαθόξσλ ηὰ κὲλ πιείσ ἀμίαλ ἔρεηλ, ηὰ δ‟ ἐιάηησ· … θαὶ ηὰ κὲλ πξνεγκέλα, ηὰ δ‟ 
ἀπνπξνεγκέλα, ηὰ δ‟ νὐδεηέξσο ἔρνληα. Πξνεγκέλα κέλ, ὅζα ἀδηάθνξα ὄληα πνιιὴλ ἔρεη ἀμίαλ, 
…·ἀπνπξνεγκέλα δέ, ὅζα πνιιὴλ ἔρεη ἀπαμίαλ ὁκνίσο· (Stob. II.7.7b in Wachsmuth and Hense 
1884:80) 
 
And further, of the indifferents some have more value, others have less... And some are preferred, 
others dispreferred, and others are neither. Preferred are whichever indifferents have much value ... 
Likewise dispreferred are whichever have much disvalue. 
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Stobaeus also says that the preferred is an indifferent thing which we select (ἐθιεγόκεζα) and the 
opposite counts for the dispreferred (by implication they must be rejected) (Stob. II.7.7g). 
 
Moreover, the Stoics held that “of the indifferents some are according to nature, others contrary 
to nature, and others are neither contrary to nature nor according to nature” (θαὶ ηὰ κὲλ εἶλαη 
θαηὰ θύζηλ, ηὰ δὲ παξὰ θύζηλ, ηὰ δὲ νὔηε παξὰ θύζηλ νὔηε θαηὰ θύζηλ; Stob. II.7.7a in 
Wachsmuth and Hense 1884:79). And further, all the things according to nature have value and 
all the things contrary to nature have disvalue (Stob. II.7.7f). The former are to be taken (ιεπηά), 
the latter are not to be taken (ἄιεπηα) (Stob. II.7.7e). 
 
Cicero provides a more coherent summary of the Stoic theory of indifferents: 
 
Cetera autem etsi nec bona nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum naturam dicebat, alia naturae esse 
contraria; his ipsis alia interiecta et media numerabat. Quae autem secundum naturam essent, ea 
sumenda et quadam aestimatione dignanda docebat, contraque contraria, neutra autem in mediis 
relinquebat. In quibus ponebat nihil omnino esse momenti, sed quae essent sumenda, ex iis alia pluris 
esse aestimanda, alia minoris: quae pluris ea praeposita appellabat, reiecta autem quae minoris. (Cic. 
Academia I.36-7 in Rackham 1956:444) 
 
“All other things, he [Zeno] said, were neither good nor bad, but nevertheless some of them were in 
accordance with nature and others contrary to nature; also among these he counted another interposed 
or „intermediate‟ class of things. He taught that things in accordance with nature were to be chosen 
and estimated as having a certain value, and their opposites the opposite, while things that were 
neither he left in the „intermediate‟ class. These he declared to possess no motive force whatever, but 
among things to be chosen some were to be deemed of more value and others of less: the more 
valuable he termed „preferred‟, the less valuable, „rejected‟.” (Rackham 1956:445) 
 
From the evidence above the Stoic doctrine on indifferents may be summed up as follows: The 
things classed as “indifferent” were subdivided into (1) “preferred indifferents” (G: proēgmena; 
L: praeposita, promota, praecipua, producta (Cic. Fin. III.52); Seneca also uses the term 
commoda (Ep. 74.17) – “advantages”), (2) “dispreferred indifferents” (G: apoproēgmena; L: 
reiecta, remota; or incommoda – “disadvantages”) and (3) “absolute indifferents” (kathapax 
adiaphora) (cf. Arnold 1911:290; Gould 1970:177; Motto 1985:10; Barney 2003:308; Brennan 
2003:264; Brennan 2005:38; Inwood 2005:101-2; Sellars 2006:111). 
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The “preferred indifferents” then are things according to nature (ηὰ θαηὰ θύζηλ; ea quae 
secundum naturam), i.e. they are the things that Nature (i.e. universal nature) has “programmed” 
us to pursue (Barney 2003:310). As has been shown in the previous chapter, all animals, 
including humans, are born with an instinctive orientation towards preserving their own 
constitution. Accordingly, we all have a natural instinct to prefer, for example, health over 
sickness (Barney 2003:310). Preferred indifferents, then, are those that contribute under normal 
circumstances to our general well-being (Sellars 2006:112). Though they are not good in the 
same way as virtue is good, they have positive value and should therefore be “selected” or 
“taken”. Examples of “preferred indifferents” are life, health, strength, wealth, good repute and 
the like (D.L. VII.106; cf. Stob. II.7.7b). 
 
“Dispreferred indifferents” are things contrary to nature (ηὰ παξὰ θύζηλ; ea quae contraria 
naturae), i.e. things that Nature has programmed us to avoid as they are harmful to our well-
being. They have negative value and should therefore be “rejected”. “Dispreferred indifferents” 
include death, sickness, weakness, poverty, ill repute and so on (D.L. VII.106; cf.Stob. II.7.7b). 
 
“Absolute indifferents” have no value whatsoever as they have no power to arouse impulse and 
so do not move us to action. One example of an “absolute indifferent” cited above would be 
whether one has an odd or even number of hairs on one‟s head (D.L. VII.104; cf. Stob II.7.7 and 
II.7.7c). 
 
One might want to ask now why virtue alone should count as good, and things such as life and 
health as mere indifferents. Firstly, the Stoics held that things such as physical health and great 
wealth cannot be considered good since they can also be used badly (Gould 1970:178; Sellars 
2006:111). To illustrate this argument, the Stoics provide the following analogy: 
 
ὡο γὰξ ἴδηνλ ζεξκνῦ ηὸ ζεξκαίλεηλ, νὐ ηὸ ςύρεηλ, νὕησ θαὶ ἀγαζνῦ ηὸ ὠθειεῖλ, νὐ ηὸ βιάπηεηλ· νὐ 
κᾶιινλ δ‟ ὠθειεῖ ἢ βιάπηεη ὁ πινῦηνο θαὶ ἡ ὑγίεηα· νὐθ ἄξ‟ ἀγαζὸλ νὔηε πινῦηνο νὔζ‟ ὑγίεηα. ἔηη ηέ 
θαζηλ, ᾧ ἔζηηλ εὖ θαὶ θαθ῵ο ρξῆζζαη, ηνῦη‟ νὐθ ἔζηηλ ἀγαζόλ· πινύηῳ δὲ θαὶ ὑγηείᾳ ἔζηηλ εὖ θαὶ 
θαθ῵ο ρξῆζζαη· νὐθ ἄξ‟ ἀγαζὸλ πινῦηνο θαὶ ὑγίεηα. (D.L. VII.103 in Hicks 1925:208) 
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For as it is characteristic of heat to warm, not to cool, so it is also characteristic of the good to benefit 
and not to harm. But wealth and health do not benefit any more than they harm; therefore neither 
wealth nor health is a good. Further they say that that which can be used well and badly, is not a good. 
But wealth and health can be used well and badly; therefore wealth and health are not a good. 
 
From this one can conclude that, the only thing that deserves to be called good is what reliably 
benefits us and will never be used for bad ends (Gould 1970:168; Barney 2003:309) and that is 
virtue. 
 
Secondly, while it might be natural for us to pursue what is beneficial to our well-being, e.g. 
health and wealth, these things might not always be appropriate to pursue (Inwood 2005:102). 
Depending on the circumstances one might sometimes choose the dispreferred indifferent, even 
when the preferred one is available. At times it might be more rational to choose sickness over 
health, poverty over wealth, and in extreme cases death over life (Brennan 2005:40; Sellars 
2006:108). 
 
One might wonder how this relates to the preceding account of self-preservation. It would seem 
that for rational beings preservation of their rationality should become more important than the 
preservation of their physical existence (Sellars 2006:108). For example, if a wise person is 
threatened by a tyrant to be killed if he does not agree to do something that he knows to be 
wrong, then he – in order to preserve himself as a rational being – will refuse even if this may 
cost him his life (Sellars 2006:108-9). Suicide might in such circumstances be the only rational 
action. The Roman Stoics in particular were known for adhering to this doctrine, the most 
famous being Cato (Arnold 1911:388; Sellars 2006:109). Another example would be Seneca 
himself, who was forced to commit suicide by Nero (Sandbach 1989:131; Colish 1990:14; 
Sellars 2006:109). But even Zeno and Cleanthes reportedly took their own lives (D.L. VII.28, 
176; cf. Sellars 2006:109). It should be clear that choosing a dispreferred over a preferred 
indifferent does not go against our natural impulse for survival; such an action is still a product 
of a desire for self-preservation, i.e. preservation of one‟s rationality. It follows that for rational 
beings the only thing that is genuinely good is not what preserves our physical constitution, but 
rather what preserves us as rational beings and that is virtue alone (Sellars 2006:109-110). 
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Lastly, and perhaps most importantly it must be remembered that depending on Nature‟s pre-
determined plan one might not always be able to obtain everything that is beneficial to one‟s 
nature, but one could be forced to accept sickness or poverty. Seeing that all events in life are 
predetermined and completely out of one‟s control, the Stoics had to make true happiness 
independent of the possession of things such as health and wealth (Smuts 1948:2; Sellars 
2006:111). The only thing that can guarantee us happiness is virtue (Gould 1970:169; Sellars 
2006:111). 
 
On account of this division of indifferents into “preferred” and “dispreferred”, the Stoics were 
often accused of adopting the views of the Peripatetics. Aristotle advocated that apart from 
virtue, certain external or physical advantages, such as wealth or good health, are goods as well 
and essential requirements for a happy life (Gould 1970:178; Brennan 2005:142-3; Sellars 
2006:112). One person who notoriously rejected these categories of “preferred” and 
“dispreferred” indifferents was Zeno‟s student Aristo. He maintained that there is no reason for 
preferring one indifferent above another, since everything besides virtue and vice was 
completely indifferent (D.L. VII.160; Cic. Fin. III.50; cf. Hadot 1969:75; Sandbach 1989:38; 
Barney 2003:310; Brennan 2005:142; Sellars 2006:113). Chrysippus criticized Aristo‟s position 
of complete indifference arguing that it would make virtue entirely meaningless (Arnold 
1911:291; Hadot 1969:75; Sandbach 1989:38; Brennan 2005:142). In the previous chapter we 
have seen that virtuous conduct involves selecting and rejecting things wisely, justly, bravely and 
temperately. Diogenes of Babylon and Antipater even included the selection of the things 
“according to nature” (i.e. preferred indifferents) and rejection of their opposites into their 
formulations of the final end. However, if all things besides virtue and vice were equally 
indifferent, a virtuous person would have no rational grounds for pursuing the one and avoiding 
the other. Aristo‟s views were later considered unorthodox and heretical and most Stoics decided 
to side with Chrysippus and held that indifferents are indifferent with regards to one‟s happiness 
and unhappiness, but not with regards to rational action. In order to know what is rational to 
select and reject, the distinction between preferred and dispreferred indifferents is of utmost 
importance (Hadot 1969:75; Brennan 2005:142).  
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As has been proposed above, correct understanding of this theory of value will enable us to 
evaluate correctly the content of presentations, and this is the first step towards being able to 
perform morally correct actions like the wise and thereby attaining happiness. Above it has been 
pointed out that one of the differences between the virtuous (i.e. morally correct) actions of the 
wise and the vicious actions of the non-wise is the character of the impulsive presentations that 
they assent to. The non-wise often have the opinion that all ordinary things in life are either good 
or bad for them (cf. Brennan 2003:264; Cooper 2005:183); the presentations they thus generally 
assent to are false. The wise, on the other hand, only assent to kataleptic presentations, since they 
know that everything besides virtue and vice is indifferent and depending on the circumstances, 
things to be “preferred” or “dispreferred”, and by this they judge whether something is worth 
selecting or rejecting (cf. Cooper 2005:184). What appears to be needed towards progress 
towards virtuous conduct is a change of one‟s inner attitude towards the things which one 
wrongly judges to be good and bad. 
 
 
3.2 Theory of Impulses 
 
To sum up what has already been established about impulses above, an impulse is a response to 
an impulsive presentation. In the case of rational beings, i.e. adult humans, this response is 
mediated by assent which involves (1) attributing value to the contents of the impulsive 
presentation and (2) determining an appropriate way to react to it. All the impulses of the wise 
are episodes of knowledge (which results from strong assent to kataleptic presentations); all the 
impulses of ordinary non-wise people are mere opinions (resulting from weak assent). An 
impulse can, thus, be generically defined as an 
 
Opinion/knowledge that (1) something is good or bad or indifferent and that (2) it is appropriate to react to it. 
 
The Stoics differentiate between three species of impulses: “emotions” or “passions” (G: pathē; 
L: perturbationes, affectus), “good feelings” (eupatheiai) and “selection and rejection” (eklogē, 
apeklogē) (Sorabji 2000:29-35; Brennan 2003:269-271). Each of these will be discussed in detail 
below. 
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3.2.1 Emotions 
 
Impulses of ordinary non-wise people consist primarily in emotions (pathē) and most surviving 
accounts of Stoic impulses are concerned with this species of impulses (Brennan 2003:269). As a 
species of impulses emotions must be understood as cognitive states that eventuate in some kind 
of action. Hence, Stoic emotions do not include any feelings that do not lead to action (Brennan 
2005:91). It should be clear that, like any impulse in a rational being, an emotion involves a 
conscious act of assent to an impulsive presentation, which means that they are completely in our 
power to control. The Stoics do acknowledge the existence of certain immediate involuntary 
physical or mental reactions that people sometimes have in response to presentations before they 
have had a chance to form a judgement about it, for example shuddering, growing pale or 
shedding of tears (Sorabji 2000:3, 68). These so-called “first movements” must not be confused 
with genuine emotions (Sellars 2006:116).
12
 
 
According to the Stoics, there are four generic emotions, in terms of which all others can be 
classified. These four emotions are “desire” (G: epithumia; L: libido, appetitus, cupiditas, 
ambitio), “fear” (G: phobos; L: metus), “pleasure” (G: hēdonē; L: laetitia), and “distress” (G: 
lupē; L: aegritudo, dolor) (D.L. VII.110; Stob. II.7.10; Cic. Tusculanae Disputationes (Tusc.). 
IV.11; Galen De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis (PHP) IV.2.1-4; cf. Arnold 1911:331; Gould 
1970:185-6; Sandbach 1989:61; Sorabji 2000:29; Brennan 2003:269). 
 
All other emotions are classified as sub-species of these four generic emotions. For example, 
anger, hatred, greed and erotic love are all sub-species of desire. Terror, panic, hesitancy, shame, 
mental agony and timidity fall under fear. Among the sub-species of pleasure are joy at others‟ 
misfortunes, self-gratification and ostentation. Grief, pity, jealousy, envy, worry, regret and the 
like are classified under distress (Stob. II.7.10b; D.L. VII.111-114; Cic. Tusc. IV.16; cf. 
Sandbach 1989:61; Sorabji 2000:136; Brennan 2003:270). 
 
                                                             
12 A detailed discussion of first movements can be found in Seneca‟s De Ira II.2-4 (Sorabji 2000:68-9; Sellars 
2006:116). 
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How the Stoics defined the four species of emotion is preserved in the following two extracts by 
Stobaeus and Cicero: 
 
Τὴλ κὲλ νὖλ ἐπηζσκίαλ ιέγνπζηλ ὄξεμηλ εἶλαη ἀπεηζῆ ιόγῳ· αἴηηνλ δ‟ αὐηῆο ηὸ δνμάδεηλ ἀγαζὸλ 
ἐπηθέξεζζαη, νὗ παξόληνο εὖ ἀπαιιάμνκελ, ηῆο δόμεο αὐηῆο ἐρνύζεο ηὸ ἀηάθησο θηλεηηθὸλ 
<πξόζθαηνλ ηνῦ ὄλησο αὐηὸ ὀξεθηὸλ εἶλαη>. Φόβολ δ‟ εἶλαη ἔθθιηζηλ ἀπεηζῆ ιόγῳ, αἴηηνλ δ‟ αὐηνῦ 
ηὸ δνμάδεηλ θαθὸλ ἐπηθέξεζζαη, ηῆο δόμεο ηὸ θηλεηηθὸλ [θαὶ] πξόζθαηνλ ἐρνύζεο ηνῦ ὄλησο αὐηὸ 
θεπθηὸλ εἶλαη. Λύπελ δ‟ εἶλαη ζπζηνιὴλ ςπρῆο ἀπεηζῆ ιόγῳ, αἴηηνλ δ‟ αὐηῆο ηὸ δνμάδεηλ πξόζθαηνλ 
θαθὸλ παξεῖλαη, ἐθ‟ ᾧ θαζήθεη <ζπζηέιιεζζαη. Ἡδολὴλ δ‟ εἶλαη ἔπαξζηλ ςπρῆο ἀπεηζῆ ιόγῳ, αἴηηνλ δ‟ 
αὐηῆο ηὸ δνμάδεηλ πξόζθαηνλ ἀγαζὸλ παξεῖλαη, ἐθ‟ ᾧ θαζήθεη> ἐπαίξεζζαη. (Stob. II.7.10b in 
Wachsmuth and Hense 1884:90) 
 
So, they say that desire is a longing disobedient to reason, and the cause of it is having an opinion that 
something good is imminent, [and that] when it is present we will get along well, while the opinion 
itself has the undisciplined fresh stimulation that this very thing is really something to be longed for. 
And fear is avoidance disobedient to reason, and the cause of it is having an opinion that something 
bad is imminent, while the opinion has the fresh stimulation that this very thing is really something to 
be avoided. And distress is a contraction of the soul disobedient to reason, and the cause of it is 
having a fresh opinion that something bad is present, on account of which it is appropriate to be 
contracted. And pleasure is an elation of the soul disobedient to reason, and the cause of it is having a 
fresh opinion that something good is present, on account of which it is appropriate to be elated.  
 
 
Est ergo aegritudo opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse 
videatur; laetitia opinio recens boni praesentis, in quo efferri rectum esse videatur; metus opinio 
impendentis mali, quod intolerabile esse videatur, libido opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu iam 
praesens esse atque adesse. (Cic. Tusc. IV.14 in King 1950:342) 
 
Therefore, distress is a recently formed opinion of a present bad, in [the midst of] which it seems right 
to be downcast and contracted in the soul; pleasure is a recently formed opinion of a present good in 
[the midst of] which it seems right to be carried away; fear is an opinion of an impending bad which 
is seen as being unbearable; desire is an opinion of an approaching good, of the kind which would be 
of use now to be present and here. 
 
In recognizing these four main species of emotions, the Stoics might have been influenced partly 
by Plato, who mentions this list of four emotions on several occasions (Plato Laches 191 D; 
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Symposium 207 E; Phaedo 83 B; Republic 429 C; 430 A; Theaetetus 156 B; cf. Sorabji 
2000:136). But the Stoics also have a rationale of their own: From the definitions cited above, 
one can observe that the four generic emotions are made up of opposing pairs, one pertaining to 
value (good and bad) and time (present and future). One pair of emotions (desire and pleasure) is 
directed at apparent goods, the other (fear and distress) at apparent bads; one pair (pleasure and 
distress) is concerned with the present, the other (desire and fear) with the future (cf. Cic. Tusc. 
IV. 11; Sorabji 2000:29, 136; Brennan 2003:269; Brennan 2005:93-4; Sellars 2006:117). 
 
If one takes a closer look at the extracts above, one will notice an obvious discrepancy between 
these two accounts: in Stobaeus the four emotions are defined as being certain reactions 
(contraction, elation, longing, or avoidance) that are caused by the opinion that a good or bad is 
present or approaching. A similar definition is preserved by Diogenes Laertius for one of the four 
emotions, namely pleasure which is said to be “irrational elation when something believed to be 
choiceworthy is present” ([Ἡδνλὴ δέ ἐζηηλ] ἄινγνο ἔπαξζηο ἐθ‟ αἱξεηῶ δνθνῦληη ὑπάξρεηλ; D.L. 
VII.114; cf. Sorabji 2000:35). In Cicero‟s account, on the other hand, it is said that the opinion is 
the emotion itself and it is in each case followed by a relevant reaction. 
 
According to Galen, Zeno held that emotions were the reactions that occurred as a consequence 
of a judgement (krisis); Chrysippus later turned the cause (i.e. the judgement) into the emotion 
itself (Galen PHP IV.2.1-6, IV.3.1-2,V.1.4; Gould 1970:181-2; Sandbach 1989:64; Sorabji 
2000:34-5; Gill 2006:247; Sellars 2006:115). Above it has already been established that 
judgement and evaluation of presentations are part of assenting, and the outcome of the act of 
assent is an opinion (or knowledge in the case where strong assent is given to kataleptic 
presentations). And Zeno himself is also recorded as having at times defined emotion as an 
opinion (doxa). Distress, for example, is said to be “fresh opinion that one is in the presence of a 
bad” (δόμαλ γὰξ εἶλαη πξόζθαηνλ ηνῦ θαθὸλ αὐηῶ παξεῖλαί [θεζη ηὴλ ιύπελ]; Galen PHP 4.7.2-
3; cf. Sorabji 2000:35). Above we have also seen that impulse and action are inseparably linked: 
once a person has an impulse to act, the action will follow automatically. The fact that assent, 
impulse and action all follow directly and inevitably upon each other, might explain why 
emotions were sometimes defined as judgements (which are strictly speaking part of the assent 
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preceding the impulse), sometimes as opinions (which actually are the impulses), and sometimes 
as the affective reactions (which in actual fact follow upon the impulse).  
 
It is uncertain whether the Stoics themselves really made an issue of the varying definitions; the 
differences seem to be mainly one of emphasis rather than doctrine (Gill 2006:248). Leaving this 
internal Stoic debate aside, what is relevant is that both Zeno and Chrysippus maintained that 
emotions involve mental assent which “forms the locus of the subject‟s responsibility for his own 
emotions” (Gill 2006:248). This becomes important in their claim that emotions are something 
that everybody should be able to control. The controlling, or rather eradication, of emotions will 
still be elaborated on below. 
 
For the sake of convenience and of conformity with what has been said about impulses above, 
the Stoic emotions may be defined as follows (cf. Sorabji 2000:30; Brennan 2005:93): 
 
Desire is an opinion that (1) a future thing is good, and that (2) it is appropriate to long for it. 
 
Fear is an opinion that (1) a future thing is bad, and that (2) it is appropriate to avoid it. 
 
Pleasure is an opinion that (1) a present thing is good, and that (2) it is appropriate to be elated about it. 
 
Distress is an opinion that (1) a present thing is bad, and that (2) it is appropriate to be downcast about it. 
 
Emotions are, moreover, said to be “disobedient to reason” (cf. Stob. II.7.10b quoted above). 
Elsewhere Stobaeus provides the definition of an emotion as “an impulse which is excessive and 
disobedient to the choosing reason or an (irrational) movement of the soul contrary to nature‟ 
([Πάζνο δ‟ εἶλαί θαζηλ] ὁξκὴλ πιενλάδνπζαλ θαὶἀπεηζῆ ηῶ αἱξνῦληη ιόγῳ ἢ θίλεζηλ ςπρῆο 
<ἄινγνλ> παξὰθύζηλ; Stob. II.7.10). Similar accounts are given by Diogenes Laertius and 
Cicero: 
 
ἔζηη δὲ αὐηὸ ηὸ πάζνο θαηὰ Ζήλσλα ἡ ἄινγνο θαὶ παξὰ θύζηλ ςπρῆο θίλεζηο ἢ ὁξκὴ πιενλάδνπζα. 
(D.L. VII.110 in Hicks 1925:216) 
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And emotion itself is according to Zeno a movement of the soul which is irrational and contrary to 
nature or an excessive impulse. 
 
 
Est igitur Zenonis haec definitio, ut perturbatio sit, quod πάζνο ille dicit, avera a recta ratione contra 
naturam animi commotio. Quidam brevius perturbationem esse appetitum vehementiorem, sed 
vehementiorem eum volunt esse, qui longius discesserit a naturae constantia. (Cic. Tusc. IV.11 in 
King 1950:338) 
 
This then is Zeno‟s definition that an emotion, which he calls pathos, is a movement of the soul turned 
away from right reason and contrary to nature. Certain men say more briefly that emotion is a too 
violent impulse, but by too violent they mean one that has departed too far from the constancy of 
nature. 
 
One thing that should be noted first is that when the Stoics define emotions as “irrational” or 
“disobedient to reason” they do not mean that they are caused by an irrational part of the soul, as 
was proposed by Posidonius (Galen PHP IV.3.3; V.1.5). He is known to have accepted Plato‟s 
partition of the soul into a rational (logistikon) and two irrational parts, the irascible (thumoeides) 
and the appetitive (epithumētikon) part (Sorabji 2000:95). However, as already ascertained in 
chapter two, it was general Stoic consent that the soul was unitary. They believed that human 
beings are born with an irrational soul which is in the course of their natural development as a 
whole transformed and replaced by reason (Frede 1999:74).  
 
It must also be remembered that all impulses in rational beings are rational events, as they 
depend on assent of the mind to an impulsive presentation (Gill 2006:251). The word „irrational‟ 
here does not mean that emotions occur without the involvement of one‟s reason, but rather that 
the assent that leads to emotion does not conform to normal rational choices (Pomeroy 
1999:118). The most common sense in which emotions are irrational and contrary to our nature 
as rational beings is that they involve wrong value judgements; i.e. the objects contained in the 
presentations are judged to be good or  bad when in most cases they are really indifferent (Gould 
1970:182; Colish 1990:42; Gill 2003:41; Brennan 2003:264; Brennan 2005:96). In short, they 
are false opinions since they are products of assent to false presentations. 
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It is, of course, not entirely implausible that a non-wise person might, for example, have an 
emotion of desire for virtue, i.e. a true good. In other words, they might assent to a kataleptically 
true presentation that virtue is a future good and that it is appropriate to long for it. However, 
even if an emotion came from a true evaluative judgement (i.e. attributing goodness to something 
that is truly good), it would still be irrational since it involves assent that is weak and inconsistent 
(Brennan 2005:96). In other words, non-wise people might assent to kataleptic presentations, but 
they assent from a mindset that also often assents to things that are actually in contradiction with 
what they are assenting to right now (Brennan 2005:95). The fact that the opinions involved in 
emotions are said to be “fresh” (πξόζθαηνλ; Stob. II.7.10b) or “recently formed” (recens; Cic. 
Tusc. IV.14) also points to their instability and fickleness. What is implied is that previously held 
opinions might easily be replaced by “fresh” new opinions if there is no rational control 
(Pomeroy 1999:119). 
 
Emotions are thus irrational and contrary to nature, either because one is assenting to false 
presentations, or because one is assenting from a weak and unstable disposition (Brennan 
2005:95). “Irrational” further implies that the opinions which make up the emotions are not those 
which someone with perfect reason would hold (Sandbach 1989:61; Gill 2006:252). So, since all 
ordinary emotions are based on faulty reasoning, they are bad states (or vices) of mind and 
should not be indulged in. Needless to say a perfectly wise person will never fall victim to this 
species of impulses. However, apparently in order to avoid the objection that human nature itself 
demands and indeed justifies certain emotional attachments to or aversions from objects in one‟s 
environment, the Stoics proposed another species of impulses, which are called eupatheiai 
(“good feelings”) (Cooper 2005:176).  
 
 
3.2.2 Eupatheiai 
 
To recap again what has been established above, the crucial difference between the wise person‟s 
and the ordinary person‟s impulses lies in their assent to impulsive presentation: the wise will 
only assent to kataleptically true presentations and their assent is always strong. Instead of 
emotions, the wise will experience impulses which the Stoics call eupatheiai. Cicero renders this 
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term with constantiae, perhaps “steady states”, as opposed to “excessive impulse” of the 
emotions (Sandbach 1989:67). It is, however, possible that Cicero might have misread eupatheia 
as eustatheia, “stability”, as is suggested by Sandbach (1989:67). 
 
There are three generic eupatheiai: “wish” (G: boulēsis; L: voluntas), “caution” (G: eulabeia; L: 
cautio) and “joy” (G: khara; L: gaudium) (D.L. VII.116; Cic. Tusc. IV.12-3; Arnold 1911:324; 
Sandbach 1989:67; Sorabji 2000:47; Brennan 2003:270; Brennan 2005:97; Cooper 2005:176; 
Sellars 2006:118). These are defined as follows: 
 
θαὶ ηὴλ κὲλ ταρὰλ ἐλαληίαλ θαζὶλ εἶλαη ηῇ ἡδνλῇ, νὖζαλ εὔινγνλ ἔπαξζηλ· ηὴλ δ‟ εὐιάβεηαλ ηῶ 
θόβῳ, νὖζαλ εὔινγνλ ἔθθιηζηλ. ... ηῇ δ‟ ἐπηζπκίᾳ ἐλαληίαλ θαζὶλ εἶλαη ηὴλ βούιεζηλ, νὖζαλ εὔινγνλ 
ὄξεμηλ. (D.L. VII.116 in Hicks 1925:220) 
 
And they say that joy is the opposite of pleasure, since it is rational elation; and caution is the 
opposite of fear, since it is rational avoidance. ... And they say that wish is the opposite of desire, 
since it is rational longing. 
 
The word εὔινγνο (translated with rational) here does not mean “rational” in the sense of 
conforming to everyday sensible behaviour, but rather something like “in accordance with 
perfect reason” that only the wise possess. It is meant to be understood as a direct opposite of 
“irrational” (ἄινγνο) used in the definition of emotion. As has been proposed above, emotions 
are “irrational” in that they are products of weak assent to false presentations. Correspondingly 
then, eupatheiai must be products of strong assent to kataleptically true presentations. 
 
By this logic, eupatheiai are impulses which consist in episodes of knowledge and come from 
the attribution of goodness to what is truly good (i.e. virtue) and badness to what is truly bad (i.e. 
vice) (Brennan 2003:270). In as much as joy, caution and wish are said to be direct opposites of 
the emotions pleasure, fear and desire one may accept the following parallel full definitions for 
the eupatheiai (cf. Brennan 2005:98): 
 
Wish is the knowledge that (1) a future thing is good, and that (2) it is appropriate to long for it. 
 
Caution is the knowledge that (1) a future thing is bad, and that (2) it is appropriate to avoid it. 
 
Joy is the knowledge that (1) a present thing is good, and that (2) it is appropriate to be elated about it. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter 3: Attainment of the Stoic telos  56 
 
 
From these definitions, one can see that the basic reasoning pattern of an eupatheia is similar to 
that of an emotion. It involves assent to an impulsive presentation judging (1) that its content is 
either good or bad and (2) that it is therefore appropriate to react accordingly (Gill 2006:225). 
However, while the objects of ordinary emotions are usually indifferent things wrongly judged to 
be either good or bad, eupatheiai take as their object only true “goods” or true “bads” (Cooper 
2005:179; Gill 2006:225). The main object of wise people‟s eupatheia “wish” is their future 
virtue and virtuous acts. Similarly, the wise experience a feeling of “caution” towards future vice 
and vicious actions. Thirdly, the wise may feel “joy” at their own or others‟ present virtuous state 
and actions (Brennan 2003:270; Brennan 2005:98; Cooper 2005:179-180).  
 
So, though free from emotions (pathē), the wise are still capable of having a rich emotional life 
(Cooper 2005:177). To three of the four generic pathē there are also three corresponding 
eupatheiai: The corresponding eupatheia of desire is wish, alongside fear there is caution and the 
opposite of pleasure is joy (Sandbach 1989:67; Brennan 2003:270; Cooper 2005:180, 187; 
Sorabji 2000:48). Unsurprisingly, there is no fourth eupatheia that stands as a counterpart to 
pain, since a wise person, being morally perfected, will never have vice present to himself at 
which he might feel downcast (Sandbach 1989:67; Sorabji 2000:49; Brennan 2003:270; Brennan 
2005:98; Cooper 2005:180, 187; Sellars 2006:119). 
 
But since eupatheiai only take as their objects true goods and bads, the Stoics needed to 
acknowledge a third species of impulses that motivates wise people to take action concerning 
indifferent things, without wrongly judging them to be good or bad. Moreover, if eupatheiai 
were the only alternative to emotions, then there would be no hope for the non-wise (who cannot 
have eupatheiai) ever to be able to act without being motivated by the sort of irrational opinion 
that the Stoics condemn (Brennan 2005:96). 
 
So, the Stoics proposed another species of impulses that does not come from wrongly judging 
indifferents as goods or bads (i.e. emotion) or judging the good as good and the bad as bad (i.e. 
eupatheia), but one that involves correctly judging preferred indifferents as preferred indifferents 
and dispreferred indifferents as dispreferred indifferents (Sorabji 2000:53).  
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3.2.3 Selection and Rejection 
 
The third type of impulse is one that involves the attribution of value or disvalue to indifferent 
objects. As has been established above, preferred indifferents are things worth selecting, 
dispreferred indifferents are things worth rejecting. The impulse that involves judging a preferred 
indifferent as a preferred indifferent and thus as appropriate to pursue or long for is called 
“selection” (eklogē); the impulse that involves judging a dispreferred indifferent as a dispreferred 
indifferent and thus as appropriate to avoid is called “rejection”13 (apeklogē) (D.L. VII.104-5; 
Stob. II.7.7g; Sorabji 2000:53; Brennan 2005:99). 
 
This third species of impulses may be experienced by both the wise and the non-wise (Sorabji 
2000:185), provided that the non-wise have come to understand that all things besides virtue and 
vice are indifferent. Since the non-wise are incapable of having true knowledge, „selections‟ and 
„rejections‟ will still be mere opinions and not episodes of knowledge (Brennan  2005:99-100). 
 
Following the same pattern as in the definitions of the emotions and eupatheiai, selection and 
rejection may be defined as follows (cf. Brennan 2005:99): 
 
Selection is an opinion/knowledge that (1) a future thing is a preferred indifferent and that (2) it is 
appropriate to select it (i.e. pursue it). 
 
Rejection is an opinion/knowledge that (1) a future thing is a dispreferred indifferent and that (2) it is 
appropriate to reject it (i.e. avoid it). 
 
These impulses are like emotions directed at indifferents, but they do not involve attribution of 
goodness or badness but mere „selective value‟ to the objects that are presented (Brennan 
2005:99). The impulse of „selection‟ corresponds to the emotion „desire‟ and „rejection‟ to the 
emotion „fear‟. Since this third class of impulses only relates to selective value (i.e. value that 
matters only for selecting or rejecting indifferents, which are considered as being either 
beneficial or harmful to have in the future) and so is exclusively future-oriented, there are no 
impulses in this group corresponding to „pleasure‟ and „distress‟ (emotions directed at present 
                                                             
13
 Scholars also use the term “disselection” for apeklogē (cf. Sorabji 2000:53; Brennan 2005:99). 
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things). The assessment that an indifferent – be it preferred or dispreferred – is present, would 
lead to no impulse at all. The „appropriate reaction‟ to a present indifferent is simply to feel 
indifferent about it (Brennan 2003:271; Brennan 2005:101). Any other response to an indifferent 
being present would grossly overestimate its value (Cooper 2005:195). 
 
Recognizing such “intermediate” species of impulses is important for two reasons: Firstly, it 
gives the wise (who has abandoned all emotions) motivation to perform intentional action with 
regards to indifferents without becoming irrational (Brennan 2005:97). Secondly, the fact that 
there is another alternative to emotions other than eupatheiai is also important for people who 
want to make progress towards a more virtuous life. These “intermediate” impulses thus offer a 
means to a gradual movement from a state where one is only driven by ordinary pathē to a state 
of moral perfection (Cooper 2005:199). As the non-wise obtain the understanding that nothing in 
life (besides virtue and vice) is good or bad but indifferent, they, though not yet virtuous, will be 
able to move away from acting on impulse of ordinary emotions and rather experience the 
impulses of “selection” and “disselection” which will enable them to do what is appropriate. 
What exactly the Stoics understood by appropriate behaviour will be discussed in 3.3 below. 
 
 
3.2.4 Apatheia 
 
The Stoics held that emotions are the greatest obstacle to one‟s attainment of happiness, and so 
the eradication of emotions became, especially among the later Stoics, a central theme in their 
discussions on the attainment of happiness (Sandbach 1989:63). As is the case with all impulses, 
emotions involve two judgements: one regarding the value of the content of a presentation, i.e. 
judge whether it is good or bad, the other regarding the necessary action to be taken. The 
judgements involved in emotions are completely voluntary, but the problem with most people is 
that they assent automatically to whatever is presented to them (Sorabji 2000:3). 
 
The first step to eradicating emotions is to understand that the judgements that constitute the 
emotions are false (Gould 1970:186). In order to rid oneself of an emotion one needs to ask the 
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following questions: whether there really is good or bad at hand, and whether a specific reaction 
is really appropriate (Sorabji 2000:160). 
 
Progress towards virtuous conduct comes largely through the replacement of emotions with 
selections and rejections (Brennan 2005:100). This means desire must be replaced with the 
impulse of selection, fear with the impulse of rejection. As has been shown above, there are no 
impulses that one should have instead of pleasure and distress. These should be replaced with 
genuine indifference.   
 
It is easy to see that humans would be happier without emotions of fear and distress. Anyone 
would want to do without such unpleasant emotions. But what the Stoics proposed was freedom 
from all emotions (apatheia). There are a number of reasons why this is the case. 
 
Firstly, it is, according to the Stoics, just as wrong to assent to a presentation that something is 
good as it is to assent to the presentation that something is bad when in reality both are 
indifferent. They, in fact, argued that pleasant and unpleasant emotions go hand in hand (Sorabji 
2000:182). If, for example, we desire something which we deem to be good but fail to obtain it, 
we will be overcome by the emotion of distress. If we feel pleasure because we are in the 
presence of something believed to be good, we are immediately exposed to negative emotions of 
fear that it might be taken away, or distress when it is taken away (Sorabji 2000:182; Sellars 
2006:118). It should, therefore, be clear that placing too high a value on indifferent things, which 
is characteristic of emotions, would only bring discomfort and interfere with one‟s peace of 
mind. 
 
Secondly, the Stoics believed emotions to be diseases of the soul analogous to diseases of the 
body (Arnold 1911:332; Gould 1970:186; Sellars 2006:117). As such they are things that we not 
only can control but really something that we should control. Already before the time of the 
Stoics, there was a debate amongst philosophers on whether emotions should be eradicated 
(apatheia) or only moderated (metriopatheia) (Rist 1969:26-7; Sandbach 1989:63; Sorabji 
2000:7, 194). The main supporters of the moderation of emotions were the Peripatetics 
(Sandbach 1989:63; Sorabji 2000:194). However, if pathē are viewed as diseases of the mind, it 
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is easy to see how the Stoics advocated their complete eradication. It would be nonsensical to 
argue that a disease should merely be moderated if it is, in fact, possible to get rid of the disease 
altogether (Rist 1969:26-7). 
 
Another reason for eradicating emotions is that they are “irrational” and contrary to our nature as 
rational beings (Gould 1970:186; Graeser 1974:151; Sorabji 2000:181; Sellars 2006:118). As has 
been shown above, this means that they are based on wrong value judgements that indifferent 
things are good or bad. Seeing that they clearly result from faulty reasoning, they should play no 
role in the life of anyone who wishes to be a properly functioning rational being (Sellars 
2006:117).  
 
Lastly, since they are based on an incorrect understanding of what is good and bad, they will lead 
to incorrect (i.e. vicious) actions, i.e. the exact opposite of morally correct actions directed by 
virtue which is the ideal that anyone who wishes to live happily is meant to strive towards 
(Arnold 1911:332). 
 
The Stoics‟ support of apatheia was unsurprisingly met with some objections. One objection was 
that the eradication of all emotion would also remove all motivation (Sorabji 2000:185). 
However, the fear that apatheia will lead to a state of total impassivity is unjustified. As 
explained above, the main idea behind apatheia is not merely to rid oneself of emotion but also 
to replace them with the impulses “selection” and “rejection”. It is, thus, possible, for example, 
to abandon the false opinion that one‟s health is something good, without losing all motivation to 
maintain it. Apatheia does, therefore, not bring with it total impassivity and absence of all 
motivation (Sorabji 2000:186; Brennan 2003:272).  
 
Another objection comes from the view point of modern psychiatry, which raises the concern 
that emotions may be wrongly suppressed (Sorabji 2000:185). People might try to convince 
themselves that they have not suffered anything bad when they have, without understanding the 
deeper cause of their emotion, and this may lead to additional emotional difficulties (Sorabji 
2000:185). However, if understood correctly, it should be clear that the Stoics do not propose to 
suppress emotions, but to remove them entirely by correcting one‟s wrong beliefs about what is 
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good and bad and understanding the real situation (Sorabji 2000:185; Brennan 2003:272). In 
other words, instead of wrongly believing things to be good and bad, one must learn to 
understand that they are indifferent (and depending on the circumstance either to be preferred or 
dispreferred), and behave accordingly.  
 
A third objection is that without emotions a person would hardly be human (Sorabji 2000:189). 
However, eradication of emotions does not mean to eradicate all forms of feelings altogether. It 
simply means to remove any false species of impulses. As has been shown above, the wise, who 
are completely free from emotions, will still be able to have a rich emotional life and feel 
attachment to other people and normal human concerns (Cooper 2005:186). 
 
At the end of this section we know what the three Stoic species of impulses are: emotions, 
eupatheiai, and “selections” and “rejections”. Emotions are false opinions and take as their 
objects indifferents which are falsely judged to be goods and bads. Eupatheiai are episodes of 
knowledge and are directed at only true goods and bads (i.e. virtue and vice). Selections are 
either correct opinions in the non-wise or knowledge in the wise, and these are directed at 
indifferents which are correctly judged to be preferred or dispreferred. Closely parallel to the 
Stoic classification of impulses and their objects of choice, is the classification of actions which 
will be focused on in the next section. Emotions, since they are false, lead to false, i.e. vicious, 
actions; eupatheiai, since they are rooted in knowledge and only the wise can have them, 
naturally result in virtuous (i.e. morally correct) actions; selections and rejections lead to what 
the Stoics called “appropriate actions”. In the case of a wise person‟s selections which constitute 
knowledge not mere opinion, the result will again be virtuous actions or – put differently – 
“perfectly appropriate actions” or “morally correct actions”. To sum up this section, it may help 
to see a chart that shows the relation between the three species of impulses, the agents affected 
by them, their epistemological categories, their objects of choice and the actions they result in: 
 EMOTIONS EUPATHEIAI SELECTIONS & REJECTIONS 
agents non-wise wise non-wise wise 
epistemology opinion knowledge opinion knowledge 
objects indifferents goods & bads                            indifferents 
actions vicious virtuous appropriate perfectly appropriate 
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3.3 Theory of Actions 
 
The Stoics held that all actions of a wise person are virtuous (Stob. II.7.5b; cf. Cooper 
2005:184); a virtuous action, in short, is one whose impulse consists in knowledge which comes 
from a strong assent to a kataleptic impulsive presentation (Brennan 2005:172). The actions of a 
non-wise person are all vicious (Sandbach 1989:47); a vicious action is one whose impulse 
involves opinion, which results from weak assent (Brennan 2005:172). There is, however, an 
“intermediate” class of actions called “appropriate actions” (G: kathēkonta; L: officia), also often 
translated with “befitting actions”, “proper functions” or “daily duties” (Arnold 1911:302; 
Brennan 2005:169). These will be focused on first. 
 
An appropriate action is defined as one that, once it has been done, admits of a reasonable 
defence (D.L. VII.107; Stob. II.7.8; cf.: Sandbach 1989:46; Brennan 1996:318; Brennan 
2005:43, 170; Inwood 2005:102-3; Gill 2006:130). This does not necessarily mean that the 
person who performed an appropriate action has to be able to defend it rationally, as appears 
from the fact that even animals and plants can behave appropriately (Sandbach 1989:46-7).  
 
Cicero explains exactly what an appropriate action consists in: 
 
Ex quo intellegitur quoniam se ipsi omnes natura diligant, tam insipientem quam sapientem 
sumpturum quae secundum naturam sint reiecturumque contraria. Ita est quoddam commune officium 
sapientis et insipientis; ex quo efficitur versari in iis quae media dicamus. (Cic. Fin. III.59 in Rackham 
1961:278) 
 
From this it is understood that, since all love themselves by nature, the non-wise just as much as the 
wise will take the things which are according to nature and reject the contrary. So, an “appropriate 
action” is something common to the wise and the non-wise; from this it is proven that “appropriate 
action” deals with the things we call “intermediate”. 
 
According to this extract, appropriate action consist in taking what is “according to Nature” and 
rejecting what is “contrary to Nature”. To put it another way, one could say that for rational 
beings appropriate action results from the selection of preferred indifferents and rejection of 
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dispreferred indifferents. The doctrine of “appropriate actions” is, thus, closely related to the 
third species of impulses and the doctrine of preferred and dispreferred indifferents, here called 
“intermediate things” (media) (cf. Stob. II.7.8; Arnold 1911:302; Inwood 2005:102-3; Sellars 
2006:120). 
 
In the previous section, we have seen that both the wise and the non-wise are capable of 
experiencing the impulses called “selection” and “rejection”. This means that they are also both 
equally capable of performing appropriate actions (Barnes 2001:367), as is also pointed out by 
Cicero. From the extract above it should, moreover, be clear that appropriate actions even extend 
to children, unreasoning animals and plants (Arnold 1911:302), since – as has been shown in 
chapter two – they too are given the impulse to take what is “according to Nature” and reject 
what is “contrary to Nature” (D.L. VII.85-86; Cic. Fin. III.16).  
 
In the discussion of the doctrine of oikeiōsis in the previous chapter, it was said that the most 
fundamental action appropriate to all living things is to preserve oneself in one‟s natural 
constitution, by pursuing what is advantageous, i.e. “the things that accord with nature” (ea quae 
secundum naturam), sometimes also called “primary natural things” (prima naturae), and 
avoiding what is harmful (Cic. Fin. III.20; cf. Hadot 1969:73; Gill 2006:130; Sellars 2006:120). 
This “first appropriate action” (primum officium; Cic. Fin. III.20) is performed instinctively 
without any deliberation or involvement of reason (Hadot 1969:73).  
 
As human beings become adult, appropriate behaviour lies in pursuing the primary natural things 
and avoiding their opposites rationally, that is selecting and rejecting them in a well thought-out 
and deliberate way (Cic. Fin. III.20; cf. Hadot 1969:74; Long 1971:100; Cooper 1996:268; Gill 
2006:77, 130). As has been shown above, someone who acts on the impulses of selection and 
rejection understands correctly that the things he pursues and avoids are not good and bad 
respectively, but preferred and dispreferred indifferents. However, the performance of 
appropriate actions of this sort does not yet constitute virtuous conduct (Gill 2006:131).  
 
An additional requirement is that the appropriate actions are performed from a correct mental 
disposition, that has attained the sort of perfection necessary for unshakable consistency, and that 
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is virtue (Hadot 1969:74; Frede 1999:79; Sellars 2006:121). In other words, the appropriate 
actions must be performed in a way that expresses the state of mind of a perfectly virtuous or 
wise person (Gill 2006:131). 
 
Once selection is performed from a correct mental disposition, i.e. from the disposition of virtue, 
one‟s actions become perfectly appropriate actions, which are also morally correct actions (cf. 
Gill 2003:41; Brennan 2005:171; Sellars 2006:121; Holowchak 2008:43): 
 
Τ῵λ δὲ θαζεθόλησλ ηὰ κὲλ εἶλαί θαζη ηέιεηα, ἃ δὴ θαὶ θαηνξζώκαηα ιέγεζζαη. Καηνξζώκαηα δ‟ εἶλαη 
ηὰ θαη‟ ἀξεηὴλ ἐλεξγήκαηα, νἷνλ ηὸ θξνλεῖλ, ηὸ δηθαηνπξαγεῖλ. (Stob. II.7.8 in Wachsmuth and Hense 
1884:85-6) 
 
And of appropriate actions, they say that some are perfect; these are also called correct actions. And 
correct actions are actions according to virtue, such as to be wise, or to act righteously. 
 
In other words, “an appropriate action that has been perfected is a correct action” (ηὸ δὲ θαζῆθνλ 
ηειεησζὲλ θαηόξζσκα γίλεζζαη; Stob. II.7.8a). These can only be performed by those who 
possess virtue, i.e. the wise (Arnold 1911:305; Gill 2003:41; Brennan 2005:171; Sellars 
2006:121; Holowchak 2008:43-4). In order to distinguish these perfectly appropriate actions 
from ordinary appropriate actions performed by the non-wise, the latter are sometimes referred to 
as “middle” or “intermediate” appropriate actions (G: mesa kathēkonta; L: media officia) (Hadot 
1969:74; Brennan 2005:171; Sellars 2006:121). What distinguishes perfectly appropriate actions 
from ordinary “intermediate” appropriate actions is that the former are performed solely for their 
own sake (Gill 2006:130; Holowchak 2008:43). This means that, no matter what the wise get as 
an outcome of their actions, they feel a sense of indifference (Brennan 2005:38-9); the only thing 
that matters to them is the “order and harmony” (ordinem et...concordiam; Cic. Fin. III.21) of 
their reason-directed actions. 
 
According to Chrysippus appropriate actions of a non-wise man are in fact still vicious because 
they are not directed by perfect reason (Sandbach 1989:48; Brennan 2005:171). Since the mental 
disposition of the non-wise lacks the consistency and stability of the wise, it is still capable of 
error (Brennan 2005:171-2; Cooper 2005:196; Gill 2006:254). Even if an appropriate action is 
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outwardly completely the same as a perfectly appropriate action, the appropriate action of a non-
wise person is done from a mental disposition that, in different circumstances, would have 
assented to a false presentation and so would have produced an inappropriate action (Brennan 
2005:171-2). The wise on the other hand, whose disposition to assent is completely stable and 
reliable no matter what circumstance they are in, will never assent to anything non-kataleptic 
(Brennan 2005:176-7). The wise, performing perfectly appropriate actions, are not necessarily 
thinking different thoughts from the non-wise vicious agent, but they differ in the way they 
assent (Brennan 2005:176). The wise assent strongly which means that the selections and 
rejections that motivate perfectly appropriate actions constitute knowledge, while in the case of 
the non-wise who assent weakly they are mere opinions. 
 
Even if one performs absolutely all of the appropriate actions, one‟s life will not yet be happy. 
However, happiness will come once one attains knowledge and one‟s appropriate actions acquire 
firmness and stability (Brennan 2005:176). 
 
 
3.4 Summary 
 
We started out by saying that, according to the Stoics, the only way to living happily is by 
performing morally correct actions that are directed by virtue. Virtue, as we know, is not 
something we are born with but something that may be obtained by cultivating and perfecting 
our reason. This entails, first of all, changing our opinions about the value of things and 
acquiring a notion of what is truly good and bad. As we have seen, according to the Stoics only 
virtue and what participates in virtue is truly good; only vice and what participates in vice is bad; 
all other things are indifferent (and these might be either preferred or dispreferred or absolutely 
indifferent). 
 
Correct understanding of the value of things will be followed by a radical change in our 
motivation. There are, according to the Stoics, three species of impulses that motivate human 
beings to action, namely emotion, eupatheiai and selections and rejections. Emotions lead to 
vicious actions and should therefore be completely eradicated. Instead, our actions should be 
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motivated by eupatheiai (concerning true goods and bads) and selections and rejections 
(concerning indifferents).  
 
However, having the correct opinions about the true value of things is not yet enough for 
virtuous conduct. What is needed is steadfast, irrefutable knowledge, as opinions are based on 
weak assent and therefore lack the stability and constancy needed to perform morally correct 
actions even in difficult circumstances. 
 
Happiness as defined by the Stoics seems like a rather unrealistic ideal and it is uncertain 
whether the Stoics themselves actually believed that it could ever really be attained in practice. 
The next chapter will take a look at how Seneca presents the Stoic telos in his Epistulae Morales, 
as well as the practical advice he gives on how it might actually be attained. 
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Chapter 4: The Stoic telos in Seneca‟s Epistulae Morales 
 
Thus far I have discussed what the Stoic happy life consists of and how it may in theory be 
attained. In short, happiness consists of a life in agreement with nature (both universal and 
human nature), which in essence comes down to living virtuously. This is achieved by 
developing and perfecting our reason and living according to it (cf. Chapter 2). The first step in 
this development is to acquire the correct knowledge of the value of things, which will enable us 
to eradicate our emotions and have correct impulses instead, and consequently perform morally 
correct actions and live virtuously (cf. Chapter 3).  
 
What remains to be determined now, is how the Stoic happy life can be attained in practice. As 
has been proposed, Seneca in his Epistulae Morales has managed to make the Stoic telos more 
realistically attainable by providing helpful practical advice. But before we begin, it must first be 
determined whether Seneca‟s teachings regarding the Stoic happy life fit into the traditional 
views of the school (as outlined in Ch. 2 and 3). This chapter will thus start with a brief 
introduction to Seneca and the Epistulae Morales (section 4.1), which will be followed by an 
investigation of the orthodoxy of Seneca‟s teachings (sections 4.2 and 4.3), while the final 
section (4.4) will take a look at some of the practical advice Seneca has to offer for anyone 
wishing to make progress towards a virtuous and happy life. 
 
 
4.1 Background 
 
Seneca is the first Stoic of whom there is a considerable amount of remaining literary works; his 
corpus is, in fact, the largest collection of surviving texts for any Stoic (Sellars 2006:12). He 
wrote several other dialogi and essays on philosophical topics, including De Ira (“On Anger”), 
De Clementia (“On Clemency”), De Brevitate Vitae (“On the Shortness of Life”), De Vita Beata 
(“On the Happy Life”). Seneca also composed three consolatory works: De Consolatione ad 
Marciam (“On Consolation to Marcia”), De Consolatione ad Polybium (“On Consolation to 
Polybius”), and De Consolatione ad Helviam (“On Consolation to Helvia”). Furthermore, there 
are three short works addressed to Serenus, a friend whom Seneca converted from Epicureanism: 
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De Constantia Sapientis (“On the Constancy of the Wise Man”), De tranquillitate animi (“On 
Peace of Mind”) and De Otio (“On Leisure”) (Campbell 1969:20; Sandbach 1989:152-3; 
Lawless 1994:6; Sellars 2006:13). After retiring from politics, Seneca spent the last two years of 
his life travelling about southern Italy, composing the Quaestiones Naturales (“Questions about 
Nature”), the Epistulae Morales (“Letters on Morality”) and most likely during that time as well 
De Providentia (“On Providence”), all three works dedicated to his young friend Lucilius 
(Campbell 1969:12-3; Lawless 1994:5; Gummere 2006:xi).14 
 
Seneca‟s philosophical writings were for the most part inspired by his own situations and needs 
and those of the people around him. “He had acquired a deep understanding of human ignorance, 
misery, and sorrow, and he was eager to furnish harassed contemporary man with some remedy 
for his mental weakness and vacillations” (Motto 1985:9). Mans (1978:233) argues, “in answer 
to problems that emerged in the lives of his friends and relatives Seneca endeavoured to give 
practical guidance which aimed at the moulding and development of the entire human being”.  
 
That Seneca had a personal passion for enlightening others and assisting them in their moral 
progress is also evident in his Epistulae Morales (e.g.: Ep. 6.4; 8.2-3; 29.1-9; 121.4; cf. Motto 
1973:189). In this collection of 124 letters he offers ethical guidance to his young friend 
Lucilius. On several occasions, Seneca expresses his delight in Lucilius‟ progress and is also not  
shy to take credit for it. “You are my handiwork” (meum opus es15) he says to him in Ep. 34.2. 
Seneca moreover believed that the teachings contained in his writings may be of assistance to 
future generations (Ep. 8.2-3; cf. 8.6; 21.5; Mans 1978:192). 
 
The informal and conversational style of Seneca‟s letters creates the atmosphere of a personal 
interaction (Mans 1978:192). It is as if Seneca invites the reader to an informal and comfortable 
conversation (Mans 1978:192). In Ep. 75.1 Seneca says himself that he wants his letters to be 
                                                             
14 Seneca also produced a number of tragedies, which were probably never intended to be performed on stage but 
rather to be read to a small audience (Campbell 1969:20). However, they have proved highly influential on later 
literature. He also composed a satire on the deification of the Emperor Claudius, entitled Apocolocyntosis 
(“Pumpkinification”) (Sellars 2006:13). Seneca was also planning to write a work on moral philosophy which was to 
cover the whole of Stoic ethics (Ep. 106.2; 108.1; 109.17; cf. Hadot 1969:55; Motto 1973:189). 
15 All Latin quotations of Seneca‟s Epistulae Morales are taken from Gummere 1925, 1970 and 2006; the English 
translations provided are my own. 
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like a personal conversation16 (Ep. 75.1; cf. Ep. 67.2). Cooper (2004:312) suggests that “it is only 
through writing of that inspirational sort that any author has any chance at all of actually 
affecting the way people live their life”. The informal letter as medium of communication also 
made it possible for Seneca to reach via Lucilius the general population and the personal and 
intimate nature of his admonition and advice and the exceptionally modern ideas contained in the 
letters make them extremely valuable even to this day (Mans 1978:237-8). 
 
Seneca has often been accused of eclecticism with the implication that his writings may not even 
be a reliable source for information about orthodox Stoicism (Hadot 1969:82-3; Inwood 2005:23; 
Sellars 2006:12-3). However, a thorough investigation of Seneca‟s work will show that he 
remained true to all fundamental teachings of the Stoic school (Hadot 1969:83; Cooper 
2004:309), although he also reserves the right to his own opinion (Hadot 1969:82-3). Seneca‟s 
approach is open, but not eclectic (Inwood 2005:24). 
 
Seneca‟s orthodoxy may be judged by comparison to the early Stoics. “What it means to be a 
Stoic is determined in large measure by a thinker‟s relation to Chrysippus, Cleanthes, and Zeno; 
in the normal way of treating the development of Stoic thought, these three philosophers 
constitute a benchmark to use in measuring the „Stoicness‟ of other thinkers” (Inwood 2005:24). 
Seneca accepts the traditional views of Zeno and Chrysippus when the facts themselves permit 
him to do so, but he does not believe in following an inflexible rule in order to abide by their 
teachings and certainly assumes no obligation to do so (Inwood 2005:25). 
 
Non enim me cuiquam emancipavi, nullius nomen fero; multum magnorum virorum iudicio credo, 
aliquid et meo vindico. (Ep. 45.4)  
 
For I have sold myself to no one; I bear no one‟s name; I have much trust in the judgement of great 
men; but I also claim something for my own. 
 
                                                             
16 “As my conversation would be if we were sitting or walking together, spontaneous and easy, so I want my letters 
to be, which contain nothing that is forced or articificial”; Qualis sermo meus esset si una sederemus aut 
ambularemus, inlaboratus et facilis, tales esse epistulas meas volo, quae nihil habent accersitum nec fictum. (Ep. 
75.1) 
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Seneca‟s letters and other philosophical works show clearly that he had a complete and accurate 
understanding of Stoic physical theory, epistemology, as well as Stoic ethics – his constant 
primary concern (Cooper 2004:309). At the same time, however, he had a strong inclination to 
think for himself and shows considerable interest in the views of schools other than his own, 
such as Platonism, Aristotelianism, and even Epicureanism (Inwood 2005:2, 16).  
 
Seneca‟s main intent was not to produce new developments in philosophy, but to advocate the 
Stoic view of life in a way that would also appeal to the layman (Ross 1974:117). He wanted to 
offer others a way to freedom and peace of mind and assist them in overcoming difficult 
circumstances (Rozelaar 1976:405). What was more important to him than transmitting the 
teachings of a specific school with scientific precision was the practical value of his teaching 
(Rozelaar 1976:405).  
 
[I]llud admoneo, auditionem philosophorum lectionemque ad propositum beatae vitae trahendam, non 
ut verba prisca aut ficta captemus et translationes inprobas figurasque dicendi, sed ut profutura 
praecepta et magnificas voces et animosas quae mox in rem transferantur. Sic ista ediscamus ut quae 
fuerint verba sint opera. (Ep. 108.35) 
 
I advise you this, listening to philosophers and reading should be for the purpose of leading a happy 
life, not so that we may capture archaic or made up words and bad metaphors and figures of speech, 
but useful precepts and noble and spirited utterances, which will at once be turned into action. We 
should learn them in such a way that words may become deeds. 
 
In short, the purpose of studying philosophy was, for Seneca, that the knowledge gained from it 
could be applied and would lead us towards the attainment of a happy life. 
 
 
4.2 Definition of the telos in Seneca‟s Epistulae Morales 
 
The final goal (G: telos; L: finis) – or highest good (summum bonum), as Seneca calls it more 
frequently – is a topic of primary interest for Seneca, since it is our notion of the highest good 
that determines the way we lead our lives (Ep. 71.2; Mans 1978:91). 
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Seneca also warns, that people that do not know which direction they are heading, will just be 
dragged along by their circumstances like objects floating around in a river (Ep. 23.8; cf. 13.6; 
20.4; Smuts 1948:21). A life without fixed purpose is inconstant (vita sine proposito vaga est; 
Ep. 95.46; cf. Smuts 1948:21; Mans 1978:92; Inwood 2005:120). Elsewhere, he writes, “if one 
does not know which harbour one is making for, no wind is favourable” (ignoranti quem portum 
petat nullus suus ventus est; Ep. 71.3). 
 
For this reason all people should have an idea of their purpose in life and set up a guideline 
according to which all their efforts and actions can be regulated (Ep. 20.3; 71.2; 95.45). Seneca 
therefore advises Lucilius: “Take hold of a single rule, once and for all, by which you may live, 
and regulate your whole life according to it” (unam semel, ad quam vivas, regulam prende et ad 
hanc omnem vitam tuam exaequa; Ep. 20.3; cf. Rubin 1901:69; Smuts 1948:21; Hadot 
1969:137).  
 
It was a common belief among all philosophical schools of the Hellenistic era that the one thing 
that all people universally strive for is to live a happy life. Consequently, happiness came to be 
regarded as the final goal and highest good of human existence. That Seneca too pursues the 
happy life (vita beata) as final goal is affirmed by the rhetorical question, “Surely you have no 
doubt that the happy life is the highest good?” (numquid dubitas, quin beata vita summum bonum 
sit?; Ep. 85.20; cf. Smuts 1948:22; Mans 1978:96). 
 
The problem is, as Seneca points out, that people seek happiness in the wrong things: 
 
Quid est ergo in quo erratur, cum omnes beatam vitam optent? quod instrumenta eius pro ipsa habent 
et illam dum petunt fugiunt. (Ep. 44.7) 
 
Seeing that all people wish for a happy life, what is it then, where they go wrong? It is that they 
consider the means for happiness as happiness itself and while they are seeking it, they are [actually] 
fleeing from it. 
 
The masses strive for happiness but have no idea what could make them happy, and once they 
achieve whatever goal they strive after, they usually find it void, of little value or even bad 
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(Ep.118.7; Smuts 1948: 21). But, as Seneca (along with most other Stoics) points out, authentic 
happiness depends essentially on one‟s state of mind (Long 2006:364-5) and not on “gifts of 
fortune” (Ep. 23.3, 7; 72.7; 76.30-31; 92.16).  
 
Seneca provides various definitions of the happy life in the Epistulae Morales. To the question, 
“What is the happy life?” (Quid est beata vita?), he answers: “freedom from care and continuous 
tranquillity” (securitas et perpetua tranquillitas; Ep. 92.3; cf. Hadot 1969:126; Mans 1978:96). 
According to Seneca you are happy, “if you are never sad, [if] no hope harasses your mind with 
expectation of the future, [and] if your soul is day and night on an even and consistent path, and 
upright and pleased with itself” (si numquam maestus es, nulla spes animum tuum futuri 
exspectatione sollicitat, si per dies noctesque par et aequalis animi tenor erecti et placentis sibi 
est; Ep.59.14).  
 
Anybody, says Seneca, who takes Nature as his teacher will be able to attain this sort of 
happiness (Ep. 45.9; cf. Rubin 1901:37). For “all things are easy and straight-forward for those 
who follow her; but for those who rebel against her, life is exactly like that of people who row 
against the current”(illam sequentibus omnia facilia, expedita sunt, contra illam nitentibus non 
alia vita est quam contra aquam remigantibus; Ep. 122.19). Seneca, then says in truly Stoic 
spirit, that the highest good that one can possess is “to conduct oneself according to nature‟s 
will” (ex naturae voluntate se gerere; Ep. 66.39; cf. Rubin 1901:71; Setaioli 2007:356). In Ep. 
5.4 he also clearly identifies himself with the Stoic school when he says, “Our purpose, as you 
know, is „Live according to Nature‟.” (nempe propositum nostrum est secundum naturam vivere; 
Ep. 5.4; cf. Smuts 1948:23; Lawless 1994:6). 
 
Seneca‟s other definitions of the “happy life” (vita beata) and the “highest good” (summum 
bonum) also link up with the orthodox Stoic doctrines outlined in the previous chapters. 
According to Seneca, the happy life and highest good is reached by developing and perfecting 
one‟s reason (ratio) (cf. Ep. 41.8; 76.10, 16; 92.2-3; 124.24) and attaining virtue (virtus) (cf. Ep. 
66.7; 76.16; 85.1, 17-21; 92.24; 95.35), wisdom (sapientia) (cf. 16.1; 20.5; 89.4-5; 90.27-28; 
93.8), and „knowledge of things‟ (rerum scientia) (cf. Ep. 31.6). This knowledge comprises the 
“knowledge of things divine and human” (scientia divinorum humanorumque) (cf. Ep. 74.29; 
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110.8) and the knowledge of moral value/“knowledge of good and bad” (scientia bonorum ac 
malorum) (Ep. 88.28), i.e. knowledge that virtue is the only good, and vice the only bad (Ep. 
31.5; 74.1; 94.8; 95.35). 
 
With regards to the attainment of happiness, Seneca also places particular emphasis on the role 
of studying philosophy, since philosophy is the only art by which we may come to know good 
and bad17 (Ep. 88.28). Philosophy is also defined as the “love of wisdom and striving after it” 
(sapientiae amor et adfectatio; Ep. 89.4), “the study of virtue” (studium virtutis; Ep. 89.5), “the 
study of correcting the mind” (studium corrigendae mentis; Ep. 89.5) and “the search for right 
reason” (adpetitio rectae rationis; Ep.89.5). Seneca therefore advises Lucilius: 
 
Ad hanc te confer si vis salvus esse, si securus, si beatus, denique si vis esse, quod est maximum, liber; 
hoc contingere aliter non potest. (Ep. 37.3) 
 
To her [i.e. philosophy] you must betake yourself, if you wish to be healthy, safe, happy, in short, if 
you wish to be – and this is most important – free; it is not possible to reach this [end] in another way. 
 
The importance of studying philosophy will be discussed later. First we shall take a closer look 
at some of Seneca‟s definitions of happiness just mentioned and compare these to other Stoic 
accounts regarding the telos of human existence. 
 
When Seneca speaks of living according to nature, he refers to both universal nature and man‟s 
own individual nature. He uses secundum naturam vivere (Ep. 5.4) as well as secundum naturam 
suam vivere (Ep. 41.9; cf. Smuts 1948:23) but, as has been explained in Chapter 2, both come 
down to the same thing, since human nature is a part of universal Nature. 
 
Seneca uses various names to refer to universal Nature. In Ep. 65.2 he explains that according to 
the Stoics, the universe is made up of an active and a passive principle. The passive principle is 
inert “matter” (materiam) which “lies motionless, as substance which is prepared for any 
purpose, but which will remain inactive if no one moves it” (materia iacet iners, res ad omnia 
                                                             
17 “But there is no other art which inquires about things good and bad”; nihil autem ulla ars alia de bonis ac malis 
quaerit. (Ep. 88.28) 
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parata, cessatura, si nemo moveat; Ep. 65.2); the active principle is “cause” (causa) or “reason” 
(ratio) which “shapes the matter and turns it into whatever it wants to, and brings forth various 
products from it” ([causa autem, id est ratio,] materiam format et quocumque vult versat, ex illa 
varia opera producit; Ep. 65.2). It is primarily the latter that we are concerned with when 
discussing universal nature. Seneca also uses “God” (deus) or “gods”, “fate” (fatum), “chance” 
(casus), “providence” (providentia), “Jupiter” or “father” (parens) to refer to the active principle 
that governs the universe and predetermines all events (Ep. 9.16; 16.4-5; 65.12; 107.8-10; 
110.10; cf. Smuts 1948:23-44; Motto 1973:45-8, 92; Setaioli 2007:338, 347, 364). He also calls 
this inevitable and unalterable course of events the “law of the universe” (lex universi; Ep.71.16) 
to which every creature, including man, is bound. 
 
In chapter 2 it was shown that part of what the Stoics meant by living according to (or “in 
agreement with”) universal Nature, is realizing that there is a predetermined inevitable order of 
events and accepting willingly whatever happens. Seneca too stresses the importance of a willing 
acceptance of one‟s fate in several of his letters (cf. Ep. 54.7; 61.2-3; 76.23; 107.7-9). In Ep. 
61.2- 3, for example, he advises: 
 
Da operam ne quid umquam invitus facias. … Itaque sic animum componamus, ut quicquid res exiget, 
id velimus et in primis ut finem nostri sine tristitia cogitemus. 
 
See to it that you do not ever do anything unwillingly. … Therefore, let us adjust our minds in such a 
way that we may [actually] wish for that which our situation demands of us and first and foremost, that 
we may think about our end without sadness. 
 
Since we cannot change the inevitable predetermined order of things, resistance to it would in 
any event be futile (Ep. 107.7, 9). But moreover, Seneca says we should not merely uncomplai-
ningly endure our fate but actually accept it gladly and with a positive will (cf. non patiens 
tantum sed etiam volens; Ep. 96.12; cf. Smuts 1948:24). 
 
We are able to do this, since we know that Nature has designed whatever happens for the benefit 
of all its creatures (Ep.74.20; 107.10; cf. Smuts 1948:24). On a more personal level nature is in 
this regard also referred to as God, who acts as creator, ruler and maintainer of the universe, 
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whose will man is obligated to follow, whether he wants to or not (Ep. 107.9; cf. Smuts 1948:23-
4). Since Seneca draws a close connection between the terms “nature” and “god” (Ep. 107.9), the 
expression “agreeing with nature” (naturae consentire) means for him the same as “obeying 
God” (deum comitari) (Ep. 107.9). In this way the goal of life can also be expressed in a 
religious sense as obedience to God‟s will. Instead of God Seneca also uses “gods” or “Jupiter” 
(Ep. 107.10) (Smuts 1948:24). Whatever name Seneca gives to universal nature, he clearly 
agrees with his Stoic predecessors that living according to universal nature in essence comes 
down to acknowledging the predetermined order of events and accepting one‟s fate willingly and 
gladly.  
 
With regards to living according to one‟s own human nature, Seneca also clearly propounds 
traditional Stoic teachings. As has been discussed in the preceding chapters, living according to 
one‟s own nature means developing the distinctive attribute which is peculiar to one‟s nature. In 
humans, this attribute is reason. Reason is what sets us apart from other animals (Ep. 86.8; 
113.17; 121.14, 21, 23; 124.1; 124.8). Seneca thus clearly follows the traditional Stoic teaching 
when he says in Ep. 76.8-9 (cf. Rubin 1901:58, 66, 71; Setaioli 2007:364): 
 
Id in quoque optimum esse debet, cui nascitur, quo censetur. | In homine optimum quid est? Ratio; hac 
antecedit animalia, deos sequitur. Ratio ergo perfecta proprium bonum est, cetera illi cum animalibus 
satisque communia sunt. 
 
In each thing that, for which it was born and by which it is judged, should be best. | What is best in 
man? Reason; by it he surpasses the animals, and follows the gods. Therefore, perfect reason is our 
peculiar good, all other things he shares with animals and plants. 
 
Similarly, Seneca writes in Ep. 41.8 (cf. Rubin 1901:71; Mans 1978:97; Goolam 2007:367): 
 
Lauda in illo, quod nec eripi potest nec dari, quod proprium hominis est. Quaeris quid sit? Animus et 
ratio in animo perfecta. Rationale enim animal est homo. Consummatur itaque bonum eius, si id 
implevit, cui nascitur. 
 
Praise the quality in him which can neither be snatched nor given away, [and] which is peculiar to 
man. You ask what this is? It is the mind, and reason perfected in the mind. For man is a rational 
animal. Therefore, his good is attained, if he has fulfilled that for which he was born. 
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In short, our highest good and final goal is attained by the perfection of our distinctive attribute – 
reason. Elsewhere, Seneca puts it more explicitly, “In this alone the happy life is located, that 
reason is perfected in us” (in hoc uno positam esse beatam vitam, ut in nobis ratio perfecta sit; 
Ep. 92.2; cf. 76.16; 124.24). 
 
Moreover, Seneca says, that our reason is in fact a portion of the divine spirit (divinus spiritus; 
cf. G: pneuma) set in our human bodies (Ep. 66.12 cf. 92.1; Setaioli 2007:363; Holowchak 
2008:114). However, we do not possess reason from birth (Ep.121.1, 4; 124.9), but it only 
develops gradually as we mature. According to the Stoic doctrine of oikeiōsis, this development 
will occur naturally, since Nature has equipped all creatures with a natural impulse to appropriate 
themselves to their constitution (cf. section 2.2). Seneca discusses this doctrine in detail in Letter 
121 (cf. Smuts 1948:27 ff.; Gill 2006:43 ff.; Trapp 2007:110 ff.). The emergence of reason in 
human beings was evidentially a controversial topic, and “Seneca structures his account around a 
series of objections from an unidentified interlocutor” (Trapp 2007:111). One of the main points 
of contention appears to have been centred around the question on how children, who do not yet 
possess reason, can appropriate themselves to a rational constitution18 (Ep. 121.14). 
 
Seneca answers this question by drawing a distinction not found in other Stoic sources between 
“appropriation to ourselves, as living a single, continuous life, and to our constitution at a given 
time (infancy, childhood, and so on)” (Gill 2006:44). 
 
Unicuique aetati sua constitutio est, alia infanti, alia puero, alia seni; omnes ei constitutioni 
conciliantur in qua sunt. … Ergo infans ei consitutioni suae conciliatur, quae tunc infanti est, non quae 
futura iuveni est. (Ep. 121.15-16) 
 
Every age has its own constitution, one for the infant, another for the boy, and another for the old man; 
all of them are appropriated to the constitution in which they are. … Therefore, an infant is 
appropriated to his constitution which at that time belongs to the infant, and not the constitution which 
will belong to him as a young man.  
 
                                                             
18 “Therefore, how can an infant be appropriated to a rational constitution, when he is not yet rational?”; Quomodo 
ergo infans conciliari constitutioni rationali potest, cum rationalis nondum sit? (Ep. 121.14) 
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A child‟s first appropriation will simply be with his natural constitution as animal (Smuts 
1948:27). But as he matures, he will keep on appropriating himself to his own nature; the arrival 
of reason will bring with it a changed sense of “what belongs” to his constitution (Smuts 
1948:27; Trapp 2007:110). “This culminates in the realization that what is most fully appropriate 
and most fully belongs to one as a human being is the perfection of rational virtue” (Trapp 
2007:110). 
 
Reason, then, once it has been perfected, fulfils man‟s happiness (Ep. 76.10; cf. Hadot 1969:101; 
Setaioli 2007:363-4). Perfect reason may be attained by acquiring a stable and unalterable 
knowledge of good and bad19 (Ep. 88.28; Mans 1978:99). This knowledge of good and bad is the 
disposition of wisdom (cf. 2.3 above); moreover, reason in its state of perfection is what 
constitutes virtue (Ep. 66. 32; 76.16). For Seneca the concepts “living according to nature” 
(secundum naturam vivere), “perfect reason” (ratio perfecta), “virtue” (virtus), “wisdom” 
(sapientia), and “the knowledge of good and bad” (scientia bonorum ac malorum) are thus all 
more or less identical which is why he uses these concepts interchangeably in his definitions of 
the summum bonum of human existence and regards them as essential requirements for anyone 
wishing to live a happy life (Hadot 1969:101). 
 
Additionally, Seneca explains, if a man manages to perfect his reason and thus attain virtue, he 
will become like God (Ep. 31.8; 92.29; cf. Motto 1985:12; Setaioli 2007:333, 364). The ideal 
Stoic sage is actually in one aspect superior to God, since God is by nature free from fear and 
exempt from enduring hardships, while a wise man has to overcome these things by his own 
efforts20 (Ep.53.11; cf. Motto 1985:12; Setaioli 2007: 364; Holowchak 2008:63). Unsurprisingly 
this bold view on Stoic virtue as portrayed by Seneca did not go without criticism. St. Augustine, 
writing a couple of centuries later in his De Civitate Dei, condemns the notion that man can 
surpass God as false and arrogant (Civ. Dei 19.4; Setaioli 2007:367).  
 
                                                             
19“The mind is perfected by [only] one thing, the unalterable knowledge of good and bad”; una re consummatur 
animus, scientia bonorum ac malorum inmutabili. (Ep. 88.28) 
20 “There is something by which the wise man surpasses God: he does not fear by nature‟s good deed, the wise man 
by his own”; est aliquid, quo sapiens antecedat deum: ille naturae beneficio non timet, suo sapiens. (Ep. 53.11) 
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From this brief overview, it is clear that in his various definitions of the happy life as the 
summum bonum of human existence, Seneca is in this regard entirely in line with the 
fundamental Stoic teachings that have been set out in Chapter 2, although he also occasionally 
adds some of his own interpretations. 
 
 
4.3 Attainment of the Stoic telos in Seneca 
 
Seneca‟s requirements for a happy life listed above are living according to nature, perfecting 
one‟s reason, attaining virtue, wisdom and knowledge of all things.  The most important first step 
for reaching this goal and living a fully satisfactory human life is, according to Seneca, the study 
of philosophy (Ep. 16.1; 37.4; 108.35; cf. Hadot 1969:108; Motto 1985:12; Inwood 2005:5). 
 
Animum format et fabricat, vitam disponit, actiones regit, agenda et omittenda demonstrat, sedet ad 
gubernaculum et per ancipitia fluctuantium derigit cursum. Sine hac nemo intrepide potest vivere, 
nemo secure. (Ep. 16.3) 
 
She [philosophy] shapes and constructs the soul, orders [our] life, directs [our] actions, shows [us] 
what should be done and what should be omitted, she sits at the helm and directs [our] course amidst 
the unpredictable waves. Without her no one can live fearlessly or securely. 
 
There are three divisions of philosophy, says Seneca, ethics, physics and logic21 (Ep. 89.9). With 
regards to the attainment of happiness, the focus is primarily on ethics, the part of philosophy 
which “directs the soul” (componit animum; 89.9). Seneca explains further that the moral part of 
philosophy, i.e. ethics, is also divided into three parts:  
 
Quam in tria rursus dividi placuit, ut prima esset inspectio suum cuique distribuens et aestimans 
quanto quidque dignum sit, maxime utilis. Quid enim est tam necessarium quam pretia rebus inponere? 
Secunda de impetu, de actionibus tertia. Primum enim est ut quanti quidque sit iudices, secundum, ut 
impetum ad illa capias ordinatum temperatumque, tertium ut inter impetum tuum actionemque 
conveniat, ut in omnibus istis tibi ipse consentias. (Ep. 89.14; cf. Rubin 1901:2; Hadot 1969:117) 
 
                                                             
21 “The greatest authors, as well as the largest number of authors, said that there are three parts of philosophy: a 
moral, a natural, and a rational [part]”; philosophiae tres partes esse dixerunt et maximi et plurimi auctores: 
moralem, naturalem, rationale. (Ep. 89.9) 
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It was agreed that this should again be divided into three parts. The first part is the theory which 
distributes to each thing what belongs to it and estimates how much each thing is worth – this is the 
most useful. For what is as essential as putting a value on things? – The second part concerns impulse, 
the third part actions. For firstly, you must judge what something is worth, secondly, you must receive 
an ordered and controlled impulse towards it, and thirdly, so that there is consistency between your 
impulse and your action, you must agree with yourself in all those things. 
 
Seneca here uses the terms inspectio, de impetus and de actionibus as equivalent to the Greek 
terms theōrētikē, hormētikē and praktikē (Gummere 1970:386). In short, then, Stoic ethics are 
subdivided into (1) the theory of value, (2) the theory of impulses, and (3) the theory of actions. 
The following section will take a look at how these three divisions of ethical doctrine are treated 
in Seneca‟s Epistulae Morales and whether his teachings also correspond to orthodox Stoic 
doctrine. 
 
 
4.3.1 Theory of Value 
 
There is hardly a letter by Seneca which does not deal with the Stoic doctrine on the value of 
things (Hadot 1969:117-8). In conformity with traditional Stoic teaching, Seneca explains that 
“all things are either good or bad or indifferent” (omnia aut mala sint aut bona aut indifferentia; 
Ep.117.9).  
 
Good is, in the first place, the knowledge of things (rerum scientia; Ep.31.6); the opposite 
(rerum imperitia) is bad (cf. Mans 1978:149). This knowledge of things is what comprises 
virtue22 (Ep. 95.56; cf. Rubin 1901:31). In agreement with the standard Stoic account, Seneca 
states that the only true good is virtue (virtus), and the only bad is vice (turpitudo) (Ep. 71.32; 
74.6; 76.19; 82.14; 94.8; 95.35; 98.9). Seneca also defines the good as that which is honourable 
(honestum). He calls the honourable both the highest good (summum bonum) as well as the only 
good (unum bonum) (Ep. 71.4; cf. 71.19; 74.1, 10; 76.16; 85.17; 87.25; 90.35; cf. Rozelaar 
1976:427). 
 
                                                             
22
 “[V]irtue is the knowledge of both other things and of itself”; virtus et aliorum scientia est et sui. (Ep. 95.56) 
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However, Seneca unnecessarily seems to overcomplicate the Stoic teaching by actually drawing 
a distinction between the good and the honourable (Ep. 118.10-12; 120.3; cf. Rubin 1901:59): 
 
Quid ergo inter duo interest? Honestum est perfectum bonum, quo beata vita completur, cuius contactu 
alia quoque bona fiunt. | Quod dico, talest: sunt quaedam neque bona neque mala, tamquam militia, 
legatio, iurisdictio. Haec cum honeste administrata sunt, bona esse incipiunt et ex dubio in bonum 
transeunt. Bonum societate honesti fit, honestum per se bonum est. Bonum ex honesto fluit, honestum 
ex se est. Quod bonum est malum esse potuit; quod honestum est, nisi bonum esse non potuit. (Ep. 
118.10-11) 
 
What is the difference between the two? The honourable is prefect good, by which the happy life is 
fulfilled, and other things may also become good by being in contact with it. | What I am saying is the 
following: certain things are neither good nor bad, such as warfare, diplomatic service, or 
administration of justice. When these things have been managed honourably, they begin to be good 
and move over from the indifferent to the good. The good comes from association with the honourable, 
the honourable is good in itself. The good flows from the honourable, the honourable from itself. What 
is good might have been bad; what is honourable, could not be anything but good. 
 
The key difference then between the good and the honourable is that the honourable can make 
indifferents good by association (Ep. 82.12) and when actions that are in themselves indifferent 
are honourably conducted the actions become good (Ep. 92.11). 
 
As indifferent Seneca classifies all things that are neither good nor bad (Ep. 82.10), things such 
as wealth, health, strength, beauty, titles, as well as, death, exile, ill-health, pain (Ep. 82.14; 94.8; 
109.12). These are indifferent with regards to our happiness (Ep. 66.46; 71.33; 92.16) but they 
do have some “selective value” and, if given a choice, one would certainly choose health and 
strength (Ep. 92.13) and, by implication, reject their opposites (Rozelaar 1976:447; Holowchak 
2008:33). As discussed in Chapter 3, these indifferents the Stoics classified as either “preferred” 
or “dispreferred”; Seneca uses the terms “advantages” (commoda) and “disadvantages” 
(incommoda) (Ep. 74.17; 92.16). 
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4.3.2 Theory of Impulses 
 
In chapter 3 it was explained that before any action can take place, we need to receive an impulse 
to act; an impulse in rational beings involves assent to an external impulsive presentation. Seneca 
writes on this point: 
 
Omne rationale animal nihil agit, nisi primum specie alicuius rei inritatum est, deinde impetum cepit, 
deinde adsensio confirmavit hunc impetum. (Ep. 113.18) 
 
No rational animal does anything, unless it was first stirred by the appearance [cf. G: phantasia] of 
some object, then received an impulse and then assent confirmed this impulse. 
 
The Stoics distinguish between three species of impulses: “emotions” or “passions” (G: pathē; L: 
perturbationes, affectus), “good feelings” (eupatheiai) and “selection and rejection” (eklogē, 
apeklogē). Seneca does not provide such a systematic classification of the Stoic impulses but 
there are numerous passages in his letters which clearly show that he stays true to traditional 
Stoic doctrine. One species of impulses that he devoted particular attention to are the four 
generic emotions: desire (G: epithumia; L: libido, appetitus, cupiditas, ambitio) (Ep. 15.9; 16.9; 
71.37; 85.11; 98.6 115.16; 118.6-7), fear (G: phobos; L: metus) (Ep. 14.3; 30.17; 58.23; 66.16; 
71.37; 74.5; 85.11, 28; 98.6; 117.31; 120.18), pleasure (G: hēdonē; L: laetitia) (Ep. 23.6; 51.8; 
59.15; 83.27; 92.10; 104.34), and distress (G: lupē; L: aegritudo, dolor) (Ep. 63.12; 78.13; 
85.11; 99.1 ff.). 
 
The problem with desire, Seneca explains, is that those desires that exceed Nature‟s demand are 
limitless and can never be satisfied (Ep. 16.9). They spring from false opinion, and “the false”, 
explains Seneca, “has no limit” (nullus enim terminus falso est; Ep. 16.9; cf. 118.7). The best 
example of limitless ambition and desire for power (ambitio) in antiquity is Alexander the Great. 
Even after gaining control of the vast Persian Empire, he found no satisfaction with his conquest 
but continued on a senseless and brutal campaign into India and only stopped once his troops 
eventually had enough and threatened mutiny (Holowchak 2008:172). Seneca writes of 
Alexander‟s ambition turned madness in Ep. 94.62-3. In his eyes Alexander, although he 
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conquered much of the known world, was a poor and pathetic figure due to his insatiable desires 
(Holowchak 2008:173).  
 
Elsewhere Seneca writes, desire is never backward-looking (Ep. 73.3), which means that people, 
after having satisfied one desire, usually do not look at what they have gained but only seek new 
and greater satisfaction (Holowchak 2008:173). In Ep. 118.6 he says: 
 
Cui enim adsecuto satis fuit, quod optanti nimium videbatur? … Tu ista credis excelsa quia longe ab 
illis iaces; ei vero qui ad illa pervenit, humilia sunt. 
 
For who was ever satisfied after having attained that which seemed great beyond measure while he 
was [still] seeking it? … You believe those things to be lofty because you are situated far away from 
them; but they are lowly for him who has reached them.  
 
People who only think of things yet to be obtained, quickly forget about the good things they 
have already received. The worst aspect of desire is therefore its ungratefulness23 (Ep. 73.2; cf. 
99.5). 
 
Fear is the emotion that Seneca focuses on most in his letters. There are many things which 
people are afraid of: illness, poverty, violence, and natural disasters such as earthquakes (Ep. 
14.3; 117.31). Fear may also be a consequence of one‟s own sins (Ep. 105.7-8; cf. 97.13-16). But 
it is the fear of death which Seneca treats most extensively in his letters (Ep. 4; 13; 24; 30.17; 
58.23; 120.18).  Again and again he assures Lucilius that death is nothing to be feared (Ep. 4.3; 
24.13; 36.12; 94.7; 120.18), since it is in fact simply a state of non-existence comparable to the 
condition we were in before we were born (Ep. 54.4-5; Holowchak 2008:146). He does however 
concede that fear of death is something natural since we are all born with a natural impulse 
towards self-love and self-preservation (Ep. 36.8; 82.15; cf. Rubin 1901:66; Rozelaar 1976:447; 
Holowchak 2008:146).  Seneca‟s views on the fear of death will still be discussed in more detail 
in Section 4.4.7 below. 
 
                                                             
23 “But whoever thinks about what is to be received, has forgotten about what has [already] been received; desire has 
not greater evil than that it is ungrateful”; Quisquis autem de accipiendo cogitat, oblitus accepti est; nec ullum habet 
malum cupiditas maius, quam quod ingrata est. (Ep. 73.2) 
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Regarding the emotion of pleasure, Seneca shows a particularly negative attitude: In Ep. 92.10 
he writes that “pleasure ... destroys [the soul] and softens all its strength” (voluptas … dissolvit et 
omne robur emollit). Elsewhere he says “the things that are called pleasures, become 
punishments when they go beyond limitation” (quae voluptates vocantur, ubi transcenderunt 
modum, poenas esse; Ep. 83.27). The consequences of excessive pleasure are always pain and 
sorrow (Ep. 23.6; 51.8; 121.4). 
 
Of the pleasures that people tend to overindulge in particularly, Seneca lists excessive wealth, 
drunkenness and over-eating. “The acquisition of riches”, he says quoting Epicurus, “has been 
for many people, not an end, but [merely] a change of troubles” (Multis parasse divitias non finis 
miserarum fuit, sed mutatio; Ep. 17.11; cf. Rubin 1901:63; Holowchak 2008:160). Elsewhere, 
Seneca states that no one can ever find true contentment in prosperity, since people usually 
prefer what they have failed to gain24 (Ep. 115.17; cf. Holowchak 2008:160). 
 
Similarly he writes of the unpleasant consequences of drunkenness. It “pays for a single hour of 
hilarious madness by a sickness of many days” (quae unius horae hilarem insaniam longi 
temporis taedio pensat; Ep. 59.15). By binge-drinking, over-eating and leading an inactive life-
style, people actually voluntarily choose to shorten their life-expectancy (Ep. 122.3-4). He paints 
a rather grim picture when he writes of people who sleep away most of the day and live solely 
for the pleasures of the night: 
 
Licet in vino unguentoque tenebras suas exigant, licet epulis … totum perversae vigiliae tempus 
educant, non convivantur, sed iusta sibi faciunt. (Ep. 122.3) 
 
Although they pass their hours of darkness in wine and perfume, and spend the whole time of their 
unnatural waking hours on sumptuous meals … they are not feasting, but conducting their own funeral 
rites. 
 
                                                             
24 “For there is no one whom his good fortune can satisfy, even if it comes right away. People complain about both 
their plans and their advances and they always prefer what is left behind”; nemo enim est, cui felicitas sua, etiam si 
cursu venit, satis faciat. Queruntur et de consiliis et de processibus suis maluntque semper quae reliquerunt. (Ep. 
115.17) 
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Elsewhere, he writes: “Drunkenness both incites and reveals every vice, and removes the sense 
of shame that hinders evil undertakings” (omne vitium ebrietas et incendit et detegit, obstantem 
malis conatibus verecundiam removet; Ep. 83.19). Drunkenness will therefore make virtuous 
action difficult, and abstaining from alcohol, or at least refraining from habitual and heavy 
consumption, is an essential feature of living a virtuous life (Holowchak 2008:167). A gluttonous 
lifestyle in general goes completely against virtue, since virtue requires moderation (Holowchak 
2008:169). 
 
Grief Seneca discusses in his letters mostly with reference to the loss of a friend. According to 
the traditional Stoic doctrine, grief, like all other emotions, must not be indulged in. Seneca, 
however, says that it is acceptable for someone who has just lost a loved one to be upset. He does 
not disregard the orthodox teachings regarding grief entirely; he merely displays a more humane 
view and understands that there is no use in telling someone who is upset that he should not be 
(Ep. 63.1). Someone who has just suffered a personal loss should be allowed to grieve for a little 
while until he has worked off the first shock (Ep. 99.1). In letter 63, in which Seneca consoles 
Lucilius for the death of his friend Flaccus, he shows sympathy for Lucilius‟ emotion, telling 
him that it is acceptable to cry, as long as he does not do it in excess. “You may weep, but you 
must not wail” (lacrimandum est, non plorandum; Ep. 63.1). Seneca admits (Ep. 63.14) that he 
himself was once overcome by grief for the death of his friend Annaeus Serenus (to whom he 
dedicated three of his philosophical essays).  
 
At the same time, however, he stresses that, when allowing ourselves to be sad, we should set a 
time limit to our mourning period, since it is in any event impossible to keep doing it forever. 
Moreover he says, “but the most shameful remedy for grief, in the case of a reasonable man, is to 
grow tired of grieving” (turpissimum autem est in homine prudente remedium maeroris lassitudo 
maerendi; Ep. 63.12). Rather than waiting for the sadness to go away, we should be the ones 
abandoning it – and that as soon as possible25 (Ep. 63.12). 
 
                                                             
25 “I prefer it that you abandon grief, than that you are abandoned by it, and stop doing it [i.e. stop grieving] as soon 
as possible”; malo relinquas dolorem quam ab illo relinquaris, et quam primum id facere desiste. (Ep. 63.12) 
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What Seneca recommends for overcoming the loss of a loved one, is to find a new friend to 
replace the one lost (Ep. 63.12; cf. Holowchak 2008:145). Besides, one may also still derive 
pleasure from recollecting a lost friend26 (Ep. 63.4; cf. 63.7; 99.5, 19, 23). 
 
All emotions, says Seneca, prevent a person from performing “appropriate deeds” (probanda; 
Ep. 94.32) and it is from emotions that vice originates (Ep. 85.10). Emotions actually cause a 
state of disease in the mind27 (Ep. 75.12 cf. Ep.116.1; Rozelaar 1976:111-2). 
 
Emotions, moreover, enslave humans (Ep. 39.6; 47.17; 66.16; 110.10; 124.3). Therefore, one es-
sential step in setting one‟s soul free and attaining happiness is to gain control over one‟s 
emotions (Holowchak 2008:63), or in fact, eliminate them completely (Ep. 85.9-10). Seneca 
discusses the Stoic doctrine of apatheia (“freedom from emotions”, impatientia in Latin; cf. Ep. 
9.2) at length in Letter 116. Here he also mentions the ongoing debate between the Stoics who 
advocated a complete eradication of the emotions and the Peripatetics who proposed a mere 
moderation of the emotions (Ep. 116.1; cf. 85.4). Since emotions are analogous to diseases, 
Seneca agrees fully with the Stoics that it would be nonsensical to merely moderate the disease 
instead of removing it altogether:  
 
Utrum satius sit modicos habere adfectus an nullos, saepe quaesitum est. Nostri illos expellunt, 
Peripatetici temperant. Ego non video, quomodo salubris esse aut utilis possit ulla mediocritas morbi. 
(Ep. 116.1) 
 
It has often been asked whether it is better to have moderate emotions or none at all. We [i.e. the 
Stoics] reject them, the Peripatetics moderate them. I, for my part, do not see how any moderate state 
of disease could be either healthy or useful.  
 
Seneca also agrees with the Stoics that emotions are essentially false opinions about what is good 
or bad (Ep. 13.4; 66.31-32; 78.13; 104.9-10; 118.6-7) and that one can get rid of them by putting 
                                                             
 26“Let us see to it that the recollection of those, who have been lost, is pleasant to us”; Id agamus, ut iucunda nobis 
amissorum fiat recordatio. (Ep. 63.4) 
27 “Emotions are objectionable movements of the soul, sudden and agitated, which by occurring frequently and 
being disregarded have produced a disease”; adfectus sunt motus animi inprobabiles, subiti et concitati, qui 
frequentes neglectique fecere morbum. (Ep. 75.12) 
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oneself under the control of reason (Ep. 37.4; cf. 85.9) and coming to know the true value of 
things. A person‟s fear, for example, may be settled by the knowledge that that which one 
initially believed to be something bad, is not truly bad (Ep. 85.25; cf. Holowchak 2008:151). 
Seneca concedes that the eradication of emotions is no easy task, as they are in some sense 
natural (Ep. 116.3). However, our biggest obstacle in ridding ourselves of emotions, says Seneca, 
is not our inability but our lack of will-power 28  (Ep. 116.8; cf. Mans 1978:198; Rozelaar 
1976:440). 
 
Yet, there are certain aspects of emotions, says Seneca, which cannot be eliminated and even the 
wise cannot avoid them. These are the involuntary physical responses that accompany emotions, 
such as blushing, sweating, trembling in the knees, the chattering of teeth, contracting of one‟s 
eyebrows, becoming dizzy when standing on a high peak, or fainting at the sight of a freshly 
inflicted wound (Ep. 11.1-7; 57.3-5; 71.29; cf. Rubin 1901:26; Hadot 1969:132-3; Holowchak 
2008:130). However, as discussed above (3.2.1), these are only the “first movements” of 
emotions and not emotions proper. Seneca explains the reason why these first movements cannot 
be subdued by reason, is that they occur outside rational activity and are purely physical 
sensations29 (Ep. 71.29; cf. Hadot 1969:132-3). 
 
As has been examined in the previous chapter, orthodox Stoicism, in disallowing all emotions, 
still leaves humans to be legitimately motivated by one or both of two other species of impulse: 
(if a wise man) by the eupatheiai, wish (G: boulēsis; L: voluntas), caution (G: eulabeia; L: 
cautio) and joy (G: khara; L: gaudium); and/or (for anyone) by the unemotional reactions of 
selection and rejection (cf. Trapp 2007:79). Seneca does not clearly identify these two other 
species of impulses but he does point out that there are alternatives to the undesirable emotions, 
desire, fear and pleasure.  
 
In Letter 116.1, he explains that, even if we eradicate the emotion of desire, we may still pursue 
the selfsame things that we used to pursue, but instead of desiring (cupere) them, we should wish 
                                                             
28  “Not wanting is the [real] reason, not being able to is alleged in excuse”; nolle in causa est, non posse 
praetenditur. (Ep. 116.8) 
29
 “For all these are sensations of the body”; hi enim omnes corporis sensus sunt. (Ep. 71.29) 
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for (velle) them. The difference between the two is that the element of vice has been removed 
(Ep. 116.1). 
 
The appropriate impulse towards things that people most commonly fear, says Seneca, is caution 
(cautio). In Ep. 85.25-6 he explains, that someone, who knows that nothing except vice 
(turpitudo) is truly bad, will not fear the things that ordinary people fear, but simply avoid them; 
“caution is proper for him, but fear is not” (cautio illum decet, timor non decet; Ep. 85.26). 
 
As an alternative to pleasure (voluptas), which is a vice (Ep. 59.1), we should experience joy. 
Unlike pleasure which eventually results in pain and sorrow, joy never stops and never changes 
into its opposite30 (Ep. 59.2). The joy that results from the attainment of virtue and wisdom is 
unbreakable, everlasting and peace-giving (Ep. 27.3; 59.16). This sort of joy is independent of 
external things and springs wholly from within oneself (Ep. 72.4; 98.1). 
 
For grief, Seneca, like his Stoic predecessors, offers no rational alternative impulse. 
 
 
4.3.3 Theory of Actions 
 
According to traditional Stoic teachings, all actions stem from impulses which arise in response 
to our evaluation of a presentation in our environment. Hence, all actions depend on our 
consideration of what is good and bad. Accordingly, Seneca writes in Ep. 76.18: 
 
Omnes actiones totius vitae honesti ac turpis respectu temperantur; ad haec faciendi et non faciendi 
ratio derigitur. 
 
All actions of life as a whole are controlled by our view of what is honourable and what is wicked; 
according to these [two] things, reason is directed at doing or not doing something. 
 
We will live a harmonious and happy life when our actions are in line with our impulses and our 
impulses in line with the true value of the objects. 
                                                             
30 “But joy is bound together by the fact that it neither stops, nor is turned into the opposite”; gaudio autem iunctum 
est non desinere nec in contrarium verti. (Ep. 59.2) 
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Tunc ergo vita concors sibi est, ubi actio non destituit impetum, impetus ex dignitate rei cuiusque 
concipitur, proinde remissus vel acrior, prout illa digna est peti. (Ep. 89.15) 
 
Therefore, life is in harmony with itself, when an action has not departed from impulse and when the 
impulse is conceived from the value of a certain object, which is then either relaxed or more violent, 
according to the objects being worthy to be sought.  
 
In order to achieve consistency in one‟s actions and live virtuously, one must therefore have a 
firm and correct knowledge of the true value of things. Hence, as has been shown above, Seneca 
makes this knowledge an essential requirement for the attainment of a happy life (cf. section 4.2) 
(Ep. 31.5; 74.1; 94.8; 95.35). The acquisition of this knowledge is, however, just the starting 
point. Once one has learnt the principles that lead to happiness, one needs to internalize them, 
and finally, put them into practice (Hadot 1969:104-5). We internalize principles, says Seneca, 
by studying them repeatedly (Ep. 16.1; cf. section 4.4.1 below) and then strengthening our 
learning through action (Ep. 94.47). There is hardly a letter in which Seneca does not emphasize 
the importance of the practical application of ethical doctrine (e.g. Ep. 20.1; 75.7; 82.8; 89.23; 
94.47; 95.10; 108.35; 117.33) which will be discussed in further detail below (section 4.4). 
 
When it comes to our actions, it is also important that they are in agreement with our words (Ep. 
34.4; cf. 20.1-2; 82.8).  
 
[F]acere docet philosophia, non dicere, et hoc exigit, ut ad legem suam quisque vivat, ne orationi vita 
dissentiat, ut ipsa intra se vita unius sit omnium actionum sine dissensione coloris. (Ep. 20.2) 
 
Philosophy teaches us to act, not to speak; it demands of every one that he live according to his own 
rule, that his life does not disagree with his words, and that his inner life is of one colour and does not 
disagree with any of his actions. 
 
Since consistency between words and deeds is the best proof of wisdom, a constant wavering 
between pretending to strive after virtue and performing vicious actions is a proof of lack of 
wisdom31 (Ep. 120.20; cf. Holowchak 2008:77). 
                                                             
31 “The greatest proof of an evil mind is wavering and a continuous movement between feigning of virtues and love 
for vices”; maximum indicium est malae mentis fluctuatio et inter simulationem virtutum amoremque vitiorum 
adsidua iactatio. (Ep. 120.20) 
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Lastly, in everything we do we must have the final goal of the highest good in front of our eyes 
to which all our actions are to be referred (Ep. 95.45; cf. Inwood 2005:120). 
 
Proponamus oportet finem summi boni, ad quem nitamur, ad quem omne factum nostrum dictumque 
respiciat; veluti navigantibus ad aliquod sidus derigendus est cursus. (Ep. 95. 15) 
 
We must set the goal of the highest good before us, towards which we may strive, and to which 
everything we do and say may be referred; as for example, sailors must direct their course according to 
a certain star.  
 
“Overall, Seneca states, progress toward virtue requires practice through appropriate acts” 
(Holowchak, 2008:57). However, if one acts in the right way without knowing that it is right, the 
rightness of the act is unstable (Ep. 95.39) and does not lead to virtuous conduct (Hadot 
1969:104; Inwood 2005:119).  
 
 
4.4 Seneca‟s Practical Advice 
 
Above it has been proven that Seneca, for the most part, adheres to the traditional Stoic teachings 
regarding the definition and attainment of happiness. As has been stressed throughout this study, 
happiness is not attained merely by entrusting knowledge to one‟s memory, but it lies solely in 
the practical application of the acquired knowledge (Ep. 75.7). Theory without living it out 
practically is useless says Seneca (Mans 1978:89). Thus he says in Ep. 94.47: “You must both 
learn and strengthen what you have learned by doing it” (et discas oportet et quod didicisti 
agendo confirmes). This final section will take a look at some practical guidelines, Seneca 
provides for the application of ethical doctrine in real life. 
 
“Stoic ethics is often criticized for its impractical rigidity and pointless idealism” (Inwood 
2005:95). And Seneca writes himself:  
 
Hoc enim turpissimum est, quod nobis obici solet, verba nos philosophiae, non opera tractare. (Ep. 
24.15) 
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For this is the most shameful thing of which we are often accused – that we [only] deal with the words 
of philosophy not with the deeds. 
 
It is not entirely certain whether Seneca believed that the Stoic ideal happy life is actually 
attainable in practice, but he clearly believed that all human beings possess “seeds of virtue” (Ep. 
75.6; 94.29; 108.8; 120.4) and are thus all equipped to develop their reason to a state of 
excellence. As has been suggested above, the aim of his Epistulae Morales and other 
philosophical writings was to provide practical guidance that would help others to come closer to 
achieving this goal. What follows, is a discussion of some practical recommendations which 
Seneca provides in his letters. 
 
 
4.4.1 Continuously Engage in Philosophy 
 
As pointed out above, Seneca saw the study of philosophy as essential for anyone with an 
aspiration to attain happiness and live a fully satisfactory human life (cf. section 4.3). Studying 
philosophy means to be well since “without it the mind is sickly” (sine hoc aeger est animus; Ep. 
15.1). And Seneca maintains that “nobody can live a happy, or even bearable life, without the 
study of wisdom” (neminem posse beate vivere, ne tolerabiliter quidem sine sapientiae studio; 
Ep. 16.1; cf. 37.4). 
 
Seneca therefore encourages Lucilius: “Dedicate yourself completely to it [philosophy]” (illi te 
totum dedica; Ep. 53.8). The study of philosophy should by no means be postponed until you 
have leisure (Ep. 72.3; cf. Mans 1978:125). It is something that should be studied on a regular 
basis32 (Ep. 53.9; cf. Mans 1978:44). 
 
But what is the purpose of continuously studying what we already know? As was explained in 
Chapter 3, only the wise are capable of firm and consistent knowledge; people still on their way 
to perfection, however, need to be reminded continuously of the principles they have just learnt 
until their beliefs become internalized. In order to strengthen and fortify what we have learnt, we 
                                                             
32 “It is not a thing that should be attended to in one‟s spare time, but it is something habitual”; non est res subsiciva, 
ordinaria est. (Ep. 53.9) 
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must study it continuously until that which is only a good intention becomes good settled 
knowledge33 (Ep. 16.1). For example, we might believe death to be an indifferent, but if this 
teaching is not rooted in our innermost being, we will most likely still fear it as if it were 
something bad. The wise, on the other hand, knows that death is an indifferent and will therefore 
never fear it. One way to strengthen one‟s belief and transform it into firm, consistent knowledge 
is to rehearse the thought that death is indifferent every day (Ep. 4.5). 
 
In short, to learn to live virtuously and attain happiness, Seneca‟s first recommendation is that 
one should dedicate oneself daily to the study of philosophy (Motto 1985:12). The study of 
philosophy should involve both learning the principles outlined above as well as applying them 
in one‟s daily life. 
 
 
4.4.2 Self-scrutiny and Willingness to Change 
 
Another requirement for the attainment of happiness and moral improvement is the ability to 
recognize and acknowledge one‟s faults and a willingness to change and better oneself. Seneca 
already treated the theme of self-reflection in De Brevitate Vitae (written between 48 and 55), 
and he also describes the relationship between self-knowledge and self-management in De 
Tranquilitate Animi (Inwood 2005:144). A more extensive account of self-examination and self-
shaping appears in Seneca‟s De Ira (Edwards 1997:28; Inwood 2005:144-5). 
 
In Ep. 28.9 Seneca introduces this idea of self-scrutiny by quoting a saying of Epicurus, “The 
beginning of salvation is the recognition of sin” (Initium est salutis notitia peccati), and he goes 
on to explain, “for he who does not know that he has sinned does not want to be corrected; it is 
necessary that you catch yourself doing wrong before you can free yourself from faults” (Nam 
qui peccare se nescit, corrigi non vult; deprehendas te oportet, antequam emendes; Ep. 28.9; cf. 
Hadot 1969:162-3; Mans 1978:211). Seneca, thus, advises Lucilius, “Therefore, as much as you 
can, convict yourself and interrogate yourself, [and] perform the roles first of the accuser, then of 
                                                             
33  “You must perservere and add strength by constant study, until what is a good intention becomes a good 
understanding”; perseverandum est et adsiduo studio robur addendum, donec bona mens sit quod bona voluntas est. 
(Ep. 16.1) 
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the judge, and lastly of the intercessor” (ideo quantum potes, te ipse coargue, inquire in te; 
accusatoris primum partibus fungere, deinde iudicis, novissime deprecatoris; Ep. 28.10; cf. 
Hadot 1969:162-3; Edwards 1997:29). Here, he tells Lucilius to imagine the procedures of the 
Roman law-court “providing a model through which his self-scrutiny may be dramatized” 
(Edwards 1997:29). 
 
Seneca is convinced that one of the main obstacles to our self-improvement and our attainment 
of virtue is that we are too readily satisfied with ourselves (Ep. 59.11):  
 
Illud praecipue inpedit, quod cito nobis placemus; … Optimos nos esse, sapientissimos adfirmantibus 
adsentimur, cum sciamus illos saepe multa mentiri; … sequitur itaque ut ideo mutari nolimus quia nos 
optimos esse credidimus. 
 
What hinders us especially is that we are too quickly satisfied with ourselves; … we agree with those 
who proclaim us to be the best and wisest, although we know that they are often lying a great deal; … 
therefore, it follows that the reason we do not want to be changed, is that we believe ourselves to be 
the best. 
 
Moreover, instead of admitting our faults, we tend to deny them and deceive ourselves, not 
realizing that the problems that afflict us are not external but within ourselves (Ep. 50.4; cf. 
Mans 1978:211). The more one is caught up in one‟s own faults, the less one is able to perceive 
them (Ep. 53.7-8). 
 
Seneca, therefore, recommends that one should make self-examination a habitual daily activity: 
“I will immediately observe myself, and what is most useful, I will review my day” (Observabo 
me protinus et, quod est utilissimum, diem meum recognoscam; Ep. 83.2; cf. Edwards 1997:28).  
 
Recognition and acknowledgement of our faults should thus be our starting point for moral 
progress, but this is not yet enough if we do not also have the will to change. Seneca writes to 
Lucilius in Ep. 80.4 that in order to become good, one needs to want to become good (Quid tibi 
opus est ut sis bonus? Velle; cf. Rozelaar 1976:440; Mans 1978:198). After all, says Seneca, the 
real reason that keeps people from improving is not their inability but their unwillingness to give 
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up their faults34 (Ep. 116.8; cf. Rozelaar 1976:440; Mans 1978:198). Accordingly, Seneca makes 
(along with the practice of self-scrutiny) a positive will and readiness for self-reformation a basic 
requirement for moral progress and the attainment of a happy life (Ep. 34.3; 71.6; cf. Rubin 
1901:73; Smuts 1948:31; Rozelaar 1976:440; Inwood 2005:138).  
 
 
4.4.3 Choose a Moral Advisor 
 
Even if we are dedicated to the daily study and revision of philosophical doctrine, and even if we 
have trained ourselves to recognize our faults and have the will to rid ourselves of them, we will 
struggle to completely cure ourselves without a helping hand. Seneca believes that no one is 
strong enough to emerge from foolishness by himself; someone must lend him a hand and lead 
him out35 (Ep. 52.2; cf. Motto 1985:11). That is why it is so useful to have an adviser by one‟s 
side in the form of a close friend (Inwood 2005:106). The favourable impact that the company of 
good men can have on our characters should not be underestimated (Ep. 94.40-1; cf. 71.1, 22.1-
2; Inwood 2005:119). 
 
Nulla res magis animis honesta induit dubiosque et in pravum inclinabiles revocat ad rectum quam 
bonorum virorum conversatio. Paulatim enim descendit in pectora, et vim praeceptorum obtinet 
frequenter aspici, frequenter audiri. Occursus mehercules ipse sapientium iuvat, et est aliquid quod ex 
magno viro vel tacente proficias. (Ep. 94.40) 
 
There is nothing that better adorns people‟s minds with honourable things and brings back on the right 
path those who are in doubt and prone to immorality, than associating with good men. For frequently 
seeing and frequently hearing them, gradually sinks into the heart and obtains the power of 
instructions. In fact, merely meeting wise men is of help, and can derive some benefit from a great man 
even if he is silent. 
 
Seneca frequently emphasizes the importance of seeking guidance from an appropriate moral 
advisor (Hadot 1969:130, 164; Edwards 1997:30): 
                                                             
34  “Not wanting is the [real] reason, not being able to is alleged in excuse”; nolle in causa est, non posse 
praetenditur. (Ep. 116.8) 
35 “No one is strong enough by himself, to emerge; it is necessary that someone else offers him a hand, someone else 
must lead him out [or educate him]”; Nemo per se satis valet ut emergat; oportet manum aliquis porrigat, aliquis 
educat. (Ep. 52.2) 
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Sit ergo aliquis custos et aurem subinde pervellat abigatque rumores et reclamet populis laudantibus. 
Erras enim si existimas nobiscum vitia nasci: supervenerunt, ingesta sunt. Itaque monitionibus crebris 
opiniones quae nos circumsonant repellantur. (Ep. 94.55) 
 
Therefore, let someone be your guardian and let him pluck your ear from time to time and drive out 
rumours and protest against popular interests. For you are mistaken, if you assume that our faults are 
born with us: they came afterwards, they were heaped upon us. Therefore, let the opinions, which 
resound around us, be repelled by frequent admonitions. 
 
Besides receiving regular admonition, we should also learn from our moral advisor by imitating 
his examples. Therefore, when choosing a moral advisor, one must be careful not to look for 
someone who is merely a clever speaker or debater, but someone who also practices what he 
preaches, someone who may teach us by the way he leads his life (Ep. 52.8; cf. 11.10; 98.17; 
Hadot 1969:164; Mans 1978:88; Holowchak 2008:223). Seneca particularly praises his own 
teacher Fabianus for leading his life in complete agreement with his teachings (Ep. 40.12; 
100.11), something which inspired many young men to follow his example (Ep. 100.12; cf. 
Hadot 1969: 164).  
 
Seneca illustrates the usefulness of a personal advisor and role model by comparing moral 
reformation with the education of a primary school child. When a child first learns how to write, 
the teacher would guide his hand, later he gives him examples to copy on his own. In the same 
way, the reformation of our minds takes place (Ep. 94.51; cf. Mans 1978:87-88, 161):  
 
Pueri ad praescriptum discunt. Digiti illorum tenentur et aliena manu per litterarum simulacra 
ducuntur, deinde imitari iubentur proposita et ad illa reformare chirographum. Sic animus noster, dum 
eruditur ad praescriptum, iuvatur. (Ep. 94.51) 
 
Boys study according to instruction. Their fingers are held and guided by another hand through the 
pattern of the letters; then, they are told to imitate a model and mould their handwriting according to it. 
Similarly, our mind is helped when it is taught according to instruction. 
 
Seneca‟s recommendation to seek guidance from an older, more experienced person is not a new 
concept but goes back to an ancient Roman tradition (Mans 1978:159-161). In ancient Roman 
education, boys would acquire practical skills by observing and imitating the example portrayed 
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by their fathers. Later, at the age of sixteen, in preparation for a career in public life, they would 
devote themselves to a well-respected and experienced politician or influential public figure 
(Hadot 1969:167; Mans 1978:159). 
 
The most effective way to learn from a moral advisor, says Seneca, is through personal 
interaction and living with him (Ep. 6.5; cf. Hadot 1969:164; Mans 1978:88; Inwood 1005:119), 
since “there are certain things which can only be pointed out by someone who is present” 
(Quaedam non nisi a praesente monstrantur; Ep. 22.1). 
 
If, however, one‟s circumstances make the association with good men impossible, Seneca 
suggests one can also find assistance from great men of the past, men such as Cato, Scipio, or 
Laelius (Ep. 52.7-8; cf. 11.10; 25.6; Mans 1978:160; Edwards 1997:30).  
 
Elige eum, cuius tibi placuit et vita et oratio et ipse animum ante se ferens vultus; illum tibi semper 
ostende vel custodem vel exemplum. Opus est, inquam, aliquo, ad quem mores nostri se ipsi exigant. 
(Ep. 11.10) 
 
Choose someone, whose life, speech and face, which lets you see his soul, please you; always show 
him to yourself, either as guardian or as example. For we indeed need someone according to whom our 
character may adjust itself. 
 
In short, the benefit derived from having an experienced person as our moral advisor and role 
model is that we may learn from him by his guidance and by imitating his way of life. A second 
benefit, as will be shown below (4.4.4), is that he may also serve as witness of our actions. His 
mere presence will deter us from sinning. In Ep. 11.9, Seneca argues that “a large part of our sins 
is eliminated, if a witness stands near us when we are about to commit a sin” (magna pars 
peccatorum tollitur, si peccaturis testis assistit). 
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4.4.4 Live Like Someone Is Watching You 
 
Seneca explicitly warns Lucilius against the dangers of solitude for an unreformed person. After 
all “solitude persuades us to all kinds of evil” (omnia nobis mala solitudo persuadet; Ep. 25.5). 
Therefore, Seneca – actually quoting a saying by Epicurus on this point – advises Lucilius the 
following: 
 
Aliquis vir bonus nobis diligendus est ac semper ante oculos habendus, ut sic tamquam illo spectante 
vivamus et omnia tamquam illo vidente faciamus. (Ep 11.8; cf. 25.5-6) 
 
We must choose a good man and always have him before our eyes, so that we may live as if he were 
watching us and that we do all things as if he could see them. 
 
Even if we are not in the company of our moral advisor (be it a contemporary, whom we know 
personally, or a great philosopher from the past), the mere thought that he might observe our 
actions should deter us from sinning. 
 
Elsewhere Seneca suggests that Lucilius should imagine Seneca himself as present and 
scrutinizing his behaviour: “Live just as if I were sure to hear about what you are doing, or 
rather, as if I were sure to see it” (Sic vive, tamquam quid facias auditurus sim, immo tamquam 
visurus; Ep. 32.1; cf. Hadot 1969:174; Edwards 1997:30). 
 
In Ep. 25.5 Seneca says that it is enough, if we live as if anyone at all were able to observe our 
actions. We should be able to live, as it were, with our doors wide open at all times (Ep. 43.4; 
83.1; Arnold 1911:366; Holowchak 2008:101).  
 
In Ep. 83.1 Seneca takes the concept even further by saying that we should live as if there were 
someone who could not only observe our actions but even look into our innermost being. He 
then adds a religious aspect to this idea when he states that there is in fact someone who can do 
so – God. For “nothing is shut off from God. He is present in our souls and he comes between 
the midst of our thoughts” (nihil deo clusum est. interest animis nostris et cogitationibus mediis 
intervenit; Ep. 83.1). 
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4.4.5 Protect Yourself From Bad Influences 
 
Another recommendation that Seneca provides for one‟s moral improvement is to protect oneself 
from bad influences. Seneca warns Lucilius to avoid crowds especially (Ep. 7.1; cf. 32.2). If we 
associate with large crowds too many vices might become attractive to us: 
 
Inimica est multorum conversatio; nemo non aliquod nobis vitium aut commendat aut imprimit aut 
nescientibus allinit. Utique quo maior est populus cui miscemur, hoc periculi plus est (Ep. 7.2).  
 
Associating with a crowd is dangerous; there is no one who does not make some vice appealing to us 
or stamp or smear it on us without us even realizing it. Obviously the larger the crowd with which we 
mingle, the greater the danger. 
 
Crowds, warns Seneca, are especially dangerous for young people, since they are still very 
impressionable and easily side with the majority 36  (Ep. 7.6). We should therefore seek to 
associate with people that will make us a better person and people whom we ourselves might be 
able to improve (Ep 7.8), for one can also learn while teaching others37 (Ep. 7.8).  
 
One danger in trying to reform others is that one might be corrupted by those whom one wants to 
help (Ep. 29.4; Hadot 1969:171). When attempting to help others, one must make sure to protect 
oneself and not allow oneself to be dragged down to their level (Holowchak, 2008:98). And in 
any event, says Seneca, it is futile to try to help others, if they do not want to be helped (Ep.29.1; 
108.4; cf. Hadot 1969:171). 
 
 
  
                                                             
36 “A mind that is young and does not hold fast enough to what is right, must be withdrawn from the people; it easily 
crosses over to the many”; Subducendus populo est tener animus et parum tenax recti; facile transitur ad plures. 
(Ep. 7.6) 
37
 “People learn, while they teach”; homines, dum docent, discunt. (Ep. 7.8) 
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4.4.6 Embrace the Simple Life 
 
“To have enduring happiness, one must renounce all false goods and embrace virtue, and that is 
impossible to do if one‟s mind is continually distracted by the thought of possessing anything 
other than oneself. Hence, an apprentice will strive to live simply” (Holowchak 2008:161).  
 
There are several benefits that come with a simpler lifestyle. For one, you will have more free 
time to devote yourself to the study and practice of philosophy (Ep. 17.5-7). Philosophy, 
according to Seneca, should be our number one priority in life (Ep. 17.5). However, if we spend 
all our time and energy on satisfying our desires and on acquiring superfluous things that 
actually exceed our natural needs, the study and practice of philosophy always tends to come 
second (Ep. 17.5). Seneca actually goes as far as saying that we should even be prepared to 
endure hunger in order to pursue philosophy38 (Ep. 17.6). 
 
Another benefit of embracing a simpler life-style and occasionally even living in poverty is that 
one will be prepared for actual poverty (should one ever find oneself in that situation) and also 
stop fearing it (Ep. 18.5, 7; 20.12-3; 119.10; 123.13). Seneca therefore recommends the fol-
lowing: 
 
Interponas aliquot dies, quibus contentus minimo ac vilissimo cibo, dura atque horrida veste dicas tibi: 
“Hoc est quod timebatur?” (Ep. 18.5) 
 
Set aside some days, during which you will be content with very little of the plainest food, and a hard 
and rough garment, and ask yourself: “Is this what I feared?”  
 
When we have learned to adapt our lifestyle according to what nature demands, we will never 
feel poverty, nor be afraid of it: “but he, who appropriates himself to what Nature demands, is 
not only without sensation of poverty, but [also] without fear [thereof]”; (cf. at hic, qui se ad id, 
quod exigit natura, composuit, non tantum extra sensum est paupertatis, sed extra metum; Ep. 
119.10). 
                                                             
38 “Those hastening towards this, must even endure hunger”; Toleranda est enim ad hoc properantibus vel fames. 
(Ep. 17.6) 
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Lastly, practicing simple living will teach us to be satisfied with what we have and help us 
control our unbound desires (Ep. 69.2-4; 78.11; 123.13). Seneca illustrates this with the 
following analogy: 
 
Quemadmodum ei, qui amorem exuere conatur, evitanda est omnis admonitio dilecti corporis, nihil 
enim facilius quam amor recrudescit, ita qui deponere vult desideria rerum omnium, quarum cupiditate 
flagravit, et oculos et aures ab iis, quae reliquit, avertat. (Ep 69.3) 
 
In the same way as he who tries to put off love, must avoid every reminder of the beloved person – for 
nothing grows again as easily as love – so he, who wishes to lay down his wants of all the things for 
which he burned with desire, must turn away both eyes and ears from the things which he abandoned. 
 
Seneca is especially opposed to excessive wealth and regards it as the source of all evil (Ep. 
17.11; 110.14-15; cf. Rubin 1901:63). He therefore advises:  
 
In primis autem respuendae voluptates; enervant et effeminant et multum petunt, multum autem a 
fortuna petendum est. Deinde spernendae opes: auctoramenta sunt servitutum. Aurum et argentum et 
quidquid aliud felices domos onerat, relinquatur; non potest gratis constare libertas. Hanc si magno 
aestimas, omnia parvo aestimanda sunt. (Ep. 104.34) 
 
But first of all we must reject pleasures; they weaken us, make us womanish and make great demands, 
and we in turn must then make great demands of fortune. Secondly, we must scorn wealth: it is the 
wages of slavery. Gold and silver and whatever else adorns our prosperous houses, must be 
abandoned; freedom cannot cost us nothing. If you value it highly, you must value all other things 
little. 
 
Seneca does not go as far as saying that, in order to live a happy life one must confine oneself to 
a life of poverty. Conveniences need not be spurned entirely as they certainly have some positive 
value, but they should not be sought as if our happiness depends on them (Ep. 110.18; 
Holowchak 2008:161). It is simply a matter of training yourself to know when one has had one‟s 
fill (Holowchak 2008:161), and to know what is necessary (necessarium) and what is 
superfluous (supervacuum). “The things that are necessary will meet you everywhere; the things 
that are superfluous must constantly be searched for and with your whole mind” (Necessaria tibi 
ubique occurent; supervacua et semper et toto animo quaerenda sunt; Ep. 110.11). 
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Seneca thus advises that instead of following convention and the lifestyle of our peers, we must 
learn to measure all things according to the demands of nature (Ep. 119.13; cf. 16.7; 25.4; 94.68; 
123.6). What embracing a simpler lifestyle essentially means, Seneca sums up as follows: 
 
Hanc ergo sanam ac salubrem formam vitae tenete, ut corpori tantum indulgeatis quantum bonae 
valetudini satis est. Durius tractandum est, ne animo male pareat. Cibus famem sedet, potio sitim 
exstinguat, vestis arceat frigus, domus munimentum sit adversus infesta corporis. (Ep. 8.5) 
 
Therefore, hold on to this sound and wholesome plan of life, that you indulge the body only as much 
as is needed for good health. It needs to be treated rather harshly, so that it is not maliciously 
disobedient to your mind. Let food settle your hunger and let drink quench your thirst, let your 
clothing keep out the cold, and let your house be a defence against physical discomfort.   
 
Seneca has often been charged with hypocrisy on the grounds of the apparent incongruity 
between his high moral standards and his own vast wealth (Lawless 1994:5; Sellars 2006:12-3). 
Towards the end of his life, however, after he retired from his political career, he gave up a large 
part of his wealth and returned many of the gifts he had received from Nero (Lawless 1994:5). 
And also, in spite of his vast wealth, he always endeavoured to lead a moderate life, something 
he had learnt from his teacher Attalus (Ep. 108.14). In Ep. 108.15-16 we read about his 
moderation when it came to eating and drinking. He, for example, did not eat mushrooms or 
oysters, or other things that were considered delicacies. Seneca also avoided luxuries such as 
perfumes or going to public baths (Ep. 108.16). 
 
On the other hand, Seneca is also not afraid to admit his own shortcomings when it came to 
embracing a more modest lifestyle. In Ep. 87.4-5, for example, he describes travelling in a 
modest cart, one of many attempts to train himself to be content with a humble and simpler way 
of living, but he admits that he feels embarrassed to be seen by his peers (Edwards 1997:31). 
 
 
4.4.7 Anticipate Misfortune 
 
In times when things seem to be going well, a sudden advent of misfortune or merely the fear 
thereof poses a constant threat to our peace of mind and momentary feeling of contentment. In 
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order to prepare oneself for a sudden and unexpected turn of events and overcome fear of the 
future, Seneca recommends that one should practice anticipating all sorts of misfortunes (Ep. 
24.2; 91.4; 98.7; 99.32; 107.4; Hadot 1969:60-1, 126-7; Sorabji 2000:235; Holowchak 
2008:219). 
 
This practice goes back to the Pre-Socratic philosophers, most famously to Anaxagoras, but also 
possibly to Antiphon and the Pythagoreans (Sorabji 2000:235). Anticipating misfortunes 
involves not only imagining that they might eventually happen but preparing oneself that they 
most certainly will happen (Ep. 99.32; Hadot 1969:61). Nothing should be unexpected to us: 
 
Ideo nihil nobis inprovisum esse debet. In omnia praemittendus animus cogitandumque non quidquid 
solet, sed quicquid potest fieri. (Ep. 91.4) 
 
Therefore, nothing should be unexpected by us. The mind must be sent towards all things in advance 
and think on not whatever usually happens, but on whatever can happen. 
 
Elsewhere, Seneca says that we should “foresee whatever can be foreseen by planning. Observe 
and avoid, whatever is harmful, long before it happens” (Quidquid consilio prospici potest, 
prospice. Quodcumque laesurum est, multo ante quam accidat, speculare et averte; Ep. 98.7; cf. 
107.4). 
 
One benefit of anticipating misfortune is thus that we are fortified and better prepared for when it 
comes (Sorbaji 2000:278). But, what is more, it will also help us overcome our fear of 
misfortune.  In Ep. 24 Seneca advises Lucilius, who is worried about the outcome of a lawsuit 
(cf. Hadot 1969:126-7): 
 
si vis omnem sollicitudinem exuere, quicquid vereris ne eveniat, eventurum utique propone, et 
quodcumque est illud malum, tecum ipse metire ac timorem tuum taxa; intelleges profecto aut non 
magnum aut non longum esse, quod metuis. (Ep. 24.2) 
 
If you want to cast off all worry, suppose that whatever you fear might happen, will most certainly 
happen and whatever that evil may be, measure it within yourself and estimate your fear; you will 
without question realize that what you fear is neither great, nor long-lasting. 
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Instead of suppressing our fear of future misfortune, Seneca thus recommends, we should make 
our worries concrete, asking ourselves what is the worst thing that could possibly happen and 
whether it is really worth fearing. 
 
What seems to have been of particular interest to Seneca is the anticipation of death and 
overcoming one‟s fear thereof (Hadot 1969:129; Motto 1985:12). Seneca‟s preoccupation with 
death probably stems from the fact that he himself suffered from ill health throughout his life 
(Ep. 54.1-3, 6; 61.1; 65.1; 67.2; 78.1-4; 104.1) and that death was constantly on his mind (Ep. 
49.9-10; 54.7; 61.4; 93.6; cf. Motto 1973:187). 
 
Since death is the one aspect of human condition that is inescapable (Ep. 93.12; cf. 78.6), people 
should be prepared to meet it at any time (Ep. 26.7; cf. 4.9; 12.6; 30.16-7; 49.11; 63.15; 74.3; 
93.1-2; 99.22; 101.1, 6-7): 
 
Incertum est, quo loco te mors expectet; itaque tu illam omni loco expecta. (Ep. 26.7) 
 
It is uncertain in which place death awaits you; therefore, you be ready to expect it in every place. 
 
In several of his letters Seneca assures Lucilius that death is no evil (Ep. 30.6; 75.17; 82.9-16), 
that it is nothing to be feared (Ep. 4.3; 24.13; 36.12; 94.7; 120.18; cf. Rubin 1901:66) and that it 
is even foolish to fear it (Ep. 24.18; cf. Holowchak 2008:147). Death, says Seneca, is merely a 
state of non-existence exactly like the state we were in before we were born (Ep. 54.4-5) and, 
moreover, death is, in fact, something that happens every day (Ep. 1.2; 58.23; 120.18). 
 
As mentioned above (section 4.3.2), Seneca concedes that it is most natural to fear death, since 
we are all born with a love for our own existence and self-preservation (Ep. 82.15; cf. Rozelaar 
1976:447). Therefore, although we should know that death is something indifferent, it is not 
something that can easily be ignored (Ep. 36.8; 82.16; Rubin 1901:66; Hadot 1969:129; 
Holowchak 2008:146). Hence, “the soul must be hardened by great practice, so that it may 
endure its [i.e. death‟s] sight and approach” (magna exercitatione durandus est animus, ut 
conspectum eius accessumque patiatur; Ep. 82.16). 
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Again and again Seneca stresses the importance of thinking upon death (Ep. 26.8-10; 30.18; 
70.17; 82.8; 101.7-8). In Ep. 30.18, he writes: “You, however, must always think on death so 
that you may never fear it” (Tu tamen mortem ut numquam timeas, semper cogita.). 
 
Moreover, in Ep. 69.6, Seneca urges Lucilius to not only meditate on death but, if circumstances 
demand it, actually invite it (cf. Ep. 70.4). Seneca views the possibility of suicide as the ultimate 
pathway to freedom (Ep. 12.10; 26.10; 51.9; 70.14, 16; 77.14-5; cf. Rubin 1901:89-90; Motto 
1985:12; Sorabji 2000:214; Holowchak 2008:87).  
 
The Stoic view on suicide is generally a controversial issue but Seneca explains that a good life 
does not depend on how long we live, but on how correctly or virtuously we live (Ep. 49.10; 
93.2; 101.15). A wise man will thus live as long as he ought to, not as long as he can (Ep. 70.4; 
cf. 65.22; Holowchak 2008:147). However, Seneca stresses that only those oppressed by severe 
circumstances – e.g. lack of bare necessities of life (Ep. 17.9), extreme weakness in old age (Ep. 
30.2; 58.35) or if one suffers from an incurable disease (Ep. 58.36; 98.16) – can rightfully resort 
to ending their lives (Motto 1985:12; cf. Motto 1973:207). Sometimes, however, even if there are 
justified reasons for committing suicide, one should refrain from it, if the needs of one‟s friends 
or relatives require one to carry on living. In Ep. 78.2 Seneca describes how he himself had often 
entertained the thought of ending his life, but decided against it, for the sake of his father who 
might not have been able to bear the loss.  
 
Circumstances that are in no way considered justifiable motives for suicide are fear of death (Ep. 
24.23; 70.8), lust for death (Ep. 24.23) or mere boredom with life (Ep. 24.22, 24, 26) and people 
who commit suicide to escape the common ills of life or physical pain, are morally corrupt and 
weak; death under such circumstances is defeat39 (Ep. 58.36; Motto 1973:207; Motto 1985:12; 
Holowchak 2008:149).  
 
The general sentiment on suicide is, thus, that it is a sensible option, when the opportunities for 
living virtuously are severely diminished or quashed (Holowchak 2008:149) and refusing to take 
                                                             
39
 “To die in such a way is to be defeated”; sic mori vinci est. (Ep.58.36) 
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one‟s life under such circumstances is in fact, according to Seneca, a sign of weakness of 
character and cowardice (Ep. 117.22-4; Rubin 1901:90). 
 
 
4.4.8 Live in the Now 
 
[N]os et venturo torquemur et praeterito. Multa bona nostra nobis nocent, timoris enim tormentum 
memoria reducit, providentia anticipat. Nemo tantum praesentibus miser est. (Ep. 5.9) 
 
We torture ourselves over what is to come as well as what has passed. Many of our goods harm us, for 
memory brings back the torture of fear, foresight anticipates it. No one is unhappy only by present 
events. 
 
Seneca believes that much of our unhappiness is caused by spending too much time worrying 
about the future or holding on to past suffering, instead of living in the now. While Seneca 
recommends the anticipation of future misfortune for the sake of being better prepared for it 
when it happens (cf. section 4.4.7), he also warns Lucilius not to ruin the present by being 
unhappy already before the actual crisis comes (Ep. 13.5, 10; Ep. 24.1): 
 
Quid enim necesse est mala accersere, satis cito patienda cum venerint, praesumere, ac praesens 
tempus futuri metu perdere? Est sine dubio stultum, quia quandoque sis futurus miser, esse iam 
miserum. (Ep. 24.1) 
 
After all, why is it necessary to summon troubles which must be endured soon enough when they 
arrive, or to anticipate [them] and spoil the present time through fear of the future? It is without doubt 
foolish to be unhappy now because you might be unhappy sometime in the future. 
 
The same applies to the recollection of past sufferings. There is no point in being unhappy, just 
because once you were unhappy40 (Ep. 78.14).  
 
Circumcidenda ergo duo sunt, et futuri timor et veteris incommodi memoria; hoc ad me iam non 
pertinent, illud nondum. (Ep. 78.14) 
                                                             
40 “What help is it to draw back past sufferings and be unhappy, because you [once] were?”; Quid iuvat praeteritos 
dolores retractare et miserum esse, quia fueris? (Ep. 78.14) 
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Therefore, two things must be removed: both the fear of future troubles, and the recollection of old 
troubles; the one is no longer relevant to me, the other not yet. 
 
Closely coupled with fear of the future is hope of receiving something good from that direction; 
both are caused by the fact that we do not adapt ourselves to the present (Ep. 5.8). Just as we are 
not to fear the future, we are also not to pin our hopes on it and should in general avoid long-
term planning, as the future is guaranteed to no one (Ep. 5.7; 101.10; Sorabji 2000:235; 
Holowchak 2008:183). Seneca, therefore recommends that we should focus all our energies on 
the present (Ep. 1.2) and live each day as if it were our last (Ep. 101.10; cf. Sorabji 2000:235). 
 
The fleetingness of time is a theme already addressed in the very first letter and one to which 
Seneca repeatedly returns (Long 2006:371). As Seneca approaches the end of his life, he appears 
to be particularly preoccupied with this topic. Seneca says, time is the only thing that is truly 
ours (Ep. 1.3). We should therefore live in the now, make the best use of the time we have been 
given and not waste it by concerning ourselves too much with the future, or allowing ourselves 
to be tortured by the recollection of past suffering. 
 
4.5 Summary 
 
In this chapter it has been shown that Seneca stayed for the most part true to the core of 
traditional Stoic doctrines regarding the definition as well as the attainment of the telos. In his 
Epistulae Morales he explains that happiness, which is the final end (telos) and highest good 
(summum bonum) for all mankind, can be found in living according to nature which comes down 
to developing one‟s reason to a point of perfection and it is the same as living according to 
virtue. For the attainment of this goal Seneca especially advises the study and practice of 
philosophy, especially ethics, since it teaches people the correct conduct of living. The Stoics 
divided ethics into three sections, one dealing with the value of things, the second with impulses, 
and the third with actions. Seneca‟s treatment of these three sections (though it lacks some detail) 
also corresponds to the orthodox Stoic account. 
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The final section of this chapter is a discussion of some requirements and recommendations 
Seneca presents in his letters on how this theoretical knowledge might be applied in practice. 
According to him, what is essential to anyone wanting to attain a happy life is the continuous 
engagement in philosophy and the ability to recognize one‟s faults and a willingness to change 
them. Seneca also recommends that one must find a moral advisor that can act as a guardian and 
role model. Next he says, one must live like someone is watching at all times, and also protect 
oneself from bad influences. Another advice Seneca offers is that one should embrace a simple 
life-style and at times even practice poverty in order to have more time to study philosophy, and 
so that one may be better prepared for actual poverty and also eliminate one‟s fear thereof. 
Another recommendation Senca gives for the elimination of the fear of future misfortunes is to 
anticipate the worst. And lastly, he encourages his reader to live in the present and not waste any 
time by letting oneself being upset by the recollection of past sufferings or the fear of future 
sufferings. 
 
This is by no means a complete list of the advice Seneca has to offer in the Epistulae Morales, 
but merely a collection of some significant recurring themes found throughout these letters. The 
informal and conversational style of his admonitions is an effective way to transfer knowledge 
and to inspire his reader to apply these in real life. Moreover, the timelessness of the issues he 
addresses makes Seneca‟s letters extremely valuable even to this day. 
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Conclusion 
 
This study investigated how Seneca presents the Stoic telos (i.e. happiness) and the requirements 
to attain it in his Epistulae Morales and sought to show that he managed to make this telos, 
which is often accused of being too rigid and idealistic to be attained in practice, more accessible 
without compromising orthodox Stoic teachings. Although there is already a large amount of 
secondary literature available on Seneca‟s treatment of Stoic ethics as well as the Epistulae 
Morales, there has not yet been such a structured investigation of the Stoic telos in Seneca‟s 
letters and the advice he offers with a view on getting closer to living a happy life. The objective 
of this study is then to contribute towards the existing collection of literature regarding Stoic 
ethics in Seneca‟s Epistulae Morales.  
 
Before proceeding to the analysis of Seneca‟s Epistulae Morales in Chapter 4, I provided a brief 
historical overview of the Stoic school as a whole (Chapter 1) and then took a closer look at the 
traditional Stoic teachings regarding the definition of the telos (Chapter 2) and the theoretical 
framework the Stoics drew up for the attainment thereof (Chapter 3).  
 
From insight gained by the research presented in these chapters, I was able to judge the 
orthodoxy of Seneca‟s own presentation of the Stoic telos and ethical theory in his Epistulae 
Morales. The detailed analysis of Seneca‟s letters in the last section allowed me to come to the 
conclusion that he in essence stayed true to the fundamental Stoic doctrines regarding the 
definition as well as the attainment of the telos. It has also been argued that Seneca‟s main intent 
was not to expound specific philosophical doctrines, but to present the Stoic view of life in a way 
that would also appeal to ordinary people. And so, what was most important to him was that the 
knowledge gained from studying philosophy could be applied in practice and would help people 
to get closer to living a happy life. The final section of the chapter discusses some of the 
practical advice Seneca has to offer and it is argued that by the informal and conversational style 
of his admonitions he successfully managed to make Stoic philosophy more personal and 
humane and inspire his reader to want to apply his advice in real life. 
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Due to the universality and modernity of the issues addressed in these letters, the findings that 
have been made in this thesis, especially with regards to the practical advice Seneca offers (cf. 
Chapter 4), should be valuable to anyone living today. It is as though Seneca himself was already 
aware of the timelessness of his ideas and was confident to gain immortal fame, when he said, “I 
will find favour among later generations” (habebo apud posteros gratiam; Ep. 21.5; cf. 79.17).  
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